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THEIR CHARACTER AND THEIR FUNCTION 



IN THB 



Cognition of the Real and the Ideal. 



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Presented for the Degree of Ph. D. at the 
University of. Minnesota, 

By HENRY WEBB BREWSTER, A. B. 

1892. 



MINNEAPOLIS: 

THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, 

1893. 



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Copyrighted By 
HENRY WEBB BREWSTER, 

1893. 



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"A careful study of the various theories which have 
been held concerning sensation would be of as much inter- 
est and importance as an investigation of any one point 
in the range of philosophy. In the theory of a philoso- 
pher about sensation we have the reflex of his funda- 
mental category and the clew to his further doctrine. 
Sensation stands on the border-line between the world of 
nature and the realm of soul ; and every advance in sci- 
ence, every development of philosophy, leaves its impress 
in a charge in the theory of sensation." 

Dewey 1 s Leibniz, p. 87. 

"Only some form of Monism that shall satisfy the 
Tacts and truths to which both Realism and Idealism ap- 
peal can occupy the place of true and final philosophy. 
. Some form of Monism which shall incorporate 
both Realism and Idealism is, therefore, at present, the in- 
telligent and avowed aim of philosophy. The tendency of 
modern thought toward a form of speculative thinking 
that is a 'Real -Idealism' or an 'Ideal -Realism,' is un- 
mistakable." 

Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 407-8. 



V<? 



CONTENTS. 



Introductory Remarks - 7-8 

BOOK I. 

Analysis of Sensation and Intellection - - 9-95 

PART I —Historical Review - - - 11-42 
Chapter I. — Preliminary Outline - - 11-13 
Chapter II— The Nature of Intellection 11-21 
Chapter III.— Tub Sensational Theory 

of Sensation 22-32 

Chapter IV.— The Component Theory of 

Sensation - 33-37 

Chapter V.— The Correlative Theory 

of Sensation - 38-42 

PART II —Critical Analysis - 43-82 

Chapter J.— Critical Analysis of Intel- 
lection ------ 43-58 

Chapter II— Critical Analysis of the 

Sensational Theory - 59-67 

Chapter III— Critical Analysis of the 

Component Theory - 68-73 

Chapter IV. — Critical Analysis of the 

Correlative Theory - 74-82 

PART III -Physical Conditions of Sensation 83-95 

Chapter I. — Preliminary Outline - 83-86 

Chapter II.— Analysis of the Senses - 87-91 
Chapter III.— Modifying Conditions - 92-95 



BOOK II. 



Cognition of the Real and the Ideal - 97-161 

PART I —The Real. - 99-136 

Chapter I. — Distinction Between the 

Real and the Ideal - - - 99-100 

Chapter II— Cognition of Matter, 

Mind, and Force - 101-103 

Chapter III— Perception of Space 104-136 

Chapter IV.— Perception of Time - 137-151 

PART II. -The Ideal. ... - 152-61 

Chapter I. — The Good, the Beautiful, 

and the True 152-9 

Chapter II— The Ideal- Real - - 160-1 

Index 162-4 



INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 



The ambiguous use of technical terms is a great hin- 
drance to the advance of any science, and psychology 
seems to suffer more in this respect than any other. 
Dr. Ward, in his article in the.Ency. Brit., puts it none too 
strongly when he says that "it seems to be the fate of 
this science to be restricted in its terminology to the ill- 
defined and well-worn currency of common speech, with 
which every psychologist feels at liberty to do what seems 
right in his own eyes, at least within the wide range 
which a loose connotation allows.'' In no case is this 
ambiguity greater or more confusing than in the use of 
the term sensation. Sensation and intellection are funda- 
mental characteristics of every stage, process, or content 
of human consciousness ; yet the definition of neither can 
be found clearly stated in psychological literature. The 
necessity of precise definitions has, of course, been recog- 
nized, and repeated attempts have been made to give 
them ; but the definitions have varied with each success- 
ive writer, who has generally, since the time of Locke, re- 
stricted the scope of the term sensation and broadened 
that of intellection. In this way the term sensation has 
been successively narrowed in meaning from Berkeley's 
sweeping inclusion of "the sun, moon, and stars, and 
every other object of the senses," down through Hamil- 
ton's "subject-object" and J. S. Mill's "signs of Perma- 
nent Possibilities," to Herbert Spencer's unconscious 
"nervous shock," or "ultimate unit of consciousness." 
And finally, T. H. Green argues that neither sensation nor 
intellection can have any meaning taken separately ; but 
that, on the contrary, they are "inseparable and mutually 
dependent," and "each in its full reality includes the 
other." 



The term sensation being still used in many of these 
different senses, it becomes highly important to determine 
the number of essentially different views held concerning 
its nature, and the relation of these views to one another. 
In analyzing the nature and relation of sensation and in- 
tellection, it is necessary to discuss the relation of the 
relative and the absolute to the ideal and the real; 
and in setting forth their functions, it is necessary to 
set forth the distinction between the ideal and the real, 
in order to show either the correspondence of the primary 
sub-divisions of each to the fundamental intellectual fac- 
ulties, or the function of each of these faculties in cogni- 
tion. Book I. of this thesis gives an analysis of sensa- 
tion and intellection, defines each, and determines the re- 
lation of each to the other and to consciousness as a 
whole. Book II. discusses the distinction between the 
ideal and the real, the correspondence of the primary sub- 
divisions of each to the fundamental intellectual, faculties, 
and the function of sensation and intellection in the cog- 
nition of each. 



BOOK I. 

Analysis of Sensation and Intellection. 



PART I. 
Historical Review. 



CHAPTER I. 
Preliminary Outline. 

The attempt to distinguish between intellect and sense 
grew out of efforts to discover and explain the relation 
between identity and change. In all efforts to explain 
change by referring it as an effect to some fixed identity 
as a cause, there has been a general tendenc}' to refer 
change as phenomenal, wholly or in part, to an origin in 
the consciousness of the perceiving subject; and this refer- 
ence is the basis of most theories regarding the nature of 
sensation. On the other hand, the fixed identit/y, which 
is supposed to be causally related to change, is usually 
postulated as a substance existing independent of con- 
sciousness; and the faculty hy which this is cognized is 
termed intellect, the function of which is intellection. 
While this association of sense with the perception of 
change and of intellect with the cosrnition of identitv has 
formed the basis of all distinctions between sensation and 
intellection, the real nature of this distinction seems never 
to have been clearly stated. 

Parmenides appears to have been the first to distinguish 
between reason and sense. He regarded reason as the 
source of the knowledge of reality, and sense as the source 
of the illusory appearance of change. Plato further em- 
phasized the distinction made by Parmenides, giving to 
intellectual cognition the name yvdtats and to sense-per- 
ception the name tfiirihqets, Aristotle restored unity to 
these divorced aspects of sentience by making them sup- 
plementary factors of one process, instead of two conflict- 
ing processes. Since Aristotle's time, philosophers have 



12 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— HISTORICAL. 

generally overlooked the correlative nature of these two 
aspects of consciousness, and represented them as two 
separate activities. By some writers they have been rep- 
resented as of equal importance; and b} r others each has 
been represented as of sole importance. The distinction 
between intellectual perception and sense-perception, how- 
ever, has gradually been changed into a distinction be- 
tween intellect and sense, and this again into a distinction 
between intellection and sensation. In tracing the history 
of the distinctions made between these two contrasted 
terms it will be both easier and clearer to follow in con- 
nected sequence the treatment of each separately. It will 
also be much clearer to trace fully the history of each, be- 
fore giving a critical analysis of the same, than it would 
to mingle history and criticism together. In order clearly 
to set forth the correlative theory of sensation it is necessary 
first to analyze the nature of intellection, hence the two 
terms, sensation and intellection, will be treated in an or- 
der the reverse of that in which they appear in the title. 

The names of the writers most prominently associated 
with the treatment of intellection are Descartes, Geulincx, 
Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, 
Hegel, and Herbart; and the treatment of the subject by 
them in successive order has been that of a continuous 
development. The treatment of sensation, on the other 
hand, is marked by the development of three essentially 
different views. The first theory developed identifies 
sense-perception, either entirely or in part, with sensation; 
and hence may appropriately be called the Sensational 
Theory. It has appeared in three distinct forms. The 
first form, which identifies sense-perception in its entirety 
with sensation, was supported by Hobbes, Locke, Berke- 
ley and Hume. The second form, which identified sensa- 
tion with a sub-division of sense-perception, the peiception 
of so-called svibjective percepts, has been supported by 
many writers, prominent among whom are Reid, Hamil- 
ton, J. S. Mill, Lotze, Murray and Sully. The third form, 
which identifies sensation with the incipient stages of 
sense-perception, originated with Fichte; but has been re- 



PRELIMINARY OUTLINE. 13 

cently supported by Ward and James. The second theory 
developed reduces sensation to the subordinate rank of a 
component element in sense-perception; and hence may 
appropriately be called the Component Theory. It has 
appeared in two distinct forms. The first form, which re- 
duced sensation to the formless matter of sense-perception, 
originated with Kant and was supported by Reinhold. 
The second form, which regards sensations as ultimate 
units of consciousness, separately unconscious, has been 
supported by many writers, conspicuous!}' by Spencer, 
Lewes, and Fick. The third theory, the last to be devel- 
oped, has never been definitely formulated; but as it denies 
any separate existence to either sensation or intellection 
and claims that each includes the other, it may appropri- 
ately be called the Correlative Theory. It originated with 
Green, has been more fully developed by Dewey, and is 
supported by Ladd. Each of these three principal theories 
will be made the subject of a separate chapter in both the 
historical review and the critical analvsis of sensation. 



CHAPTER II. 

The Nature of Intellection. 

Modern writers, as was stated on p. 7, have shown a 
general tendency to widen the meaning of the term intel- 
lection at the expense of the term sensation, yet different 
theories of the former, corresponding to those of the lat- 
ter, have not appeared. In fact, intellection seems never 
to have been precisely defined by psychologists. It has 
been alluded to, on p. 11, as the funcion of the intellect; 
but just what this function is, can best be shown after 
both intellection and sensation have been analyzed, since 
the distinction between the two enters into the definition 
of each. In general, however, intellection may be said to 
include the fundamental principles of finite knowledge, the 
primary laws resting upon them, and the universal pro- 
cesses of thought governed by these laws. The disclosure 
of these principles, laws and processes has progressed 
from the particular to the general; and hence it will be 
easier to analyze and define them in their historical order. 

Socrates led the way in the discovery that universal 
processes of thought dominate every individual con- 
sciousness in every field of thought. Before his time such 
processes had been recognized in the subject of mathe- 
matics, but he disclosed their presence also in the defining 
of concepts and in the field of morals. 

Plato made the first attempt to systematize universal 
processes of thought, and to set forth their relations to 
objects of sense. But inasmuch as he regarded change as 
belonging to the individual objects of sense-percep- 
tion, he held all universals to be unchangeable 
entities existing independent of consciousness; and 



THE NATURE OF INTELLECTION. 15 

hence his system of ideas, although each was sup- 
posed to sustain a generic relation to a multitude of 
sensible objects, were indefinable and incapable either of 
enumeration or of classification among themselves. Had 
Plato understood the nature of his problem, had he 
realized that he was dealing with universal processes of 
thought instead of unchangeable things, he doubtless 
would have perceived that the universal aspect of con- 
sciousness, or intellect, could have no meaning or exist- 
ence except in connection with the variable aspect, or 
sense. But failing to perceive this, he discarded sense-per- 
ception as deceptive; and thus reduced universal processes 
of thought to mere abstractions, and rendered the classi- 
fication of sense-objects meaningless. 

Aristotle again restored unity to consciousness by 
uniting the functions of sense and intellect in every activi- 
ty of thought. This enabled him to systematize a classi- 
fication of generic and specific names for objects of sense 
and to adapt this classification to the variable inductions 
of individual experience. 

Another advance which he made upon Plato was his 
definite enumeration of the categories, or universal pro- 
cesses of thought. And his distinct recognition, in oppo- 
sition to Plato, of the validity of the data of sense-per- 
ception, further showed itself in the fact that his list of 
categories, viz., substance, quantity, quality, relation, 
where, when, action, passion and possession, includes sev- 
eral in which the sensational element is prominent. 

A third and most important advance made by Aris- 
totle was the formulation of the law of identity and con- 
tradiction. From the fact that his system of classifica- 
tion was perfectly adapted both to sense-objects and to 
the quantitative relations of pure-mathematics, and from 
the further fact that the law of identity and contra- 
diction applied equally to both, Aristotle failed to dis- 
tinguish between empirical and a priori judgments. This 
necessarily led him somewhat astray in regard to both. 
His treatment of a judgment as the inclusion of a minor 



16 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

term in a major does not strictly appb r to inductions of 
experience; and, on the other hand, the law of identity 
and contradiction applies to a priori judgments onry 
when they express mathematical relations. 

Descartes, in modern times, took a more advanced 
position, when he made the conscious ego the basis of all 
certitude in thought. This makes the conscious self a cor- 
relate of every object of thought; yet Descartes so far 
failed to see this that he set up an antithesis of spirit and 
matter, making thought an attribute of spirit, and exten- 
sion an attribute of matter independent of thought. 
From Descartes' classification of ideas into fictse, adven- 
titial, and innatia?, the theory of innate ideas originated; 
and in this theory the categories assumed the character 
of innate ideas. 

Geulincx, in his doctrine of occasionalism, caught ob- 
scurely an important principle, which is an advance upon 
Aristotle's reference of all phenomena to an origin in an 
unmoved cause of motion. This advance consisted in 
making human consciousness an intermediate «agency be- 
tween infinite consciousness and the origin of phenomena. 
Geulincx, however, reversed the true logical order by rep- 
resenting human consciousness as the originating source, 
and infinite consciousness as the medium of expression. 

Malebranche corrects this position in two respects. 
He made human consciousness intermediate between in- 
finite consciousness and phenomena, and he also repre- 
sented the manifestations of conscious activity as gov- 
erned b\ r fixed laws instead of by occasional impulses. 

Spinoza showed bv his method of reasoning from the 
finite to the infinite that he consciously transcended the 
law of identity and contradiction, and grasped the prin- 
ciples underlying two other primary laws of thought, one 
governing the use of strict correlatives, and the other 
restricting the application of categories when they come 
into mutual conflict. His conception of the infinite was in- 
compatible with his conception of an efficient cause, for the 
latter implied and the former precluded temporal limita- 
tions. Spinoza therefore discarded the category of cans- 



THE NATURE OF INTELLECTION. 17 

alit\ T , and reasoned to the infinite from the finite through 
the principle of correlativity. Had he, however, compre- 
hended the nature of this correlation, as affected by Des^ 
cartes' reference of all objects of thought to the conscious 
ego as a correlate, he never would have made thought an 
attribute of substance, but would have made substance a 
category of thought. 

Leibniz did philosophy a great service by counteract- 
ing the pantheistic tendency which Spinoza's doctrine of 
substance had given it. Having rejected Spinoza's con- 
clusion, Leibniz naturally rejected his method of reason- 
ing also; but feeling the inadequacy of the principle of 
causality, he sought a better one in what he termed the 
"principle of sufficient reason," "principium rationis suffi- 
cientis." This principle has never been defined otherwise 
than as "necessity in thought;" but as necessity in 
thought comes only through the law of identity or the 
law of correlation, it must come under one of these laws. 
As the principle of sufficient reason is usually employed, it 
is the same as that of correlativity. Leibniz' monad- 
ology, although full of inconsistencies, has done much to 
maintain the view that finite consciousness is character- 
ized by individuality and spontaneity^. 

Contemporaneous with this last group of writers, to 
whom we are greath^ indebted for the elucidation of the 
principles of intellection, was a class of sensational writ- 
ers, whose work, even though it held to the principle 
"Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensn" 
greatly helped to bring to the front the laws and prin- 
ciples of intellection. Thus, Locke really rendered an im- 
portant service to the intellectualists by his pol- 
emic against innate ideas. Hume's challenge con- 
cerning the principle of causality but forced them 
to a new and an important advance. From the 
sensational standpoint, the category of causality must 
either come through the senses or be an illusory fiction ; 
yet Hume proved that it could not come through the 
senses. The intellectualists then had to give a satisfactory 
account of it, or surrender it as illusorv. To surrender it 



18 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— HISTORICAL. 

was to surrender all claim to either science or philosophy. 
Hume's challenge met a master intellect in Kant, who not 
only gave a satisfactory account of the origin of the cate- 
gory of causality, but also disclosed the fundamental fal- 
lacies of sensationalism. 

Kant successfully terminated the long-continued effort 
to discover the origin of necessary ideas, by showing that 
they are the product of universal processes of thought. 
Profiting by Locke's polemic against innate ideas, he 
states that "they admit, if separated from sensibility, of 
no use at all ; that is, they cannot be applied to any pos- 
sible object, and are nothing but the pure form of the use 
of the understanding with reference to objects in gen- 
eral." 1 In answer to Hume's sensationalism, he shows 
that all experience must be organically related to a "unit\- 
of apperception;" and that this organic unification re- 
quires, possesses, and discloses universal and invariable 
processes of thought. These universal processes of 
thought are the categories, with the use of which he con- 
nected "the concept, or, if the term be preferred, the judg- 
ment, ' I think,' " which he styled "the vehicle of all con- 
cepts in general."- That Kant failed, however, to per- 
ceive the correlative nature of the categories is shown by 
his agreement with Aristotle on the application of the 
law of contradiction, by his first two groups of categor- 
ies, and D3 r his antinomies of pure reason. But that he 
perceived the necessity for some limitation of the cate- 
gories when they came into mutual conflict, is shown by 
his doctrine of phenomena and noumena. 

Fichte brought to attention the correlative nature 
of the universal processes of thought by showing that a 
category is a s\mthesis of two correlative opposites, and 
that each correlate included as well as excluded the other. 
He failed, however, to perceive the full force of the correla- 
tive principle, and represented a pair of correlates as in- 
clusive onh* in part and as exclusive only in so far as they 
were not inclusive. This is shown in his treatment of 

1 "Critique of Pure Reason," Max Mueller's Translation, p. "JIG. 

2 id. p. 297. 



THE NATURE OF INTELLECTION. 19 

limitation. Instead of reconciling the ego and the non- 
ego in a correlative unity, he reduced the non-ego to a 
mere limitation of the ego ; and since Kant had disclosed 
the universal aspect of all processes of thought, Fichte 
sublated the non-ego in the ego, and the individual^ of 
the ego in its universality, and so ended with a universal 
pantheism of an idealistic nature. 

He thus confused the principle of correlativity, which 
underlies the law of correlation, with the principle of rela- 
tivity, which underlies the law of contradiction. In ac- 
cordance with the law of contradiction, all sense objects 
and all quantitative terms of pure mathematics can be 
classified into genera and species, each genus including 
several mutually excluding species. But neither the in- 
clusion nor the exclusion of a pair of correlates under the 
law of correlation is of this quantitative nature. This 
can be illustrated by means of a line drawn, for instance, 
north and south. In accordance with the law of contra- 
diction, the two ends may be said each to include half of 
the line, and both to mutually exclude each other. In ac- 
cordance with the law of correlation, however, neither the 
inclusion nor the exclusion has a quantitative significa- 
tion ; but the mutually including and excluding terms are 
simply opposed aspects of a unit}', which is quantitatively 
indivisible in so far as it is characterized by these terms. 
Thus, if the north half of the line were erased there would 
still remain a line with both a north end and a south end ; 
and if the erasing were continued, this would remain true 
until the line wholly disappeared, when the correlative as- 
pects would vanish together. Applying this illustration 
to the relation of the ego and the non-ego ; it will be seen 
that the two are, not quantitative divisions, but correla- 
tive aspects of finite consciousness; and that while each, 
from a separate point of view, excludes the other, both 
are mutually dependent and inseparable aspects of an in- 
divisible unity. 

Schelling, realizing Fichte's failure correctly to set 
forth the principle of correlative, attempted to remedy 
the error by reducing the opposition between correlative 



20 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

opposites to a complete indifference. But his total indif- 
ference of subject and object, which received the name of 
"System of Identity," instead of explaining the principle 
of correlativity, annihilated it. 

Hegel set forth the principle of correlativity in its 
true nature, except that, instead of representing each 
category as a unit}' of two correlates, he included a trans- 
itional mean between them, and thus grouped his cate- 
gories in threes. In applying the principle of correlativity 
to his doctrine of the absolute, Hegel very naturally car- 
ried it too far, and held "that the Absolute, or Reason, is 
the unity of subjectivit/y and objectivity;" 1 also "that the 
common consciousness can demand that a ladder be fur- 
nished it upon which it can ascend to the absolute stand- 
point." 2 These statements violate the law of thought 
which governs the use of categories when they come into 
mutual conflict, as they do when applied to the infinite. 
Finite reason may properh' be called the "unity of sub- 
jectivity and objectivity"; but absolute reason transcends 
such qualifications, except as they refer, not to the infin- 
ite in itself, but merely to the aspects which it assumes in 
finite cognition. Again, while "the common consciousness 
can" comprehend the correlative relation of the finite to 
the infinite, it never "can ascend to the absolute stand- 
point." 

Herbart perceived the nature of this law governing 
the mutual conflict of categories, and also Hegel's viola- 
tion of it; but instead of formulating the law and defining 
the principle on which it rests, he meiely indicated its 
nature hy referring to all conflicting aspects of the infinite 
as "accidental views" (Erdmann), or "contingent as- 
pects" (Schwegler). Had Herbart accepted Hegel's prin- 
ciple of correlativity and modified his doctrine of "acci- 
dental views" accordingly, he might have made a great 
advance; but in rejecting the principle of correlativity and 
in applying the law of contradiction to all processes of 

1 Erdmann's His. of Phil., Vol. II, p. 687. 

2 id. p. 684. 



THE NATURE OF INTELLECTION. 



21 



doctrine of "reals' 



pi; 



thought, he reduced 1 
abstractions. 

A summary of the analysis of intellection gives two 
fundamental principles determining the character of finite 
knowledge, and three primary laws governing the pro- 
cesses of thought. The principle first disclosed is that of 
relativity, which has taken two distinct forms underlying 
two corresponding laws of thought, the law of contra- 
diction, which was formulated b} 7 Aristotle, and the law r 
of mutual limitation, which was developed by Herbartbut 
not formulated by him. The second principle is that of 
correlativity, underlying the law of correlation. This 
principle was disclosed by Fichte and developed by Hegel, 
but the law resting upon it has never been formulated. 
The deduction and definition of the universal processes of 
thought can best be given in the critical analysis of intel- 
lection, after various attempts at their deduction have 
been criticised; also, the further definition of the funda- 
mental principles of knowledge and the corresponding 
primary laws of thought can best be given after the cate- 
gories have been defined and classified. 



CHAPTER III. 
Sensational Theory of Sensation. 

§1. Sensation as Sense-Perception. — This view origin- 
ated with Hobbes, was formulated by Locke, and was 
supported by Berkeley and Hume. Hume, however, re- 
stricted the definition of sensation slightly, and so led the 
way to the second form of this theory. 

Hobbes defines sense as follows: — "Concerning the 
thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly, and 
afterwards in train, or dependence upon one another. 
Singly, they are everyone a representative or appearance, 
of some quality, or other accident of a body without us; 
which is commonly called an object. Which object work- 
eth on the eves, ears, and other parts of man's body; and 
by diversity of workings, produceth diversity of appear- 
ances. * * * The original of them all, is that which we 
call sense (For there is no conception in man's mind, 
which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begot- 
ten upon the organs of sense.); the rest are derived from 
that original. * * * The cause of sense, is the external 
body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each 
sense, either immediately, as in taste and touch; or 
mediately, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pres- 
sure, by the mediation of nerves, and other strings, and 
membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain, 
and heart, causeth there a resistence, or counter-pressure, 
or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself; which endeav- 
our, because outward, seemeth to be somematter without. 
And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense. 
* * * But when we would express the decay, and signify 
that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. 



THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. 23 

So that imagination and memory, are but one thing, 
which for divers considerations hath divers names." 1 

Locke defines sensation, and distinguishes between it 
and reflection, as follows: — "First, our senses, conversant 
about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind 
several distinct perceptions of things, according to those 
various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And 
thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, 
heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which 
we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses con- 
vey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects con- 
vey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. 
This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending 
wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the un- 
derstanding, I call sensation. * * * Secondly, the other 
fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understand- 
ing with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our 
own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it 
has got ;which operations, when the soul comes to reflect 
on and consider, do furnish the understanding with 
another set of ideas, which could not be had from things 
without; and such are perception, thinking; doubting, be- 
lieving, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different 
actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, 
and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our 
understanding as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies af- 
fecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has 
wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having 
nothing to do with external objects, yet is very like it, 
and might properly enough be called internal sense. But 
as I call the other sensation, so I call this reflection, the 
ideas it affords being such only as the the mind gets by re- 
flecting on its own operations within itself." 

Berkeley agreed with Locke in identifying sensation 
with sense-perception; but he tried, by representing sensa- 
tion as an active function of the mind, to avoid the ab- 
surdity of representing extended objects as being im- 

1 "The Leviathan." Part I, Chapters I and II. 

2 "Essay Concerning Human Understanding." Book II, Chap. I, §§ 3 and 4. 



24 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— HISTORICAL. 

pressed upon the non-extended mind in sense-perception. 
His great mistake consisted in overlooking tKe distinc- 
tion between the individual variability- of sensation and 
the universal invariability- of intellection. Berkeley re- 
duced all knowledge to a sensational basis, and thus vir- 
tually committed philosophy- to the scepticism disclosed 
by Hume. Berkeley 's views are clearly expressed in the 
following quotations: "Did men but consider that the 
sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, 
are only so many sensations in their minds, which have 
no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless 
they would never fall down and worship their own ideas; 
but rather address their homage to that eternal invisible 
Mind which produces and sustains all things." 1 "In 
short, let any one consider those arguments, which are 
thought manifesth- to prove that colours and tastes exist 
only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal 
force, be brought to prove the same thing of extension, 
figure, and motion." 2 

Hume states this view of sensation in the following 
words: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve 
themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call im- 
pressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists 
in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they 
strike upon the mind, and make their way into our 
thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter 
with the most force and violence, we may name impres- 
sions; and under this name, I comprehend all our sensa- 
tions, passions and emotions, as they make their first ap- 
pearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of 
these in thinking and reasoning ; such as, for instance, are 
all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, ex- 
cepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, 
and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it 
may occasion." 3 "Impressions may be divided into two 
kinds, those of sensation and those of reflection. The 

1 "Principles of Human Knowledge," Part I., Sec. 94. 

2 id. Sec. 15. 

3 "Treatise on Human Nature," Green & Grose's Ed. p. 311. 



THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. 25 

first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown 
causes. The second is derived in a great measure from 
our ideas, and that in the following order. An impres- 
sion first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive 
heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some 
kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken 
by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; 
and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, 
when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impres- 
sions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may 
properly be called impressions of reflection, because de- 
rived from it." 1 "As to those impressions, which arise 
from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, per- 
fectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be 
impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise 
immediately from the object, or are produced by the cre- 
ative power of the mind, or are derived from the author 
of our being." - 

§2. Sensations as Subjective Affections. — Thomas Reid 
originated the view which identifies sensation with sense- 
perception, when the latter is regarded as a mere affection 
of the perceiving subject abstracted from all reference to 
physical causes. The following are his own statements: — 
" Sensation is a name given by philosophers to an act of 
mind, which may be distinguished from all others by this, 
that it hath no object distinct from the act itself. Pain of 
every kind is an uneasy sensation. " 3 "Almost all our per- 
ceptions have corresponding sensations which constantly 
accompany them, and, on that account, are very apt to 
be confounded with them. * * * Hence it happens, that 
a quality perceived, and the sensation corresponding to 
that perception, often go under the same name. This 
makes the names of most of our sensations ambiguous. 
* When I smell a rose, there is in this operation 
both sensation and perception. The agreeable odor I 
feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external 

1 op. cit. pp. 316-7. 

2 id. p. 385. 

3 "Works of Thomas Reid," Hamilton's Ed., p. 229. 



26 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

object, is merely a sensation. * * * Observing that the 
agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and 
ceases when it is removed, I am led b}" my nature, to con- 
clude some quality to be in the rose, which is the cause of 
this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object per- 
ceived; and the act of my mind by which I have the con- 
viction and belief of this quality, is what in this case I call 
perception. But it is here to be observed, that 

the sensation I feel, and the quality in the rose which I 
perceive, are both called by the same name." 1 

Hamilton states this view very fulfy, and illustrates it 
with examples. The following quotations set forth his 
views: — "In Perception proper there is a higher energy of 
intelligence, than in Sensation proper. For though the 
latter be the apprehension of an affection of the Ego, and 
therefore, in a certain sort, the apprehension of an im- 
material quality; still it is only the apprehension of the 
fact of an organic passion; whereas the former, though 
supposing Sensation as its condition, and though only 
the apprehension of the attributes of a material Xon-ego, 
is, however, itself without corporeal passion, and, at the 
same time, the recognition not mereh* of a fact, but of re- 
lations." 2 "Sensation proper has no object but a subject- 
object, i. c, the organic affection of which we are con- 
scious. * * * Sensation proper, viewed on one side, is 
a passive affection of the organism; but viewed on the 
other, it is an active apperception, bv the mind, of that 
affection."^ "Aristotle's discrimination of the Common 
and Proper Sensibles or Percepts embodies not only the 
modern distinction of the Primary and Secondary Quali- 
ties of matter, but also the modern distinction of the two 
perceptions, Perception proper and Sensation proper." 4 
"Sensation proper and Perception proper were, however, 
even more strongly contra-distinguished in the system of 

1 op. eit. p. 310. 

2 O. W. Wight's "Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton," p. 419. 

3 id. pp. 421-2. 

4 id. p. 433. 



THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. 27 

the lower Platonists." 1 "In the Cartesian philosophy, 
the distinction was virtually taken by Descartes, but first 
discriminated in terms by his followers." 2 

J. S. Mill still further restricts the scope of the term 
sensation, as is shown by the following quotations: — "The 
thread of consciousness which I apprehend the sensation 
as a part of, is the subject of the sensation. The group of 
Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to which I refer it, 
and which is partially realized and actualized in it, is the 
object of the sensation. * * * We have no conception 
of either Subject or Object, either Mind or Matter, except 
as something to which we refer our sensations, and what- 
ever other feelings we are conscious of. The very existence 
of them both, so far as cognizable by us, consists only in 
the relation they respectively bear to our states of feel- 
ing. Their relation to each other is only the relation 
between those two relations. The immediate cor- 
relatives are not the pair, Object, Subject, but the two 
pairs, Object, Sensation objectively considered; Subject, 
Sensation subjectively considered. * * * The difference 
between these two classes of our sensations, answers to 
the distinction made by a majority of philosophers 
between the Primary and the Secondary Qualities of Mat- 
ter. * * * There are, however, some of our sensations, 
in our consciousness of which the reference to their Object 
does not play so conspicuous and predominant a part as 
in others. This is particularly the case with sensations 
which are highly interesting to us on their own account, 
and on which we willingly dwell, or w T hich by their inten- 
sity compel us to concentrate our attention on them. 
These are, of course, our pleasures and pains. 
Those of our sensations, on the contrary, which are al- 
most indifferent in themselves, our attention does not 
dwell on; our consciousness of them is too momentary to 
be distinct, and we pass on from them to the Permanent 
Possibilities of Sensation which they are the signs of, and 
which are alone of importance to us. We hardly notice 

1 op. cit. p. 434. 

2 id. p.. 435. 



28 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

the relation between these sensations and the subjective 
chain of consciousness of which they form so extremely 
insignificant a part, the sensation is hardly anything to 
us but the link which draws into consciousness a group of 
Permant Possibilities; this group is the only thing dis- 
tinctly present to our thoughts.'' 1 

LoTZE unites in sensations the characteristics assigned 
to them by both Hamilton and Mill. In his theor^v of 
"Local Signs" he asserts the existence of separate, non- 
spatial sensations in the soul, each of which has "a certain 
accessory impression' ' which acts as a sign to determine 
its spatial relations. His own statements are as follows: — 
"Many impressions exist conjointly in the soul, although 
not spatially side by side with one another; but they are 
merely together in the same way as the synchronous tones 
of a chord ; that is to say, qualitatively different, but not 
side by side with, above or below, one another. Notwith- 
standing, the mental presentation of a spatial order must 
be produced again from these impressions. The question 
is, therefore, in the first place, to be raised : How in gen- 
eral does the soul come to apprehend these impressions, 
not in the form in which they actually are — to-wit, non- 
spatial, — but as they arc not, in a spatial juxtaposition? 
„ .. ., Accordingly we conceive of this in the follow- 
ing way: Every impression of color r — for example, red — 
produces on all places of the retina, which it reaches, the 
same sensation of redness. In addition to this, however, 
it produces on each of these different places, a. b, c, a cer- 
tain accessory impression, o, .;, ;-, which is independent 
of the nature of the color seen, and dependent merely on 
the nature of the place excited. This second local impres- 
sion would therefore be associated with every impression 
of color r, in such manner that r a signifies a red that ae 
upon the point a, r ,' signifies the same red in ease it ac - 
upon the point b. These associated accessory impressio 
would, accordingly, render for the soul the clue, by follow- 
ing which it transposes the same red, now to one, now to 

1 "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy." Vol. I, pp. 264 



THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. 29 

another spot, or simultaneously to different spots in the 
space intuited by it." 3 

Murray makes sensations "elementary facts of mind ' 
that cannot be defined, yet that can be consciously felt 
and distinguished. The following is his own statement: 
"For sensations, being the simple elementarv facts of 
mind, cannot be defined or described by anything more 
simple or elementary. The onl\' way in which a sensation 
can be known is by being felt." 2 

Sully agrees with Murrav that a sensation is an "ele- 
mentary mental phenomenon" indefinable as it appears in 
consciousness, but definable as related to the physical con- 
ditions involved in its stimulation. He says: "A sensa- 
tion being an elementary mental phenomenon cannot be 
defined in terms of an3'thing more simple. Its meaning 
can only be indicated by a reference to the nervous pro- 
cess on which it is known to depend. Accordingly a sen- 
sation may be defined as a simple mental state resulting 
from the stimulation of the outer extremity of an incarry- 
ing nerve, when this stimulation has been transmitted to 
the brain centers." 3 

§ 3. Sensation as Incipient Sense-Perception. — Fichte 
originated this view of sensation, and, according to the 
following quotation from Erdmann, makes sensation an 
incipient stage of sense-perception: "Fichte has often 
confessed his 'boundless' respect for Maimon's genius, 
which gave the first impulse towards his theory of sensa- 
tion." 4 "The development begins with the very lowest step 
of that unconscious act of creation, that state in which in- 
telligence first discovers what is already, it is true, in 
itself, viz., sensation. This is taken as the state in which 
no distinction is as yet made between external and in- 
ternal sensation, and just as little between that which 
feels sensation and that which is felt as such. Inasmuch 
as the (centrifugal) ego transcends sensation, it dis- 



1 "Outlines of Psychology," Ladd's Translation, pp. 50-3. 

2 "Hand-book of Psychology," p. 30. 

3 "Teachers' Hand-Book of Psychology," p. 86. 

4 "History of Philosophy," vol ii, p, 483. 



30 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

tinguishes itself from it, and the latter thereby acquires a 
reference to something beyond itself." 1 

Dr. Ward identifies sensation with an incipient stage 
of presentation, in which "we are able to distinguish the 
conscious subject and the ' affection' of which it is con- 
scious." He also assigns to sensation "two 'aspects,' 
the one a ' sensible or intellectual ' or 4 qualitative, ' the 
other an 'affective' or 'emotive.'" His own statements 
are as follows : " The ordinary conception of a sensation 
coincides, no doubt, with the definition given by Hamil- 
ton and Mansel: 'Sensation proper is the consciousne-- 
of certain affections of our bod}' as an animated organ- 
ism ; ' and it is because in ordinary thinking we reckon 
the body as a part of self that we come to think of sen- 
sations as subjective modifications. But when considera- 
tions of method compel us to eliminate physiological im- 
plications from the ordinary conception of a sensation, 
we are able here to distinguish the conscious subject and 
the 'affections' of which it is conscious, as clearly as we 
can distinguish subject and object in other c <>t pn 

entation. * * * * Thus the further we go back tl 
nearer we approach to a total presentation having the 
character of one general continuum in which different 
are latent, * * # a certain objective continuum form- 
ing the background or basis to the several relatively c 1 
tinct presentations that are elaborated out of it. "Ac- 
cordingly all the more recent psycholog been 
driven by one means or another to recognize two 'as 
peets' (Bain), or 'properties' (Wundt), in what they call 
a sensation, the one a ' sensible or intellectual' or 'quali- 
tative,' the other an 'affective' or 'emotive; spect or 
property." 3 

Prof. James gives the latest, fullest and most definite 
account of this view, as the following quotations will 
show: "Sensation, then, so long- as we take the analytic 
point of view, differs from Perception only in the extreme 

l op. cit. p. 505. 

- Bncy. Brit., vol. xx., pp. 41-2. 

a id. p. 4-0. 



THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. 31 

simplicity of its object or content." 1 "Some persons will 
say that we never have a really simple object or content. 
My definition of sensation does not require the simplicity 
to be absolutely, but only relatively, extreme." 2 "As we 
can only think or talk about the relations of objects with 
which we have acquaintance already, we are forced to 
postulate a function in our thought whereby we first be- 
come aware of the bare immediate natures by which our 
several objects are distinguished. This function is sensa- 
tion." 3 "Sensations are the stable rock, the terminus a 
quo and the terminus ad quern of thought. To find such 
termini is our aim with all our theories — to conceive first 
when and where a certain sensation may be had, and then 
to have it. Finding it, stops discussion. Failure to find 
it kills the false conceit of knowledge. * * * Pure sen- 
sations can only be realized in the earliest days of life. 
They are all but impossible to adults with memories and 
stores of associations acquired. Prior to all impressions 
on sense-organs the brain is plunged in deep sleep and con- 
sciousness is practically non-existent. Even the first 
weeks after birth are passed in almost unbroken sleep by 
human infants. It takes a strong message from the sense- 
organs to break this* slumber. In a new born brain this 
gives rise to an absolutely pure sensation. * * * The 
£rst sensation -which an infant gets is for him the universe. 
And the universe which he later comes to know is nothing 
but an amplification and an implication of that first 
simple germ which, by accretion on the one hand and in- 
tussusception on the other, has grown so big and com- 
plex and articulate that its first estate isunrememberable. 
In his dumb awakening to the consciousness of something- 
there, a mere this as yet (or something for which even the 
term this would perhaps be too discriminative, and the 
intellectual, acknowledgement of which would be better 
expressed by the bare interjection ' lo ! ' ) , the infant en- 
counters an object in which (though it be given in a pure 



1 " Principles of Psychology," val. ii., pp. 1-2. 

2 id. p. 2, foot-note. 

3 id. p. 3. 



32 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

sensation) all the 'categories of the understanding' are 
contained. It has objectivity, unity, substantiality, caus- 
ality, in the full sense in which any later object or system 
of objects has these things" 1 

1 op. cit. pp. 7-8. 






CHAPTER IV. 

The Component Theory of Sensation. 

§1. Sensation as Formless Matter. — Kant's ideas, in 
which this view of sensation originated, are fairly set 
forth in the following quotations: — "Our knowledge 
springs from two fundamental sources of our soul; the 
first receives representations (receptivity of impressions), 
the second is the power of knowing an object by these 
representations (spontaneity of concepts). By the first 
an object is given us, by the second the object is thought, 
in relation to that representation which is a mere deter- 
mination of the soul. * * * We call sensibility the re- 
ceptivity of our soul, or its power of receiving repre- 
sentations whenever it is in any wise affected, while the 
understanding; on the contrar} r , is with us the power of 
producing representations, or the spontaniety of know- 
ledge." 1 "Both are either pure or empirical. They are 
empirical when sensation, presupposing the actual pres- 
ence of the object, is contained in it. They are pure when 
no sensation is mixed up with the representation. The 
latter may be called the material of sensuous knowledge." 2 
"In a phenomenon I call that which corresponds to the sen- 
sation its matter; but that which causes the manifold 
matter of the phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in 
a certain order, I call its form. Now it is clear that it can- 
not be sensation again through which sensations are ar- 
ranged and placed in certain forms. The matter only of 
all phenomena is given us a posteriori; but their form 
must be ready for them in the mind a priori, and must 
therefore be capable of being considered as separate from 



1 "Critique of Pure Reason," Max Mueller's Translation, pp. 44-5. 
d. p. 44. 



34 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— HISTORICAL. 

all sensations. I call all representations in which there is 
nothing that belongs to sensation, pure (in a transcen- 
dental sense). The pure form therefore of all sensuous in- 
tuitions, that form in which the manifold elements of the 
phenomenon are seen in a certain order, must be found 
in the mind a priori. And this pure form of sen- 
sibility may be called the pure intuition. 
In the course of this investigation it will appear that 
there are, as principles of a priori knowledge, two pure 
forms of sensuous intuition, namely, Space and Time" 1 
"It cannot be denied that phenomena may be given in in- 
tuition without, the functions of the understanding. 
* * For we could quite well imagine that phenomena 
might possibly be such that the understanding should not 
find them conforming to the conditions of its synthetical 
unity, and all might be in such confusion that nothii 
should appear in the succession of phenomena which 
could supply a rule of synthesis, and correspond, for in- 
stance, to the concept of cause and effect, so that this con- 
cept would thus be quite empt\', null and meaningless. 
With all this, phenomena would offer objects to our intui- 
tion, because intuition by itself does not require the func- 
tions of thought." 2 

REINHOLD supports Kant's theory of sensation, as t 
following quotation from Erdmann's "History of Philos- 
ophy" will show: — "On account of the double relation in 
which, according to the highest principle, the presentation 
stands, it must contain two component parts or moments, 
the matter corresponding to the presented thing or the 
object, and the form corresponding to the present; I In- 

ject. * * * If now we reason back to the inner ground 
of the presentation, we must distinguish in the faculty of 
presentations a faculty for the given, the matter, that is 
to say, receptivity, and likewise one for producing the 
form, that is to say, spout ninety.'' 3 

£2. Sensations as Ultimate Units of Consciousness. — 

1 op. cit. pp. 18-20. 

•2 id. pp. 80-1. 

3 Vol. II. pp. 4-7»'.-T. 



THE COMPONENT THEORY. 35 

Herbert Spencer states this view at length, and illus- 
trates it by referring to conscious phenomena which he 
holds to be composed of unconscious infinitessimal units. 
The following are his own statements: — "Well known ex- 
periments prove that when equal blows or taps are made 
one after another at a rate not exceeding some sixteen per 
second, the effect of each is perceived as a separate noise; 
but when the rapidity with which the blows follow one 
another exceeds this, the noises are no longer identified as 
separate states of consciousness, and there arises in place 
of them a continuous state of consciousness, called atone. 
On further increasing the rapidity of the blows, the tone 
undergoes the change of quality distinguished as rise in 
pitch; and it continues to rise in pitch as the blows con- 
tinue to increase in rapidit}', until it reaches an acuteness 
beyond which it is no longer appreciable as a tone. So 
that out of units of feeling of the same kind, many feel- 
ings distinguishable from one another in quality result, 
according as the units are more or less integrated. * * * 
If the unlikenesses among the sensations of each class may 
be due to unlikenesses among the modes of aggregation of 
a unit of conscionsness common to them all; so, too, may 
the much greater unlikenesses between the sensations of 
each class and those of other classes. There may be a 
single primordial element of consciousness, and the count- 
less kinds of consciousness may be produced by the com- 
pounding of this element with itself and the recompound- 
ing of its compounds with one another in higher and 
higher degrees: so producing increased multiplied, 
variety, and complexity. Have we any clue to this prim- 
ordial element? I think we have. * * * The subjective 
effect produced by a crack or noise that has no appreciable 
duration, is little else than a nervous shock. Though we 
distinguish such a nervous shock as belonging to what 
we call sounds, yet it does not differ very much from ner- 
vous shocks of other kinds. An electric discharge sent 
through the bod}', causes a feeling akin to that which a 
sudden loud report causes. A strong unexpected impres- 
sion made through the e\ r es, as by a flash of lightning, 



36 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

similarly gives rise to a start or shock. The 

fact that sudden brief disturbances thus set up b}- different 
stimuli through different sets of nerves, cause feelings 
scarcely distinguishable in quality, will not appear strange 
when we recollect that distinguishableness of feeling im- 
plies appreciable duration; and that when the duration 
is greatly abridged, nothing more is known than that 
some mental change has occurred and ceased. 
It is possible then — may we not even say. probable — that 
something of the same order as that which we call a ner- 
vous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness; and that 
all the unlikenesses among our feelings result from unlike 
modes of integration of this ultimate unit.'" 

Fick supports this theory of unconscious psychic units 
and the production of different conscious states from 
the same unit differently compounded, and claims that the 
theory is proved I)}- the production of feelings of touch 
and feelings of temperature from the same unit differently 
compounded. He is quoted by Prof. James as follows: 
"A feeling of temperature arises when the intensities of 
the units of feeling are evenly gradated, so that between 
two elements a and b no other unit can spatially intc 
vene whose intensity is not also between that of a and b. 
A feeling of contact perhaps arises when this condition is 
not fulfilled. Both kinds of feeling, however, arc com- 
posed of the same units." His own words arc: 'Mi 
takes are made in the sense that he admits having been 
touched, when in reality it was radiant heat that affected 
his skin. In our own before-mentioned experiments there 
was never any deception on the entire palmar side of the 
hand or on the face. On the back of the hand in one case 
in a series of 60 stimulations 4- mistakes occurred, in an- 
other ease 2 mistakes in 45 stimulation- . theextensor 
side of the upper arm 3 deceptions out of 4S stimulations 
were noticed, and in the case of another individual, 1 out 
of 3L. In one case over the spine 3 deceptions in a sen 
of 11 excitations were observed; in another, 4 out of 1 

1 "Principles of Psychology," pp. 14-9- ~ 

- "Principles of Psychology," vol. i., p. 151. 



THE COMPONENT THEORY 3 I 

On the lumbar spine 6 deceptions came among 29 stimu- 
lations, and again 4 out of 7." 1 

G. H. Lewes defends this theory of ultimate units and 
carries it back to what he calls "the raw material of con- 
sciousness , ' ' "neural units , " ' ' trem ors of the psychoplasm . ' ' 
He says: — "If, instead of considering the whole vital organ- 
ism, we consider solely its sensitive aspects, and confine our- 
selves to the Nervous System, we may represent the molecu- 
lar movements of the Bioplasm by the neural tremors of the 
Psychoplasm; these tremors are what I term neural units] 
the raw material of Consciousness. * * * The move- 
ments of the Bioplasm constitute Vitalit}^; the movements 
of the Psychoplasm constitute Sensibility. * * * View- 
ing the internal factors solely in the light of Feeling, we 
may say that the sentient material out of which all the 
forms of Consciousness are evolved is the Psychoplasm in- 
cessantly fluctuating, incessantly renewed 

1 op. cit. p. 150. 

2 "Problems of Life and Mind," Vol. I, pp. 109-10. 



1)2 



CHAPTER V. 

The Correlative Theory of Sensation. 

T. H. Green may justly be called the author of this 
view. His clearest statements upon the subject are the 
following: — "In reflecting on the process by which we have 
come to know anything, we find that, at am- stage we 
may recall, it consists in a further qualification of a given 
material Try the consideration of the material under reV 
tions hitherto unconsidered. Thus as contrasted with, 
and abstracted from, the further formation which upon 
continued observation and attention it ma}' require, any 
perception, any piece of knowledge, may be regarded s - 
an unformed matter. On the other hand, when we look 
at what the given perception or piece of knowledge is in 
itself, we find that it is already formed, in more complex 
ways than we can disentangle, by the synthesis of less de- 
terminate data. But there is a point at which the indi- 
vidual's retrospective analysis of the knowledge he finds 
himself to possess necessarily stops. Antecedently to any 
of the intellectual formative processes which he can trace, 
it would seem that something must have been given for 
those processes to begin upon. This something is taken 
to be feeling, pure and simple. When all accretions of 
form, due to the intellectual establishment of relations, 
have been stripped off, there seem to remain the mere sen- 
sations without which the intellectual activity would 
have had nothing to deal with or operate upon. These 
then must be in an absolute sense the matter — the matter 
excluding all form — of experience. Now it is evident that 
the ground on which we make this statement, that mere 
sensations form the matter of experience, warrants us in 
making it, if at all, only as a statement in regard to the 



THE CORRELATIVE THEORY. 39 

mental history of the individual. Even in this reference it 
can scarcely be accepted. There is no positive basis for it 
but the fact that, so far as memory goes, we always find 
ourselves manipulating some data of consciousness, them- 
selves independent of any intellectual manipulation which 
we can remember applying to them. But on the strength 
of this to assume that there are such data in the history of 
our experience, consisting in mere sensations, antecedently 
to any action of the intellect, is not really an intelligible 
inference from the fact stated. It is an abstraction which 
may be put into words, but to which no real meaning can 
be attached. For a sensation can only form an object of 
experience in being determined by an intelligent subject 
which distinguishes it from itself and contemplates it in 
relation to other sensations; so that to suppose a primary 
datum or matter of the individual's experience, wholly 
void of intellectual determination, is to suppose such ex- 
perience to begin with what could not belong to or be an 
object of experience at all. * * * Thus, when we in- 
quire whether there is such a thing in the world of phenom- 
ena as sensation undetermined by thought, the question 
may be considered in relation either to the facts, as such, 
or to the consciousness for which the facts exist. It may 
be put either thus — Among the facts that form the objects 
of possible experience, are there sensations which do not 
depend on thought for being what they are? or thus — Is 
sensation, as unqualified by thought, an element in the 
consciousness which is necessary to there being such a 
thing as a world of phenomena? After what has already 
been said, the answer to these questions need not detain 
us long. If it is admitted that we know of no other me- 
dium but a thinking or self-distinguishing consciousness, in 
and through which that unification of the manifold can 
take place which is necessary to constitute relation, it fol- 
lows that a sensation apart from thought — not deter- 
mined or acted upon by thought — would be an unrelated 
sensation; and an unrelated sensation cannot amount to a 
fact. Mere sensation is in truth a phrase that represents 
no reality. It is the result of a process of abstraction; 



40 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — HISTORICAL. 

but having got the phrase we give a confused meaning to 
it, we fill up the shell which our abstraction has left, by 
reintroducing the qualification we assumed ourselves to 
have got rid of. * * * Feeling and thought are insep- 
arable and mutually dependent in the consciousness for 
which the world of experience exists, inseparable and mu- 
tually dependent in the constitution of the facts which 
form the object of that consciousness. Each in its full 
reality- includes the other. * * Neither is the product 

of the other. It is only when by a process of abstraction 
Ave have reduced either to something which is not itself, 
that we can treat either as the product of anything, or 
apply the category of cause and effect to it at all. For 
that category is itself their product. Or rather, it repre- 
sents one form of the activity of the consciousness which 
in inseparable union they constitute." 1 

Dr. Dewey supports this view and formulates it more 
definitely than T. H. Green, as appears from the follow- 
ing: — "We have now seen that will, knowledge, and feel- 
ing are not three kinds of consciousness, but three aspects 
of the same consciousness. We have also seen that each 
of these aspects is the result of an artificial analysis, since, 
in any concrete case, each presupposes the other, and can 
not exist without it. The necessity of this mutual con- 
nection may be realized by reverting to our definition of 
psychology, where it was said that psychology is the 
science of the reproduction of some universal content in 
the form of individual consciousness. Every conscious- 
ness, in other words, is the relation of a universal and an 
individual element, and cannot be understood without 
both. It will now be evident that the universal element 
is knowledge, the individual is feeling, while the relation 
which connects them into one concrete content is will. 
It will also be seen that knowledge and feeling are 
partial aspects of the self and hence more or less 
abstract, while will is complete, comprehending both 
aspects." 2 "The sensation is not a fact immedi- 
ately present in consciousness. We do not have 

1 "Prolegomena to Ethics," jiS-tS-oO. 
_ "Psychology," pp. 20-1, 



THE CORRELATIVE THEORY. 41 

direct knowledge of it any more than we do of the 
atom or molecule. Actual mental life is concrete, not 
made up of isolated atomic sensations. It is thoroughly 
complex, and no simple element can be immediately laid 
hold of. In fact, knowledge always consists in relation 
— in the connection of elements, and their mutual reference 
to each other — and so no isolated, unrelated sensation, 
such as we suppose forms the material of knowledge, 
could possibly be immediately known. Sensations are 
known, then, only as the result of a process of abstrac- 
tion and analysis, and their existence is supposed only be- 
cause, without them, it would be impossible to account 
for the complex phenomena which are directly present in 
consciousness . ' n 

Prof. Ladd's treatment of sensation explicitly rejects 
the first and second theories, and, while it does not state 
any exact distinction between sensation and intellection, 
it is, so far as his analysis is carried, in complete harmony 
with the correlative theory. His position is fairly repre- 
sented by the following quotations: — "It is essential, in 
the first place, to distinguish 'simple sensations' from 
'presentations of sense,' or those complex objects of. con- 
sciousness which result from an act of mental synthesis 
on the basis of several simultaneous affections of sense. 
As respects developed experience, the simple sensation is a 
necessary fiction of psycho-physical science. Conscious- 
ness is scarcely more able directly to analyze a presenta- 
tion of sense into those factors out of which it originated 
than it is to analyze a drop of water into its component 
oxygen and hydrogen gasses." 2 "There are no sensations 
(whatever ph3 T sical occasions of sensations may exist) ex- 
cept those that appear in consciousness. " 3 "It analyzes 
w hat is relatively very complex into what is relatively 
simple and elementary; and it points out the conditions 
under which, and the terms — so to speak — on which the 
latter combines into the former. Of course, in doinsr this 



1 op. cit. p. 34. 

2 "Elements of Physiological Psychology," pp. 305-6. 

3 id. p. 362. 




42 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— HISTORICAL. 

the psychologist must not be deceived into supposing that 
these factors, or 'moments' of psychic life, are entities, 
after the fashion of the atom or molecule, dealt with by 
the natural sciences of chemistry and molecular physics. 
But they are entities in the sense in which psychic facts 
are entities. The existence of some of them can be readily 
detected by such analysis as self-consciousness can make- 
while others of them are rather speculative necessities 
postulated in the effort to account for the varying charac- 
teristics of those complex phenomena which constitute 
the primar}- problems of psychology." 1 

1 "Philosophical Review," Vol. I, pp. SO-1. 



PART II. 

Critical. 



CHAPTER I. 
Analysis of Intellection. 

§1. The Character of the Categories. — The character 
of the categories can best be shown by first stating a few 
erroneous views which have been set forth concerning 
them in philosophical literature. They are not innate 
ideas. In case there had ever been any occasion for doubt 
on this point, Locke's polemic would have removed it. 
They are not generalizations from experience, as Hume sup- 
posed. Kant effectually disproved this theory. The} 7 are 
not generic concepts of the highest class, under which are 
"subsumed" empirical concepts of lower genera, as Aris- 
totle and Kant supposed; for that would make the cate- 
gories but names for the highest generalizations of experi- 
ence. Kant seemed to feel the force of this fact, and so 
tried to make his theor}' consistent by representing the 
categories as forms only, that is, as void until experience 
connects them with the material of sense, when they be- 
come limiting forms into which the material of sense is 
synthesized. Were not the inductions of experience 
limited by this theory of categories to a stereotyped 
plan of pre-conceived classification, Kant's use of the term 
"forms" might have been appropriate; but as he intended 
the categories to be used, they could be applied only to the 
deductions of mathematics. 

The categories may now be defined as fundamental 
processes of thought of universal application, by means 
of which an object of consciousness is made to assume 
pairs of correlative aspects, the correlatives constituting 
each pair being mutually inclusive as well as mutually ex- 



44 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 

elusive. This can be illustrated by the category of caus- 
ality. Cause and effect are contrasted aspects applied b}^ 
everyone to any and every content of consciousness. Not 
that the sense-world, or an}- part of it, can be separated 
into two parts, one being all cause and cause only, 
and the other being all effect and effect only; but 
every possible object of consciousness presents both as- 
pects, cause and effect. Subordinate categories are also 
characterized by the correlative principle. The terms 
right and left cannot be used as mutually exclusive, with- 
out being at the same time mutually inclusive. If either 
term be taken alone, it must at once be subdivided into 
both right and left, or become a mere abstraction. All the 
categories, both fundamental and subordinate, are pro- 
cesses of thought by means of which some content of con- 
sciousness is made to assume pairs of correlative aspects, 
each pair of correlates being thus held in a synthesis in- 
clusive as well as exclusive. 

£2. Deduction of the Categories. — Three attempts have 
been made to give a logical deduction of the categories, 
and in each case special effort has been made to give a 
complete list and to exclude all empirical elements. 

Kant made the first logical deduction, which he 
based entirely on Aristotle's classiiication of judgments. 
He commended Aristotle for taking the first step in 
making a list oi categories, but styled his method of 
enumeration as inductive, empirical and hap-hazard; but 
in basimr his own deduction on an inductive classification 
of judgments, he rendered his method also inductive and 
empirical. After completing his table o\ categories, Kant 
proceeds to give a transcendental deduction of them, in or- 
der to show "how such concepts can a priori refer to ob- 
jects." He does not apply his argument to any category 
in particular, to show how it can so "refer to obje^ 
but merely aims to show that there must be a priori con- 
cepts in order to make experience possible. This is really 
equivalent to a surrender of all valid claim to a transcen- 
dental deduction, so far as his table of categories is con- 
cerned. In fact, an y claim to a transcendental deduction 



ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTION. 4-.") 

of categories is inconsistent, from Kant's standpoint. He 
made the categories "functions of unity," that is, forms 
for the synthesis of the manifold of phenomena. Over 
these a priori functions, as the primary function of unit}-, 
he placed the "transcendental unity of apperception." 
His own statements are as follows: — "If we wish to follow 
up the internal ground of this connection of representa- 
tions to that point toward which they must all converge 
and where the\ r receive for the first time that unity of 
knowledge which is requisite for ever\ r possible experience, 
we must begin with pure apperception. The 

transcendental unity of apperception therefore refers to 
the pure S3'iithesis of the imagination as a condition a 
priori of the possibilit}' of the manifold being united in 
one knowledge." 1 "Only by ascribing all perceptions to 
one consciousness (the original apprehension) can I say 
of all of them that I am conscious of them. * * * It is 
the permanent and unchanging Ego (of pure appercep- 
tion) which forms the correlate of all our representations, 
if we are to become conscious of them, and all conscious- 
ness belongs quite as much to such an all-embracing pure 
apperception as all sensuous intuition belongs, as a repre- 
sentation, to a pure internal intuition, namely, time."'* 
This deduction of the categories identifies the "Ego (of 
pure apperception)" with "that point toward which they 
must all converge," and ascribes all perceptions to one 
consciousness," so as to "say of all of them that I am con- 
scious of them." Only as a correlative of the empirical 
ego can this pure ego be connected in consciousness with 
processes of thought. Were the pure ego transcendent 
and separated from the empirical ego in accordance with 
the law of contradiction, as Kant supposed, it could give 
no more objective validity to "the categories, as the true fun- 
damental concepts of the pure understanding," 3 than it 
could to the •" transcendent concepts of pure reason." 4 

1 "Critique of Pure Reason." Max Miiller's Translation, pp. 102-3. 

2 id. pp. 107-8. 

3 id. p. 72. 

4 id. p. 268. 



46 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 

Fichte realized that Kant's deduction rested upon an 
induction of Aristotle's; but not having clearly perceived 
the nature of the principle of correlativity, hetoo, sought, 
in his deduction of the categories, to isolate the a priori 
functions of consciousness from the empirical. Fichte's 
starting-point is the universal pure ego, "not the knowing 
mind but knowledge, not an active somewhat, but an act. 

" :f Since among the activities to be explained con- 

sciousness also is to be found, it is self-evident that the 
acts to be unfolded by the Science of Knowledge do not 
fall within consciousness. But, for that reason, the Sci- 
ence of Knowledge has not to do with inventions, but its 
problem is to draw forth into the light the concealed 
mechanism by means of which consciousness is realized, 
that is to say, to bring into consciousness what does not 
fall within consciousness, because it is a conditio sine qua 
non of consciousness (hence it is called a priori This 

position of Fichte's, like that of Kant's, renders a deduc- 
tion of a priori categories not only impossible, but ab- 
surd, for it places the necessary starting-point beyond the 
reach of individual consciousness. In order "to bring in- 
to consciousness what does not fall within consciousn'. ss 
Fichte starts with the principle of identity, which he 
has to exchange for the ego, and then again the ego for 
the principle of identity; consequently his thesis, antithe- 
sis and synthesis involve the processes and limitations of 
empirical consciousness. 

Hegel's method of deduction was inductive rather 
than deductive. He started as far as possible from the 
concrete conscious ego, with an oscillation between the 
bare concepts of being and nothing; and from this oscilla- 
tion deduced the category of becoming, which, when the 
transition is from being to nothing, passes into that of 
decease, and when the transition is the reverse, passes into 
that of origination. A continuation of this dialectic led 
to an inductive deduction of the whole table of categories. 
This dialectic of Hegel's, however, instead of isolating the 
a priori functions of consciousness from the empirical, 



1 Erdmann, Vol. 11. p. 4-OS. 



ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTION. 47 

serves rather to emphasize the principle of correlativity in 
accordance with which the two functions are to be treated, 
not only as inseparable, but as mutually inclusive. 

There is thus no possible transcendental or a priori 
method of deduction. The categories do not exist separ- 
ate from, and cannot be separated from, empirical con- 
sciousness. The only way to discover their character, 
number, and relations, is to analyze empirical conscious- 
ness, and to test all processes of thought disclosed, so as 
to determine which are of universal validity. The only 
proper starting-point for the deduction of the fundamen- 
tal categories is the totality of consciousness. In regard 
to the number of such categories, no one can say with cer- 
tainty of any table, as Kant said of his, that they ''com- 
pletely exhaust the understanding and comprehend every- 
one of its faculties." 1 The following list is offered, tenta- 
tively, as setting forth in logical order only those which 
are fundamental. It might be called a psychological 
table, since it is a result of psychological analysis. 

Self and Not-self. Identity and Change. 

Subject and Object. Absolute and Relative. 

Ego and Non-Ego. Substance and Phenomena. 

Unitv and Pluralit\ r . Cause and Effect. 

Individuality and Activity and Passivity. 

Universality. 

Finitude and Infinitude. Co-existence and Succession. 

If any category can claim the first place in a logical or- 
der, it is that of self and not-self. This category must 
dominate every stage of finite consciousness, even though 
it were possible for a stage of consciousness not to be self- 
conscious. There can be no consciousness without some 
kind of self, either permanent or intermittent, either pure 
or composite, that perceives phenomena, and that also 
forms the unifying basis of all relations into which the 
perceived phenomena are brought. An unperceived phe- 
nomenon is a contradiction in terms; and so is a phenome- 
non perceived but unrelated. A series of related phenom- 

1 "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 71. 



48 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 

ena with no unifying basis of relations is an absurdity; 
and no less absurd would it be for one of the fluent phe- 
nomena to form such a basis of fixed relations. The only 
basis possible for any series of fixed relations among phe- 
nomena perceived is the self that perceives and relates 
them. It is not the character of the self that is here in 
question, but the fact of the existence of the self. What- 
ever this self may be, whether mind or bod}-, pure being 
or composite being, permanent or changeable, a perceiving 
self there must be; and this self must be the unifying basis 
with which all phenomena perceived must be correlated in 
in a series of fixed relations. And no less true is it that 
there must be, in every form of finite consciousness, a not- 
self which the self perceives and relates to itself. A self, 
perceiving only itself, would be an unrelated self, and an 
unrelated self must be either a nonentity or an infinity. 
If knowledge commenced with either a self alone or a not- 
self alone, the exact nature of that self or of that not-self 
would be known. All doubt in regard to knowledge con- 
sists in uncertainty concerning the relation of the self and 
the not-self; and this doubt covers every object of finite 
knowledge. All efforts to disclose a consciousness of a 
pure self as an object of knowledge, separate from a 
not-self, are not only futile but absurd. One of the great- 
est advances ever made in psychology was Kant's dis- 
closure of the fact that neither the self nor the not-self can 
separately be made an object of knowledge. This is the 
fundamental category of consciousness; and there is no 
stage, form, phase, or aspect of consciousness that does 
not imply both the self and the not-self. 

After the self and the not-self have been consciously 
differentiated.the self assumes the character of a knowing 
subject, and the not-self that of an object known. These 
two terms are strictly correlative. Every possible content 
of consciousness is both subjective and objective. When 
any extra-organic object occupies the focus of attention, 
it presents both subjective and objective aspects* When 
such object comes in contact with a sense organ and stim- 
ulates it to activity resulting in conscious affections, the 



ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTION. 49 

sense organ, in contrast with the stimulus, assumes the 
subjective aspect, and the stimulus the objective. When 
the contrast is between the sense organ and the conscious 
affections, the latter become subjective and the former ob- 
jective. When the contrast is between the conscious affec- 
tions and the perceiving self, the latter is subjective and 
the former objective. But the conscious self, when made 
the object of an introspective anatysis, retains both as- 
pects, that of a consciously perceiving subject and that of 
conscious affections objectified under the focus of atten- 
tion. Only in regard to the cognitive process have the 
terms subjective and objective any fixed meaning. Every 
case of finite perception involves a subject perceiving an 
object, and all aspects of sense-perception involving 
relations antithentical to this subject and this object, are 
rightly termed subjective and objective. But neither the 
perceiving subject nor any object perceived can be 
viewed alone without presenting both aspects. 

After the perceiving subject has distinguished itself 
from the object perceived, and has again differentiated the 
object perceived into other pairs of perceiving subjects 
and objects perceived, the perceiving subject assumes the 
character of an ego and the object perceived that of a 
non-ego. 

In the contrast between the perceiving ego and the 
non-egos perceived, there arises an opposition of unity 
and plurality. Only in the most careless observation can 
the correlative nature of this opposition be overlooked. 
Even should the ego be identified with the body as a 
whole, the aspect of plurality is too marked to be over- 
looked; and when viewed as a mind, the ego presents such 
a plurality of aspects as to be mistaken by many for a 
collection of separate faculties. On the other hand, all 
the non-egos perceived are differentiations of a not-self 
as a unity, and can again be united by the synthetic move- 
ments of attention, into the same unity. 

In so far as each conscious ego is unique, it presents the 
aspect of individuality, and in so far as all conscious 
egos are identical, they present the aspect of universality. 



50 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 

Xo ego can be entirely individual, for then it could have no 
fellowship with other egos, in fact, could not even be con- 
scious of other egos. Xo more can an ego lack individu- 
alit} T , for then it would have no conscious self. The terms 
individuality and universality- form a pair of strict corre- 
latives. 

The contrast between the limited range of individual- 
ity and the unlimited range of universality leads to the 
category of finitude and infinitude. Every form of finite 
consciousness is a manifestation of effort put forth in lim- 
itations of force, space, and time ; and each of these limi- 
tations, as an object of pure thought, is characterized 
as infinite in both extension and divisibility, but as an 
object of sense, as finite in both of these respects. But 
an infinite extension, or quantity, is, in reality, an incon- 
sistency ; for quantity is but a limitation of the activity 
of a finite consciousness. For an infinite consciousness 
there can be no limitation, hence no limiting quantity. 
Xeither is it the self of the finite counsciousness that is 
limited by quantitative relations, but the activity of the 
finite self in its efforts to determine the character and re- 
lations of all conscious changes. Finitude of self con- 
sists, not in being measured in terms of force, space, and 
time; but in being limited to change. Change in a finite 
consciousness implies, not the annihilation of one con- 
tent of consciousness and the creation of another, but 
the communication of some content of consciousness from 
one conscious self to another. But no finite self can com- 
municate its individuality to another finite self; it can 
communicate only what can be related in terms of force, 
space, and time. Change in a finite self thus implies, not 
only a universal consciousness in which changes can be 
related in terms of force, space, and time; but also an in- 
finite consciousness unlimited by relations of force, space, 
and time ; in which the individuality of every finite self 
realizes its own conscious existence. 

The contrast between infinitude and finitude leads to 
that between identity and change. These terms are strict 
correlatives. There is nothing: in the sense-world, no ob- 



51 



ject of finite consciousness, that does not present both as- 
pects, the identical and the changeable. Neither of these 
terms, abstracted from the other, can have any meaning. 
Identity means nothing butunchangeableness,and change 
means nothing but loss of identity. 

The absolute and the relative follow as the objective 
support of identity and change. Identity implies an inde- 
pendent 01 absolute entity in which there is no change, 
hence no relation; and in correlation to this, change im- 
plies a dependent or relative entity which manifests its 
dependence through successive changes. 

Substance and phenomena stand as the essence of the 
absolute and the relative. Substance is that which ren- 
ders the absolute independent of all changes and relations; 
and as the correlate of this, phenomena are but manifes- 
tations of the relative or changeable. 

The category of causality stands as the mediation be- 
tween substance and phenomena. Any attempt to abstract 
either substance or phenomena from the other aspect dis- 
closes their necessary connection under the category of 
causality, in which substance appears as cause and phe- 
nomenon as effect. 

Activity and passivity mediate between cause and effect 
in a manner similar to that in which causality mediates 
between substance and phenomena. Cause and effect, 
separated from each other, are but abstractions; and the 
only way in which they can be connected is to make the 
cause an activity of which the effect is the passive result. 
The correlation of activity and passivity is tersely ex- 
pressed in the axiom, "action and reaction are equal and 
in the opposite direction." 

The last category enumerated in the list, co-existence 
and succession, is implied in each of several of the preced- 
ing categories; yet its correlative nature is frequently over- 
looked. The category of causality, perhaps, illustrates 
this as well as any. Causation implies succession in time, 
yet no cause can be conceived as entirely separate from, 
and hence as entirely antecedent to, its effect. In arguing 
that these two terms are correlative, it is not meant that 



52 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 

a series of successive phenomena is also a series of co-exist- 
ing phenomena, but that the perception of a series of terms 
as forming a succession involves some form of co-existence 
in consciousness of all the terms consciously related as 
successive. It would be no more possible to perceive that 
each of a series of terms is related in a succession, unless all 
of the terms so related existed in some form in conscious- 
ness in the act of perception; than it would be to perceive 
that each of a series of straight lines enters into the per- 
imeter of a polygon, unless all of the lines so related were 
at once present to consciousness. On the other hand, 
every series of terms perceived as co-existent is perceived as 
a series of terms standing in certain relations of succes- 
sion under the movements of attention. Ouantitv of everv 
kind can be perceived only as successive repetitions of 
some standard unit of measurement. 

The nature of the subordinate categories can be indi- 
cated, and their relation to empirical concepts can be illus- 
trated, by means of a tabular classification of the subor- 
dinate concepts. 

§3. Classification of Subordinate Concepts — All sub- 
ordinate concepts fall into two classes, inductive and 
a priori, the latter being subdivided into two divisions, 
the objective or real, and the subjective or ideal. Empirical 
concepts have both the intellectual and the sensational 
aspects, and the\' classify, in generic and specific relations, 
all objects of sense. A priori concepts are characterized by 
the universal aspect onh- ; the real concepts classify ob- 
jects in quantitative relations of force, space and time ; 
and the ideal classify all the aspects of consciousness, 
fundamental and subordinate, into correlative pairs. 

The fact that there is no one invariable law for deduc- 
tion is much more conspicuous in the subordinate than 
in the fundamental categories. The only manner of 
deduction that has any resemblance to law is the rule that, 
we should apply to the fundamental aspects of conscious- 
ness, the self and the not-self, such subordinate contrasts 
as appear most general, and to continue the proce^ 
through successive ditferentations. In this method there 



ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTION. 53 

is no one invariable order of differentation and no ulti- 
mate stopping-place. Kant was mistaken in supposing 
that "If we are once in possession of the fundamental and 
primitive concepts, it is easy to add the derivative and 
secondary, and then to give a complete image of the gene- 
alogical tree of the pure understanding." 1 A "genealogi- 
cal tree" may be constructed with more or less logical order, 
but no one such "tree" will suit every purpose. This, 
however, is no detriment to classification ; for it is an ad- 
vantage rather than a disadvantage for thought to be 
logical and yet free from a stereotyped expression. To 
show the difference between the empirical and the a priori 
concepts, it is necessary to construct a separate "gene- 
alogical tree" for each class, as each is constructed on a dif- 
ferent principle. One such tree will show the relation be- 
tween the real and the ideal a priori concepts, and will 
also show why the real are applicable to the classification 
of the inductions of experience, while the ideal are not. 
In the construction of any "genealogical tree," the logical 
order most natural to the purpose in hand must be fol- 
lowed; and no claim to infallibility in this respect can be 
made. In the two examples following, the first is designed 
to illustrate the character and relation of a priori con- 
cepts, and the second to illustrate the mutually exclusive 
relations of empirical concepts in biological classifications. 
For geological, chemical or physical classifications, differ- 
ent principles of differentiation would be necessary. The 
differentiations given in the biological tree are not intended 
to follow strictly the latest biological classifications, 
which are more or less conflicting, but simply to illustrate 
the principle of all empirical classification and definition. 

1 op. cit. p. 73. 




54 



SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 



("Infinite Consciousness. 






f 



Universal Aspect, f Objective Form, or Intellection. 

or Thought. [Subjective Form, or Self-Consciousness. 
Individual Aspect, [Objective Form, or Sensation, 
or Feeling. [Subjective Form, or 



Active State, or Will. 



{Objective Form, or Volition. 
Subjective Form, or Attention. 



03 



■/. 




<S: 




^ 




a 




90 




P 


Vi 





a 




V 


'Z> 


c 


!T. 


tfl 


a 


2 


c 


.2 


U 


'3 



* 



T.I 

5 
u 



fc 



{Universal Aspect, or Matter. 
Individual Aspect, or Mind. 



■s. 



y. 



c 



Subjective Form, or Effort 



f Individual Aspect, or Action. 
[Universal Aspect, or Reaction. 



I I 



si 
03 






Individual As- (Duration. 

f Before, 
pect, or Time. (Limiting Points; 

[After. 





Vol 


'-> 




o 




















00 




u 




c 






v. 


+j" 


~* 


- 


■1 


■ 




< 


03 


"3 

91 


tt 






u 


■H 


> 


E 
















f-^ 







Area. 



;- u 



Length. 



Vertical 



Lateral 



ru P . 

[Down. 

| Right. 
I Left. 



Longitudinal ^ 



Back. 



[Forth. 



(Individual Aspect, or The Evil. 
Active Phase, or Motive .. 

[Universal Aspect, or The Good. 



Subjective, or j Individual Aspect, or The 
Sensible Form [Universal Aspect, or The Beauti 



ful. 



Passive Phase 



Objective, or In- j Individual Aspect, or The False, 
tellectual Form \ Universal Aspect, or The True. 



ANALYSIS OP IXTELLIXTION. 



55 






Inorganic- 



Fluids 
Solida 



Gases. 
Liquids. 



Cryptogams. 



Vegetable 



Phen ogams • 



Endogens. 
Exogens. 






O 



u 

u 

V. 

K 

CO 

n 
o 



o 






Invertebrate. 
Oviparous. 

Xon-Ungulata. 
Ruminant. 



Pv es 



.S< & 



»C J o 

> 






Double Hoofed. 



Non-Ruminant ' 



Single Hoofed- 



Stinmli 



o ^ 






Sense Organs 



Electrieit3'. 

Heat. 

Light. 

Chemical Action. 

Undulations. 

Pressure. 

Friction. 



Muscles. 

Skin. 

Tongue. 

Nose. 

Eyes. 

Ears. 



Ass. 
Horse. 



Mind 



i Intellect. 
Sense. 
Active Phase, or Will. 




56 SENSATION AND IXTELLECTIOX— CRITICAL. 

From the classification given of a priori concepts, it is 
evident that real concepts, being based entirely upon un- 
changing characteristics, can be used to classify all possible 
objects of experience in mathematical relations, and that 
the\ r can be used, in such classification, in a mutually ex- 
clusive sense; but that when they are used to classify the 
various aspects of consciousness as an organic unity, they 
must be used in a correlative sense. It is also evident that 
ideal concepts, notwithstanding the fact that they are 
universally valid, are based largely on relative, individual 
characteristics, and hence cannot be applied to any objects 
with mathematical precision. 

From either classification of concepts, the a priori or 
the empirical, it will be seen that the definition of any 
single object of consciousness involves the construction 
of a "genealogical tree," which shows the successive dif- 
ferentiations of the totality of consciousness until all 
conceptions have been excluded except the one defined, 
and the s\ T nthesis of all the objects differentiated in their 
various specific and generic relations. This is shown by 
the position of the term horse in the classification of em- 
pirical concepts. 

§4. Principles ol Knowledge and Laws of Thought. 
— As stated on page 21, there are two fundamen- 
tal principles and three primary laws governing the differ- 
ent processes of thought. The principle ot relativity, as it 
underlies the law of contradiction, may be defined as that 
limitation of finite knowledge by virtue of which an object 
can be defined only by including it with all other objects 
differentiated in consciousness in mutual relations to one 
another and to consciousness as a totality and by exclud- 
ing from this totality all objects not included in the defini- 
tion ; as it underlies the law ol'm titual lirnita tion, it may 
be defined as that limitation of finite knowledge by virtue 
of which all incompatible aspects of any object of con- 
sciousness, when such aspects are inseparably connected 
with universal processes of thought, areto be attributed, 
not to the object itself, but only to its appearance as 
determined bv the limitations of finite consciousness 



ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTION. 57 

The principle of correlativitv may be define I as 
that limitation of finite knowledge by virtue of which an 
object can be defined only by referring it, as one of a pair 
of opposite aspects, each of which includes the existence 
but excludes the appearance of the other, together with all 
other like pairs of aspects, to the totality of conscious- 
ness as an organic unity. The law of contradiction ap- 
plies to empirical and to real a priori concepts, the lormer 
including relations of both quality and quantity, and the 
latter, only relations of quantity. The law oi mutual 
limitation applies only to a priori concepts when different 
categories came into conflict; and it is the application of 
the principle of relativity to such conflict. The law ot cor- 
relation, also, applies onhv to a priori concepts ; and it is 
the application of the principle of correlativitv to them. 
In the application of the law of contradiction to em- 
pirical concepts and to real a priori concepts, two marked 
differences between these two classes of concepts must be 
noticed. The latter, being objects of pure thought, are 
absolutely exclusive and infinitely divisible; while the 
former, being objects of sense, are only relatively exclus- 
ive and finitely divisible. Thus the a priori classifications 
of mathematics are absolutely exclusive, and the quanti- 
ties of pure mathematics are infinitely divisible; while 
empirical classifications run together, and all sensible 
magnitudes cease to be perceptible after repeated division. 
Many long-standing inductive classifications, which were 
almost universally accepted, are gradually losing their dis- 
tinctive character. The science of chemistry is gradually 
obliterating the distinction between the organic and the 
inorganic. The distinction between the animal and the 
vegetable is fading out. Between the distinct sexes, range 
both hermaphrodites and neuters. Inductive classifica- 
tions can never be proved to be ultimate. No one knows, 
for example, that either ox}'gen or ozone is an elementary 
substance. No chemical element is known to be abso- 
lutely simple. Eminent scientists and philosophers who 
have failed to notice these differences between empirical 
and a priori concepts have violated the law of contradic- 



58 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 

tion in two respects. . The Eleatic philosopher Zeno based 
all his arguments to disprove the possibility of motion on 
the infinite divisibility of space as an a priori concept, yet 
he applied his arguments to sensible space. Herbert 
Spencer, in his discussion of the perception of space, di- 
vides magnitude into planes, planes into lines, and lines 
into points. This is the reverse of Zeno's error, since it 
carries the division of pure space to an absolute limit, 
while Zeno made sensible space infinitely divisible. An- 
other error, which is a combination of these two, is com- 
mitted by all scientists who argue to the indivisible atom. 
This error consists in carrying the division of matter past 
sensible limits, \-et holding to the sensible qualities of mat- 
ter after all sensible limits have been passed, and stopping 
the process of division abitrarily at an absolute limit, 
which, since it is past sensible limits, must be a limit to a 
priori division. Or, more strictly, this carries sensible 
properties past sensible limits and terminates an a priori 
process of division arbitrarily. 

The law of mutual limitation is violated whenever the 
character of any object of consciousness is determined by 
one category alone, when such determination conflicts 
with any other fundamental category. Hegel violated 
this law when he maintained that " the stages which the 
consciousness of the individual subject passes through, 
have already been passed through by the universal mind." 

The law of correlation is violated in two ways, by rep- 
resenting a pair of correlates as in an antagonism which 
must cancel one of them, and by annulling the opposition 
between a pair of correlates, and so obliterating both of 
them. Kant's doctrine of the antinomies of pure reason is 
an illustration of the first error; although Kant, in the 
end, saves either term from being sacrificed by his doctrine 
of phenomena and noumena. Fichte's idealism is another 
illustration in which one correlate, the non-ego, was sacri- 
ficed. Schelling's "System of Identity,'' with its doctrine 
of total indifference between subject and object, is a good 
example of the second error. 

1 Erdmann, vol. ii. p. 6fi 



CHAPTER II. 

Criticism of the Sensational Theory. 

§1. Sensation as sense-perception. — This view, as 
stated by Locke, represents the mind, in sensation, as 
passive to the impress of extended objects, and the con- 
sciousness of the impression thus received, as the perception 
of such objects. If the mind were, in strictness, merely re- 
ceptive of such impressions, it would require an actual im- 
pact of physical forces, and a corresponding impress of ex- 
tended objects upon the non-extended mind. Had this fact 
been evident to Locke, he doubtless would have amended 
his theory. Three reasons may be pointed out for his fail- 
ure to recognize it. First, when he represents the mind as 
passive, he does not conceive it as entirely passive. As has 
been shown, activity and passivity are strict correlates; 
and when either term is used, it is used in a sense not ab- 
solute but relative. Again, in tactual perception, the tact- 
ual surface receives an actual impress of extended objects, 
and this impress gives rise to a metaphor in which such 
perception is represented as an impression upon the mind. 
Lastly, in visual perception, the impress is refined into the 
convergence of ra\ r s of light upon a focal point which, los- 
ing nearly all extension, easily cheats one, who has taken 
the metaphor in a literal sense, into believing that an act- 
ual impression has been made upon the mind. In order 
to correct Locke's error, it is only necessary to realize that 
the human mind is necessarily both active and passive in 
every conscious state, that the phrase, "impression on the 
mind," is always necessarily metaphorical, that a non-ex- 
tended mind cannot be located in any point of space, and 
that nothing can receive an impact of physical forces un- 




60 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 

less it be both extended and material. Locke deserves 
great credit for distinguishing between sensation and re- 
flection; but not only is his distinction untenable, his 
method of reasoning also must be abandoned. 

Berkeley improved upon Locke's account by making 
the mind active in sensation; but his failure to make any 
distinction between sense and intellect led not only to an 
exaggerated form of sensationalism, but also to sensa- 
tional idealism, both of which have been very generally re- 
jected. 

Hume's great service consisted in establishing the fact 
that no knowledge of universal validity can come from 
sensations alone; but the answer to the scepticism thus 
awakened was reserved for Kant. 

§2. Sensations as subjective percepts. — Thomas Reid, 
in his distinction between sensation and perception, makes 
a decided advance toward the true nature of the difference 
between them. His treatment consisted in the abstraction 
of the category of causality from the process of perception, 
and the identification of the perceptive process, as so modi- 
fied, with sensation. If this distinction were made complete, 
by abstracting from perception all a priori categories, the 
distinction would be identical with the correlative theory. 
But stopping where Reid does only gives one of the various 
points of contrast between sense and intellect, and implies 
that this is all the distinction there is to be made. It is 
true, as Reid infers, that the category of causality charac- 
terizes perception and not sensation; but this category can 
be separated from the process of perception only by abstrac- 
tion, and then consistency would require the abstraction 
of all the other a priori categories. To ascribe to sensa- 
tion any power of perception at all, even if only of subjec- 
tive affections, as Reid does, is to grant it the category of 
causalit\ T as well as the other categories. If his distinction 
be of any value, it must lie in the subjective nature ascribed 
to the object perceived in sensation. This point is empha- 
sized by Hamilton. 

Hamilton, while criticising Reid's form of statement, 
holds to the same distinction between sensation and per- 




CRITICISM OF THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. 61 

ception. In making "the modern distinction of the Pri- 
mary and Secondary Qualities of matter" correspond to the 
"modern distinction of the two perceptions, Perception 
proper and Sensation proper," he simply extends Reid's 
distinction to all objects of sense, and makes the distinc- 
tion a little stronger by abstracting more of the a priori 
categories. But since these categories can be separated 
from the perceptive process only by abstraction, the pro- 
cess so modified would correspond to nothing found in 
actual experience. Yet Hamilton has in mind cases of per- 
ception in actual experience, and identifies sensation with 
such cases. His distinction must, therefore, if maintained, 
rest entirely upon the subjective character assigned to the 
objects perceived in sensation. His "material Non-ego" 
clearly implies a correlative material ego as the real basis 
of his "organic passion," and clearly shows that his "sub- 
ject-object" is actually objectified in causal relations. As 
Dr. Ward says, "When considerations of method compel 
us to eliminate physiological implications from the ordin- 
ary conception of a sensation, we are able to distinguish the 
conscious subject and the affections of which it is conscious 
as clearly as we can distinguish subject and object in other 
cases of presentation." 1 The "ordinary conception," to 
which Dr. Ward referred, was Hamilton's. The only dis- 
tinction that Hamilton can be said to have made would 
be, not a "distinction of the Primarj^and Secondary Qual- 
ities of matter," as he supposed, since his "subject-object" 
retains "Primary" as well as "Secondary Qualities," but 
a distinction between incipient and advanced stages of 
perception, between stages in which the objective relations 
of the percepts are vague and stages in which they are 
clear. This distinction reduces to the third form of this 
theory, which will be criticised in order; but that Hamil- 
ton did not have this distinction in mind is shown by the 
following quotation : " On the testimony of consciousness, 
and in the doctrine of intuitive perception, the mind, when 
a material existence is brought into relation with its organ 
of sense, obtains two concomitant, and immediate cogni- 

1 Ency. Brit. Vol. XX, p. 41. 



62 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 

tions. Of these, the one is the consciousness (sensation) 
of certain subjective modifications in us, which we refer, 
as affections, to certain unknown powers, as causes, in the 
external reality ; the secondary qualities of body : the other 
is the consciousness (perception) of certain objective attri- 
butes in the external reality itself, as, or as in relation to 
our sensible organism ; the primary qualities of body. Of 
these cognitions, the former is admitted, on all hands, to 
be subjective and ideal; the latter, the Natural Realist 
maintains, against the Cosmothetic Idealist, to be objec- 
tive and real." 1 This statement of Hamilton's, that in 
sense-perception the mind "obtains two concomitant and 
immediate cognitions," one subjectiveand the other objec- 
tive, is an exaggerated distortion of the perceptive process 
in which two correlative aspects of one process are repre- 
sented as two separate processes. It is impossible to di- 
vide sense-percepts into two classes, subject-objects and 
object-objects. An attempt to do so soon shows that 
ever\ r sense-percept necessarily has both aspects, the sub- 
jective and the objective, and that the two aspects are 
strictly correlative. The onh' conclusion possible is that 
Reid and Hamilton tried to make a distinction between 
sensation and perception on an untenable basis. 

J. S. Mill's doctrine of sensation, when carried to its 
logical results, reduces both primary and secondary quali- 
ties of matter to a sensational basis, and thus i everts to 
Locke's sensational realism. It reduces all objects of per- 
ception to "permanent possibilities of sensation," that is. 
to permanent possibilities of signs of permanent possibili- 
ties, &c, ad infinitum. It also reduces sensations to signs 
of "permanent possibilities of sensation," that is, to signs 
of permanent possibilities of signs, &c, ad infinitum. It 
is hardly necessary to state that the view is untenable, yet, 
in a less explicit form of statement, it is still held very gen- 
erally . 

In criticising Lotze's doctrine of sensation, it is nec^ 
sary first to note the different constructions that can be 
logically put upon his statements, for they are certainly 

1 O. W. Wight's "Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton." p. 274-. 



CRITICISM OF THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. 

susceptible of more than one. It' his "impressions," which 
"exist conjointly in the soul although not spatially side In- 
side with one another," and which the soul apprehends 
"not in the form in which they actually are — to-wit, non- 
spatial — but as they are not, in a spatial juxtaposition," — 
if these impressions are the elements actually entering into 
and forming objects of perception; then his doctrine is a 
form of sensational idealism. But if, as a natural realist, 
Lotze makes sensations mere signs of permanent objects, 
each sign having an "accessory impression" for a "local 
sign" to determine what part of the permanent object each 
primary impression is to signify, then his doctrine reduces 
to a sensational realism still more refined than J.S. Mill's. 
Lotze cannot be classed with "psychic stimulists," since 
he believes the impressions to "exist conjointly in the 
soul," and to be apprehended, not directly as they are pro- 
duced, but by reproduction; not as "the;,- actually are," 
"but as they are not, in a spatial juxtaposition." His po- 
sition seems to be anomalous. He postulates sensations 
after the analogy of J. S. Mill's signs, but he is not, like 
Mill, a natural realist. He seems to be a sensational ideal- 
ist, holding objects of perception to be constructed, not 
upon the occurrence of sensations as stimuli to intellectual 
activity, but out o /"sensations. He is not of the same view 
as Berkeley, who made no distinction between sense and 
intellect; for Lotze distinguishes between the impressions 
and the power of the soul to act on them, and represents 
the impressions as passive to such action. His objects of 
perception are intellectual constructions, but into them 
the impressions enter as component factors. This form of 
idealism, as well as Berkeley's, is devoid of all a priori va- 
lidity, since the constructions are determined, not by intel- 
lectual relations, but b}' sensations called "accessory im- 
pressions" which serve as "local signs." This doctrine 
would also make sensations fixed entities, like objects of 
perception, which is contrary to all other theories of sen- 
sation. Lotze's position, under all possible interpreta- 
tions, is untenable. 

J. Clark Murray confesses that a simple sensation 



64 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 

is undefinable, and states that ''the only way a sensation 
can be known is by being felt." But unless it can be de- 
fined, how can one know when he feels it? To know when 
he feels it, he must distinguish it from other conscious 
states, and how can it be thus distinguished without be- 
ing defined? 

Sully seeks to avoid this difficulty by describing the 
physical conditions involved in a simple sensation; but 
this attempt succeeds no better. "The stimulation of the 
the outer extremity of an mcarrying nerve." even "when 
this stimulation has been transmitted to the brain centers, 
does not always awaken consciousness. And when it 
does, how is the "mental state resulting from the stimula- 
tion" known to be simple? When one is conscious of the 
stimulation and also of the "mental state" as "resulting 
from the stimulation," the "mental state" is certainly not 
"simple" enough to be called a "mere sensation." When 
one is not conscious of the stimulus, how can it aid him 
in knowing what a simple sensation is? Moreover, the 
outer extremities of the iticarrying nerves are not isolated, 
so that one can be stimulated without affecting its neigh- 
bors; but even if it were possible to stimulate separately 
the end-organ of one sensory nerve fibril, when it is remem- 
bered how minute such an end-organ is, it will not seem 
possible for such stimulation alone to be even transmitted 
to the brain centers. So-called sensations that can be 
produced and regulated by determining the character of 
nerve stimulation may be comparatively simple feeling 
yet they can be not only defined, but measured. No such 
sensation is absolutely simple. 

£3. Third iorm. — Fichte argues that the first awaken- 
ing act of consciousness is mere sensation devoid of all in- 
tellectual discrimination. Since this argument cannot 
rest on an empirical analysis of consciousness, it must be 
based on analogies in which the relatively complex is de- 
veloped from the relatively simple. In a relative sense, 
mental development is an evolution of the complex from 
the simple; but in an absolute sense, there is not in the en- 
tire universe an ultimately simple element, either mental 



CRITICISM OF THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. <>,> 

or physical. Even the postulated atom has both attract- 
ing and repelling forces, quality, weight, and magnitude. 
No state of consciousness can be absolutely simple, for 
every such state involves a self differentiating a not-self un- 
der various a priori contrasts. There can be no finite con- 
sciousness that is not limited to change and identity as cor- 
relative aspects of a presentation continuum as a whole, 
and of every sense-object differentiated from it. Objects of 
perception become fixed, it is true, but fixed only in so far 
as they are determined by n priori categories; in so far as 
they depend upon sensation, they are constantly changing. 
Dr. Ward recognizes and states the fact that in the 
state of consciousness which he calls sensation, "We are 
able to distinguish the conscious subject and the affections 
of which it is conscious," also that "The further we go 
back the nearer we approach to a total presentation hav- 
ing the characteristic of a general continuum in which 
differences are latent." Having made sensation a present- 
ation, he must make this primary presentation a sensa- 
tion, or he would have a presentation without sensation, 
a condition conceded by no one. In this first sensation, 
then, are involved "a certain objective continuum" "in 
which differences are latent" as well as "the conscious 
subject and the affections of w T hich it is conscious." 
While these conditions do characterize the most elementary 
states of consciousness, it is not proper to term such con- 
scious states mere sensations, if a tenable distinction is to 
be made between sensation and intellection. Dr. Ward's 
position ascribes too much to sensation, for in the state 
of consciousness specified are involved a priori categories. 
If the distinction is claimed to be only relative, the basis 
of such relative distinction must be given before it can be 
intelligible. Order in time can be no basis for even a rela- 
tive distinction, since the sensational and intellectual 
aspects of conciousness predominate in time in very irreg- 
ular order of succession. To take complexity as a basis 
of distinction does not help the matter, since sensation as 
well as intellection may be very complex. Activity of the 
sense organs is the only basis that could be claimed for 



66 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 

this distinction, and the distinction could then be only 
relative. No consciousness can arise from mere organic 
action, for this would lack all a priori analysis and S3*n- 
thesis, without which consciousness cannot exist; nor, on 
the other hand, can airy state of consciousness exist that 
does not involve organic action. If organic action be 
made the basis of a relative distinction between sensation 
and intellection, how is such distinction to be drawn? 
Who is to say where the line shall be drawn? How can 
uniformity of distinction as made by different individuals 
be secured? Of what use would such distinction be, even 
if it could be made uniform? Would it not be a hindrance 
to psychological analysis to make a distinction which 
would render a priori certainty impossible by referring all 
knowledge to a relatively sensational "background or 
basis?" Whatever relative distinction individuals may 
make in their own personal analyses, it is evident that no 
uniformity of distinction could be made on this basis of 
organic activity ; it is also evident that no relative distinc- 
tion can be of any value in psychylogical analysis. 

Prof. James is explicit in making organic action the 
basis of his distinction between sensation and intellection; 
and in some of his statements he claims that the distinc- 
tion is absolute. He restricts "pure sensations" to "the 
earliest days of life," making them " all but impossible to 
adults with memories and stores of associations acquired." 
He explicitly gives to "a newborn brain an absolutely 
pure sensation " in which " all the ' categories of the under- 
standing' are contained." Instead of making a distinc- 
tion between sensation and intellection, this annihila; 
all distinction by reducing " all the categories of the under- 
standing "to an origin in sensation. Instead of criticis- 
ing this most pronounced sensational idealism, which has 
been regarded as utterly untenable since the time of Hume 
and Kant, one feels like looking further to see if the author 
really means what he says. In a foot-note. pp. 4-5, Vol. 
II, of his "Psychology," in a most excellent discussion of 
the relation between sensation and intellection, Pr- 
James shows that he meant something nearer the truth. 



CRITICISM OF THE SENSATIONAL THEORY. G7 

He says: " Psychologically, the sensory and the repro- 
ductive or associative processes may wax and wane inde- 
pendently of each other. Where the part directly due to 
stimulation of the sense-organ preponderates the thought 
has a sensational character, and differs from other 
thoughts in the sensational direction. Those thoughts 
which lie farthest in that direction we call sensations, for 
practical convenience, just as we call conceptions, those 
which lie nearer the opposite extreme. But we no more 
have conceptions pure than we have pure sensations. 
Our most rarefied intellectual states involve some bodily 
sensibility, just as our dullest feelings have some intellect- 
ual scope. Common sense and common psycholog}' ex- 
press this by saying that the mental state is composed of 
distinct fractional parts, one of which is sensation, the 
other conception. We, however, who believe every mental 
state to be an integral thing, cannot talk thus, but must 
speak of the degree of sensational or intellectual char- 
acter, or function of the mental state. Prof. Hering 
puts, as usual, his finger better upon the truth than 
any one else. Writing of visual perception, he says : ' It 
is inadmissable in the present state of our knowledge to 
assert that first and last the same retinal picture arouses 
exactly the same pure sensation, but that this sensation, 
in consequence of practice and experience, is diiferently in- 
terpreted the last time, and elaborated into a different per- 
ception from the first. For the only real data are, on the 
one hand, the physical picture on the retina, — and that is 
both times the same; and on the other hand, the result- 
ant state of consciousness — and that is both times distinct. 
Of any third thing, namely, a pure sensation thrust in 
between the retinal and the mental pictures, we know 
nothing.'' " These passages from James and Hering are a 
most excellent statement and illustration of the relation 
between sensation and intellection. Had they made an 
absolute distinction between these two correllative aspects 
of ever}- act of perception, their position would be that of 
the third view; but making only a relative distinction, 
based on organic action, their distinction is valueless while 
their psychology is sound. 



CHAPTER III. 
Criticism of the Component Theory. 

§1. First Form. — This view, as it originated in Kant, 
rested on the only basis that made an absolute distinction 
between sensation and intellection possible, namely, the 
difference between the variable and the invariable aspects 
of consciousness. In making this distinction and in dem- 
onstrating its absolute validity, Kant rendered to psy- 
chology a lasting and invaluable service. He erred in not 
making sensation the sole function of sensibility, and in 
not assigning all a priori functions to the intellect. This, 
doubtless, more than anything else, prevented his distinc- 
tion from being generally adopted. Sensation, however, 
is not a ready-made matter given to a passive mind, as 
Kant supposed, but a necessary aspect of event* form of 
the activity of a finite consciousness. 

Reinhold made one nominal, but not real, advance 
upon Kant. He united- sensibility and understanding as 
two functions of one faculty, but he still considered the 
sensuous function a passive receptivity of impressions, 
and so made no real advance. Moreover, he failed to em- 
phasize the distinction between sensation and intellection 
as resting on an a priori basis, and hence lost more than 
he gained . 

£2. Second Form. — Mr. Spencer's use of the term " ner- 
vous shock" is not free from ambiguity, since it might 
refer to sudden unconscious movements in the physical 
organism, mere reflex actions, or to sudden conscious 
movements. The former, not entering consciousness, can- 
not be considered sensations, any more than can the sud- 
den movements of the sensitive plant. The latter, in so 



CRITICISM OF THE COMPONENT THEORY. 69 

far as the movements precede consciousness, arc, like the 
former, mere reflex actions ; but in so far as consciousm 
precedes movement, in so far as the shock is psychical, it 
not only follows, but also results from the perception of 
danger, sometimes vague, sometimes distinct. One may 
touch an object, either hot or cold, and shrink from it be- 
fore perceiving which it is; yet, previous to this recoil, there 
is a perception apprehensive of danger. An apprehension 
of this kind ma} r be developed by the experience of the 
individual or by the experience of the race, and trans- 
mitted through heredity ; it results, however, in either 
case, from experience of danger. All nervous shocks of a 
psychic nature result from perception apprehensive of dan- 
ger, and to identify them with sensations as units of con- 
sciousness preceding all perception, is to reverse the real 
order of facts. Mr. Spencer's use of the term nervous 
shock is so entirely based upon plrysical analogies that a 
thorough criticism of it requires the analysis of the condi- 
tions involved in nerve stimulation. 

The term might refer merely to the physical stimulus, 
were it not identified with the " ultimate unit of conscious- 
ness." His discussion refers to normal states of conscious- 
ness in the perception of sound whose physical stimulus 
consists of "equal taps or blows" "not exceeding some 
sixteen per second." Further analysis will show that the 
"nervous shock" attributed to the effect of one of these 
blows cannot be simple, even according to Mr. Spencer's line 
of argument. For not only " the unlikenesses among the 
sensations of each class," but also "the much greater un- 
likenesses between the sensations of each class and those 
of other classes" are "due to unlikenesses among the 
modes of aggregation of a unit of consciousness common 
to them all;" "and the countless kinds of consciousness 
may be produced by the compounding of this element with 
itself and the recompounding of its compounds with one 
another in higher and higher degrees." According to this, 
the ultimate " unit of consciousness " cannot be the result 
of one of the "equal taps or blows " at a rate of " sixteen 
per second ;" for in sound of the highest pitch audible, the 




70 SEXSATIOX AND IXTELLECTIOX — CRITICAL. 

sound-waves strike the drum of the ear at a rate of 
38,000, or more, per second, each of which must produce 
a " nervous shock" and a corresponding "unit of con- 
sciousness." But even this unit, less than one two-thou- 
sandth part of the one Air. Spencer cites, must be an 
aggregation. For, in referring to "tastes," "odors" and 
"colors," he says," shall we not regard it as probable that 
there is a unit common to all these sharply contrasted 
classes of sensations?"- In the perception of violet the 
undulations of ether impinge upon the retina at a rate of 
over 700,000,000,000,000 per second. Can each of these 
produce a "nervous shock" which will result in an ulti- 
mate "unit of consciousness?" Can 700,000,000,000,000 
units of consciousness be compounded per second ? If not, 
if these undulations taken separately cannot be counted 
as nervous shocks, if they must be summed together in 
order to give rise to a "unit of consciousness," how can 
the number which must be summed together be deter- 
mined ? If this number be determined by the number of 
conscious changes that can be discriminated per second, 
the number must be different not onh-for different persons 
but for different sense-organs in the same person. Either 
over 700,000,000,000,000 "units of consciousness" must 
be compounded per second, or stimuli must be summed 
together in the production of conscious states. If the 
number of "ultimate units of consciousness" cannot ex- 
ceed "some sixteen per second," the number of stimulat- 
ing disturbances represented by each must exceed 40,000,- 
000,000,000. But inasmuch as the number of percepts 
discriminated per second varies with the person, with the 
sense-organ, and with the practice of the individual; it 
must be concluded that the number of nerve disturbances 
involved in the stimulation pf the nerves has no intelligi- 
ble bearing upon the number of states of consciousne- 
resulting from such stimulation. Spencer's position is 
similar to that of Hamilton, who in the following pas- 
sage argues that conscious states are composed of uncon- 
scious states: "When we look at a distant forest, we perceive 
a certain expanse of green. Of this, as an affection of our 



CRITICISM OF TIIH COMPONENT THEORY. 71 

organism, we are clearly and distinctly conscious. Now, 
the expanse of which we are conscious, is evidently made 
up of parts of which we are not conscious. No leaf, per- 
haps no tree, may be separately visible. But the green- 
ness of the forest is made up of the greenness of the 
leaves,; that is, the total impression of which we are con- 
scious, is made up of an infinitude of small impressions of 
which we are not conscious." 1 

Whatever force this argument may seem to have mus* 
be claimed from the stand-point of natural realism, the 
position maintained by both Hamilton and Spencer. But 
from this very point of view the argument can be dis- 
proved on both empirical and a priori grounds. Scientific 
experiments show that the impression made by the 
sight of a word is not composed of the several impress- 
ions made by the sight of the letters separated, for 
words can be distinguished in consciousness nearly as 
rapidly as can letters. Again, if a certain force will move 
a body at a certain velocity, then, according to Hamil- 
ton's argument, a part of the force would impart a cor- 
responding rate of velocit}^. But a part of the force may 
not overcome the inertia, and so may not impart any 
velocity to it. In like manner, a certain stimulation ma}' 
awaken consciousness when a part of the stimulation 
will not. This can be verified by anyone at pleasure. It 
is much more rational to suppose that a stimulus below a 
certain limit fails to awaken consciousness at all than to 
suppose that it awakens an unconscious state of con- 
sciousness. To suppose a conscious state to be composed 
of unconscious states is just as absurd as to suppose an 
extended object to be composed of non-extended parts. 
When quantitative zeros can be summed together and 
made to produce extended quantities, then it may do to 
argue that unconscious zeros may be summed together 
and made to produce conscious states; but not before. 

The "deceptions," or "mistakes," mentioned in Fick's 
experiments, are based not upon an uncertain compound- 
ing of "units of feeling," but upon the reference of a com- 

1 Mill's "Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton," Vol. II., p. 10. 



12 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION — CRITICAL. 

plex state of feeling to that cause which would seem most 
likely to awaken the feeling. Sensations of touch and 
temperature are so intimately connected that, in normal 
experience, neither one is felt without the other. Sensa- 
tions of temperature can be located only b\- means of re- 
lated tactual sensations. That there should be four de- 
ceptions out of seven stimulations "on the lumbarspine," 
a region of little discriminative power for either sensation, 
fs not surprising, especialh r when the attention is adjust- 
ed for the perception of both. Four mistakes "in a series 
of 60 stimulations" on the back of the hand is better 
than could be expected. But when it is remembered that 
"there was never any deception on the entire palmar side 
of the hand or on the face," it seems to be evidently a 
matter of developed discrimination and association, and 
not of a mixture of "units of feeling." 

Mr. G. H. Lewes carries the analysis of the physical 
conditions of sensation far past anything reached yet; but 
even he can not claim to have reached ultimate elements, 
since he stopped with ' ' the movements of the psych opl asm " 
which "constitute sensibility." These " tremors of the 
Psychoplasm," which he terms "neural units, the raw 
material of consciousness," must be exceedingly numerous 
and minute; yet they cannot be either ultimate or raw. 
Whatever the " Psychoplasm " may be, these "tremors'' 
must contain all the disturbances of all the end-organs of 
all the nerves of all the sense-organs in all the various 
forms of stimulation. In each retina there are estimated 
to be 1,000,000 end-organs. Undulations of light impinge 
upon these at rates varying from 4-00,000.000,000,000 to 
700,000,000.000,000 per second. A fair average would 
be at least 500,000,000,000,000 per second. Multiplying 
the number of end-organs in both retina? by this average 
would give 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 retinal dis- 
turbances per second. But each of these " tremors " in- 
volves very many "molecular movements;" and so, to 
reach the ultimate component disturbances of the "Psy- 
choplasm," another large multiplication must be made. 
Yet even this inconceivably great product will give neither 



CRITICISM OF THE COMPONENT THEORY. 73 

ultimate " neural units" nor "raw material." These 
molecular " neural units" are not only compound, being 
resultants of atomic movements, but inasmuch as heat is 
always evolved in chemical synthesis, this " material of 
consciousness " must have been cooked in the process. To 
reach the ultimate "raw material of consciousness," it is 
necessary to compute the attracting and repelling forces 
of the atoms. This, however, is the uitimate "raw ma- 
terial," not of sense, but of nonsense. 



CHAPTER IV. 

CRITICISM OF THE CORRELATIVE THEORY. 

§1. Review. — Green's position is most positive and ex- 
plicit in den\ r ing the existence of "such a thing in the 
world of phenomena" as "mere sensations antecedent to 
any action of the intellect ; but he uses the term sensation 
whenever it suits his convenience to do so. Yet he not only 
fails to give a clear distinction between sensation and 
"action of the intellect;" but the following state- 
ments indicate that such distinction was not clear in his 
own mind. " We conclude, then, that facts of feelings, as 
perceived, are not feelings as felt; that, though perception 
presupposes feeling, yet the feeling only survives in per- 
ception as transformed by a consciousness, other than 
feeling, into a fact which remains for that consciousness 
when the feeling has passed." 1 "Only because we do 
more than feel — only because we think in feeling, and thus 
feel objects — have we any need of words. Hence we have 
talked of seeing and touching things long before we have 
reflected on the visual and tactual feelings which are the 
conditions of our seeing and touching them. When we 
come thus to reflect, we have no words for the feelings, 
but the same which we have applied to the perceptions 
conditioned by but essentially different from them; and 
under the illusion caused by this usage, we are brought to 
think that the visual and tactual sensations are equiva- 
lent to the perceptions which we call by the same names. 
It, requires, therefore, a certain eftbrt to convince our- 
selves that it is possible to have a visual sensation with- 
out seeing anything, and a tactual sensation without being 
conscious of touching anything; and, conversely, that 

1. "Works," Vol. I, p. 412. 



CRITICISM OF THE CORRELATIVE THEORY. 75 

what I am said to see never is or includes a visual sensa- 
tion, nor what I am said to touch a tactual sensation." 1 

These passages imply that " a consciousness other than 
feeling" might exist apart from feeling; "that 'facts of 
feeling' as perceived" might be devoid of "feelings as 
felt;" that "feelings as felt" might be unperceived ; and 
that feeling might be "transformed by a consciousness other 
than feeling into a fact that remains — when the feeling is 
passed." Green states "that it is possible to have a vis- 
ual sensation without perceiving anything — and con- 
versely, that what I am said to see never is or includes 
a sensation." Again he states "to feel warm then is not 
the same as to perceive that I am warm," 2 and "Hence 
our habit of overlooking the essential difference between 
the ' phenomenon ' as it issues from the process of atten- 
tion — the proper object of perception — and the sensation 
which precedes that process, or of any of the sensations 
which accompany it." 5 

In some of these statements Green seems to assume 
Hamilton's position, making sensation a perception of 
secondaiw qualities. In making sensations precede the 
"process of attention," he seems to take J. S. Mill's posi- 
tion. But his own positive statements repudiate both of 
these views. Hence by "feelings as felt" he must have 
meant sensations ; and by " consciousness other than feel- 
ing," " action of the intellect." Feeling cannot be "trans- 
formed" into anything "other than feeling," and the "fact 
that remains for that consciousness" is the fact that the 
self remembers and continues to feel. Feeling is fluent, 
facts are fixed. There can be no fluent feeling that is not 
perceived as a fixed fact, neither can there be fixed facts, 
the perception of which does not involve fluent feeling. 
Fluent feeling could not be transformed in the act of per- 
ception and still be perceived as fluent. Again it is impos- 
sible "to have a visual sensation without seeing any- 
thing," unless the "seeing" be restricted to discriminate 

1 op. cit., p. 414, 

2 id, p. 414. 

3 id, p. 415. 




76 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 

perception; and when it is to limited it should be so 
stated. The statement, " what ^ c.m said to see never is or 
includes a visual sensation," is true, but misleading. No ob- 
ject perceived is composed of mere sensations ; it is a product 
resulting from a conscious activity of which sensation is but 
an inseparable function. To say that an object of percep- 
tion "never is or includes sensation " is equivalent to say- 
ing that a fixed identity' objectified under a priori categor- 
ies in unchanging relations never is or includes change. 
Green's statement is, in reality, a sort of figure of speech ; 
a figure confusing, yet frequent in that part of psychologic- 
al literature which treats of sensation. The figure really 
involves two pairs of correlatives, }*et the contrast is made 
between two terms, one of which belongs to each pair. 
Change and identity- are correlative aspects of every object 
of perception, and sensation and intellection are corres- 
ponding correlative aspects of every act of perception. 
In speaking of sense-objects it is customar\- to refer to the 
aspect of identity alone and to regard the aspect of change 
as characterizing only the perceptive process In this way 
the object, spoken of as " what I am said to see," is repre- 
sented as a fixed identity independent of its correlative 
change; and in contrast with this object, misrepresented 
in this figure of speech as unchanging, is placed the term 
sensation, misrepresented also as being independent of its 
correlative intellection. It is unfortunate to use techni- 
cal terms in a figurative sense, or in a loose popular 
way, or without accepting or giving any definition of 
them ; also to make statements general when they are 
true only in a restricted sense. And it is inconsistent, to 
say the least, to err in both respects, after having been 
severely critical of the same errors in others. 

But Prof. Green has carried the analysis of conscious 
phenomena farther than it had ever been carried before ; 
and consequently, either new terms must be used, or old 
terms must be used in a more restricted sense. He has es- 
tablished the fact that all classifications of the phenomena 
of consciousness must be based, not upon the principle of 
relativity, but upon that of correlativity. This requires a 



CRITICISM OF THE CORRELATIVE THEORY. 77 

constant discrimination on the part of a writer, between 
the relative and the correlative signification of such terms 
as feeling and sensation, and a corresponding qualification 
of statement, both of which are all but impossible to those 
who first make the distinction. The criticism to which 
Prof. Green has left himself open is that his statements 
fail to do justice to his thought. 

Dr. Dewey distinguishes ver}' clearly between feeling 
and thought, making the former the individual aspect and 
the latter the universal aspect of consciousness. He does 
not, however, define sensation so as to show its relation 
to feeling. This will be done later. 

Prof. Ladd emphasizes the facts that " there are no sen- 
sations (whatever physical occasion of sensation may ex- 
ist) except those that exist in consciousness;" that "the 
simple sensation is a necessary fiction of psycho-physical 
science;" and that ps^^chology " analyzes what is relatively 
complex into what is relatively very simple and elemental." 
This precludes the view w T hich holds to unconscious in- 
finitessimal sensations, also the view that sensations may 
be given independently of all intellectual activity ; and it 
at the same time justifies the use of the term sensation in 
psychological analysis. 

§2. Definition and Illustration. — In every form of con- 
sciousness there are involved, as before stated, both a 
priori categories, and fluent states of feeling. When the 
perceptive process is dominated principally by the a priori 
categories, the percepts assume the form of quantitative 
relations of force, space, and time; but when dominated 
principally by the flow of feeling, so-called subjective per- 
cepts of sound, color, taste, smell and feeling occupy the at- 
tention . In both cases of perception there are involved both , 
categories, or the universal element, and feeling, or the in- 
dividual element. The percepts of force, space, and time 
have meaning only as causing, containing, and ordering 
the subjective percepts; and the subjective percepts can be 
defined only as they are related causally, spatially, and 
temporally. In illustrating this difference between sensa- 
tion and intellection, it is customary to refer to the ex- 



78 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 

periences of earliest infancy , as being chiefly sensational. 
But since this early experience cannot be recalled in mem- 
ory, it becomes necessary to adopt some method of pro- 
ducing an experience which is supposed to be character- 
ized principally by sensation. Thus, b\ r inhaling anaes- 
thetics, one can gradualh r reduce the whole field of con- 
sciousness through a series of indistinct, confused, and 
fading presentations, to a fluent blur, in which forms, col- 
ors, sounds, and all other percepts are dissolved in a 
flickering, vanishing continuum, which, so long as con- 
sciousness lasts, continues to be a changing, fading object 
of attention. Am^one disliking to follow this method can 
try another which, though not so effectual, will illustrate 
pretty well the same facts. By focusing the attention 
steadily upon a fixed point in the field of vision, the whole 
field may be gradually reduced to a glimmering sheen, in 
which forms and colors blend together, only to start forth 
again on the least movement of the attention from one 
to another of the main points which are constantly van- 
ishing or emerging from the visual field. So soon as the 
focus of attention is moved from one point to another, 
the whole field assumes a new and distinct phase, which, 
if the attention be again held fixed, fades as belore. In 
normal perception, the attention is allowed free move- 
ment; and the presentation, rapidly changing from one 
fixed phase to another, is synthesized into an object. 
which, although constantly changing, is regarded as 
changed in appearance only, that is. the change is re- 
garded as subjective, and a fixed identity is ascribed to the 
object. The movements of attention emphasize the fixed 
phases of the presentation which are regarded as different 
appearances of an unchanged object. In this analysis of 
perception there must be noted (1) the constantly char 
ing, vanishing, and emerging aspects of the field of con- 
sciousness, giving way, under (2) the movements of at- 
tention, to (3) fixed phases of the presentation continu- 
um. The perceptive process is thus always both analytic 
and synthetic, that is, it differentiates the presentation 
continuum into analytic data under the movements of at- 



CRITICISM OF THE CORRELATIVE THEORY. 79 

tention, and automatically and instantaneously synthe- 
sizes these analytic data into complex ' 'presenta- 
tions of sense." The three facts, changing aspects, 
movements of attention, and fixed phases, are in- 
volved in every state of finite consciousness; and, 
though it may at first seem impossible, they are 
simultaneous. It at first seems that the changing 
aspects precede the movements of attention and cause 
them, also that the movement of attention consists in a 
series of starts and stops, and that each stop is followed 
by a fixed phase of the presentation. More careful obser- 
vation, however, will show that the attention is in con- 
stant movement, moving more or less rapidly at times, 
and hence appearing at times more or less fixed, but never 
absolutely fixed. Moreover, the movements of attention 
may be considered the cause of the changing aspects just 
as logically as the effect of them. The e\^e moves volun- 
tarily and involuntarily, and voluntary movement fre- 
quently seems to be composed of starts and stops ; yet 
the eye cannot be held absolutely fixed, as anyone can 
verify by trial. The attention moves in harmony not with 
the action of the eye alone, but with the action of every 
sense-organ, both' voluntarily and involuntarily. Like the 
movements of the eye, the voluntary movements of atten- 
tion seem composed of starts and stops. When, however, 
any apparently single and separate movement of atten- 
tion is carefully examined, it proves to be, like every other 
presentation, a continuum of still lower analytic data; 
and this fact holds true indefinitely. This shows not that 
a conscious state can be held under the focus of attention 
and subjected to an infinite process of division into 
infinites simal elements approximating to zeros of con- 
sciousness ; but that no fixed states of consciousness" 
exist, and that the so-called analysis is a process of con- 
stant change in which the component elements are but 
moments. The vanishing and emerging aspects of the pre- 
sentation may precede certain voluntary movements of at- 
tention, but they cannot precede all movements of atten- 
tion and be in consciousness at all. The changing aspects, 



80 SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 

the movements of attention, and the fixed phases of the 
presentation are simultaneous and correlative factors of 
every state of finite consciousness, in which consciousness 
there are no absolutely fixed, unchanging elements separ- 
ated in time. In the process of perception, consciousness 
constructs fixed objects of sense upon the differentiations 
of the continuum, regarding each object as a synthesis of 
fixed component elements, each of which in turn is again 
regarded as composed of still lower analytic data, and so 
on ad infinitum. Every possible sense-object thus becomes, 
under the movements of attention, according as the move- 
ment is SAmthetic or analytic, either an analytic compon- 
ent element of a higher continuum, or a synthetic contin- 
uum of lower analytic data. There is no ultimate stopping- 
place in consciousness where the anah'tic data can be, or 
correspond to, simple sensations or ultimate units of con- 
sciousness. The three characteristics of consciousness, 
changing aspects, movements of attention, and fixed 
phases of the presentation, correspond to the (1) individ- 
ual element related through (2) functions of the will to (3) 
the universal element. Thus, corresponding to the indi- 
vidual and the universal elements, are the two aspects of 
the sentient phase of consciousness termed, respectively, 
feeling and thought ; and these two phases are related to 
each other through the motive phase, the will. Each of 
these factors of consciousness, feeling, thought, and will, 
according as it is referred to the ego or the non-ego, as- 
sumes a subjective or an objective form. The subjective 
form of the will, the adjustment of the ego to the non-ego. 
is attention; the objective form, the adjustment of 
the non-ego to the ego, is volition. The subject- 
ive form of thought is self-consciousness, the ob- 
jective form is intellection. The subjective form of 
feeling is, as yet, without a name, except as it 
is referred to as pleasure and pain. A very appropriate 
and convenient name for it would be patliv, by which 
name it will be designated hereafter in these pages. The 
objective form of feeling is sensation. Prof. Bain expresses 



CRITICISM OF THE CORRELATIVE THEORY. 81 

this fact very neatly as follows: " A sensation is, prop- 
erly speaking, a sensum,aphase of our objective conscious- 
ness." 1 This, of course, as has been repeatedly stated, does 
not mean that so-called subjective percepts, such as colors, 
sounds and tastes, are sensations ; for all such percepts in- 
volve the a priori principles of intellection as well as sen- 
sation. In so far as such percepts can be described in 
terms of universal application, giving causal, spatial and 
temporal relations, they involve the a priori principles of 
intellection ; and in so far as their character is variable for 
each individual perceiving subject, in so far as they can 
be described only by comparing them with one another, 
when such comparison is not known to be identical for all 
perceiving subjects, they involve sensation. Sensation and 
intellection cannot be regarded as component elements of 
sense-objects. In so for as sense-objects can be analyzed, 
they are composed of lesser sense-objects ; and their differ- 
ent qualities, such as form, color, taste, etc., are but their 
appearances to different sense-organs, singly or in groups, 
each of which appearances involves both sensation and 
intellection. Consciousness is a unity; and the sense-world 
is a continuum, complex in its differentiations. Yet each 
object gets meaning only as it is related to the whole con- 
tinuum. Consciousness cannot begin in disconnected 
states of any kind. To be conscious is to be a unity, con- 
scious of a continuum; and the presentation continuum, 
in its earliest stages, is a complex unity presenting both 
aspects, sensation and intellection. 

In giving final definitions to psychological terms, it is 
necessary to notice the double use made of many of them. 
The same term is used to denote either an activity of con- 
sciousness, or the product resulting from such activity. 
In some cases kindred terms are used, such as conception 
and concept, perception and percept. The nature of 
sense, sensation, intellect and intellection, and also their 
relation to each other and to consciousness as a whole, 
can best be shown by the following tabulation: 

1 "The Senses and Intellect," 3d Ed., p. 382. 



82 



SENSATION AND INTELLECTION— CRITICAL. 



(A 

w 
2; 




w 

Z 
O 
U 


Infinite. 


a* 

z 

to 


Motive Phase, or Will. 


a 

o 

'v 

M 

O 

V 

— 

a 

CI 

a 

u 

d5 




Subjective 

Form, or 

Attention. 


Objective 
Form, or 
Volition. 


Process. 


Individual 

Aspect, or 
Feeling. 


Active State, 
or Sense. 


Pathy. 




Passive State^ 
or Sensibility. 




Pro 


Universal 

Aspect, or 
Thought. 


Active State, 
or Intellect. 


Self-Con- 
sciousness. 


Intellection. 


— 


Passive St., or 
Intellectuality 


Cause. 


Effect. 





In the above tabulation, every term represents con- 
sciousness as a unity, viewed in some correlative phase, 
aspect, form, or state; e.g., "Sensation" represents con- 
sciousness in the objective form of the individual aspect 
of the sentient phase. 

In addition to the generic meaning of the term sensation, 
as indicated in this tabulation, it has two specific mean- 
ings which are of frequent use. In psycho-physical mec 
urements, it is used to designate a simple percept of any 
single sense; and in psychological analysis it is used to 
designate any least possible change in the sensational as- 
pect of the presentation continuum. It would be well if 
the term percept could supplant the use of the term sensa- 
tion in all psycho-physical measurements, for then the 
term sensation would have but one generic and one spe- 
cific meaning, and all ambiguity would thus be avoided. 



PAET III. 

Physical Conditions of Sensation 



CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE. 

• 

§ 1. Limits to Physical Analysis. — In passing from 
the mental to the physical conditions of sensation, one 
might at first expect to pass from the changeable to the 
fixed. Such expectation, however, if entertained, soon 
vanishes. In a certain sense the physical is more fixed 
than the mental ; but in the physical conditions of sensa- 
tion there is such an endless complexit}' of detail, forever 
dissolving before a critical analysis into still lower minutiae, 
that no fixed limit can be named from which to start 
definition and classification. The only ultimate starting- 
place would be the atom of matter and the undulation of 
force; but these are entirely beyond empirical analysis, and 
so are even less satisfactory than the ever changing pre- 
sentations of consciousness. 

§ 2. Doubtful Problems. — Doubt exists concerning the 
number of senses and the character of the functions of 
some of them. The so-called sense of touch includes 
several senses, the number and character of which are 
still undetermined. The existence of three, the tactual, 
the muscular, and the thermal, appears to be established 
beyond reasonable doubt. Two others, the sense of the 
articular cartilages and the sense of innervation, are still 
in dispute. 

Doubtful points concerning the exact nature of nerve- 
stimuli can probably never be determined. The nature of 




84 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF SENSATION. 

the photo-chemical process, by which the rods and cones 
of the retina are supposed to be stimulated, is beyond the 
reach of even intelligent guessing. In what manner we 
perceive the direction from which sounds come, is a ques- 
tion involving complex difficulties. The differences be- 
tween normal and abnormal stimulation cannot always 
be determined. Every problem of physiological ps\'Chol- 
ogy involves undetermined factors and indeterminable 
conditions. 

§3. Changes of Nervous Tissue. — Chemical change is 
constantly taking place in all the tissues of the body ; but 
there is reason to believe that in nerve-stimulation such 
change is unusually rapid in both brain and nerves. "On 
general principles of physical science there can be little 
doubt that the excitation and conduction of nerve-com- 
motion is dependent upon a chemical change in the ner- 
vous tissue itself. Moreover, we know that the process of 
conduction in the nerve requires each of its molecules to 
act upon the neighboring elements as the condition of the 
process continuing. Nor can this process itself be a mere 
impartation of motion, from molecule to molecule; on the 
contrary, the phenomena of electrotonus seem to show- 
that it must also consist in the setting free of energy 
which exists latent within the molecules of the nerve-sub- 
stance. Accordingly, we should be tempted to describe 
the process of progressive excitation of the nerve some- 
what as follows : Every element of the nerve, by reason 
of its highly complex and unstable chemical constitution, 
contains a large store of energy ; the excitement of the 
nerve consists in the explosive decomposition successively 
of these elements of the nerve ; and the result of the de- 
composition is the setting free of the stored energy to be 
expended in part in the excitation of the next adjoining 
elements. The process, then, is not altogether unlike the 
burning of a line of powder grains. Such an hypothesis, 
however, would at once have to answer several difficult 
questions. Why does not the whole of the explosive sub- 
stance burn up instead of only an amount of it approxi- 



PRELIMINARY OUTLINE. 

mately proportional to the strength of the stimulus which 
sets the process agoing?" 1 

§4. The Psyco-physical Law. — The relation between 
strength of stimulus and intensity of sensation is deter- 
mined by actual experiment and stated in the so-called 
"psycho-physical law." The strength of the stimulus can 
easily be determined in regard to the senses of sight, hear- 
ing, and touch; but since the intensity of the sensation 
always involves a subjective estimate, no invariable law 
is possible. The general law holds, that the ratio of in- 
crease in the stimulus is greater than the ratio of increase 
in the intensity of the sensation. In general, the more in- 
tense the sensation, the less sensitive is the judgment to 
slight changes in intensity; hence (since intensity cannot 
be measured objectively, but can only be estimated sub- 
jectively), it naturally follows that the ratio of successive 
changes in intensity is less than that of the corresponding 
changes in the strength of stimulus. 

Prof. James uses the term, "elementary psycho-physic 
law," to express "the connection of thought and brain" 
when "stated in an elementary form." He saj^s: "As the 
total neurosis changes, so does the total psychosis 
change." "Every sensation corresponds to some cerebral 
action. For an identical sensation to recur it would have 
to occur the second time in an unmodified brain." "Before 
the connection of thought and brain can be explained, it 
must at least be stated in an elementary form; and there 
are great difficulties about so stating it. To state it in an 
elementary form one must reduce it to its low r est terms 
and know which mental fact and which cerebral fact are, 
so to speak, in immediate juxtaposition. We must find 
the minimal mental fact whose being reposes directly on 
a brain-fact; and we must similarly find the minimal brain- 
event which will have a mental counterpart at all. Be- 
tween the mental and physical minima thus found there 
will be an immediate relation, the expression of which, if 
we had it, would be the elementary psycho-plrysic law." 2 

1. Ladd's "Phys. Psy." pp. 222-3. 

2. '-Principles of Psychology," vol. I, pp. 243, 232, and 177. 



86 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF SENSATION. 

The ' 'minimal mental fact," in the form of an "ultimate 
•unit of consciousness," proved to be a mere fiction; and 
the minimal "neural unit," in the "raw material of con- 
sciousness," proved likewise to be a mere product of the 
imagination. But if it be true that "For an identical sen- 
sation to recur it would have to occur the second time in 
an unmodified brain" (and no one seems ever to have dis- 
puted or doubted the statement), it would require, in order 
to fully state "the connection of thought and brain, "a com- 
plete physical and chemical analysis of both brain and 
nerves, setting forth all conditions and changes for each 
successive sensation. This would be the "minimal brain- 
event" involved in "the elementary psycho-physic law" of 
which Prof. James speaks. 

Any psycho-physical law that pretends to express in 
mathematical terms a causal relation between the physical 
and the psychical involves undetermined factors, inde- 
terminable conditions, and unverifiable assumptions. 



CHAPTER II. 

Character of the Several Senses. 

81. The muscular sense is so inseparably associated 
with the tactual, that its exact nature can probably never 
be determined. That it has a distinct character cannot 
reasonably be doubted, since the presence of both sensory 
nerve-fibrils and motor end-plates in the muscles warrants 
the conclusion that the sense of effort is dependent upon 
the muscular sense for its intensive character. The sense of 
effort seems to be attributed by different psychologists to 
at least four different sources, stimulation of tactual 
nerves, of afferent nerves in the muscles, of the motor 
end-plates of the efferent nerves to the muscles, and to 
central innervation. Bain, Wundt, Helmholtz and others 
claim the existence of a sense of central innervation; 
Ferrier, Ladd, James and others dispute the existence of 
such a sense, and claim that the sense of effort is due 
chiefly to kinaesthetic tactual sensation. James argues 
the question very forcibly from three different stand-points, 
the u a priori" the ' 'introspective, " and the "circumstan- 
tial." The a priori argument is that such a sense could 
be of no value, inasmuch as the movements causing all de- 
sired changes in sensation are associated with the kinaes- 
thetic sensations accompanying such changes, and these 
sensations furnish the only cue needed for the proper con- 
trol of the necessary movements. Arguing from the "in- 
trospective" point of view, James says: — "There is no in- 
trospective evidence of the feeling of innervation. When- 
ever we look for it and think we have grasped it, we 
find that we have really got a peripheral feel- 
ing or image instead — an image of the way in 



88 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF SENSATION. 

which we feel when the innervation is over, and the 
movement is in process of doing or is done. * * * There 
is indeed the fiat, the element of consent, or resolve that 
the act shall ensue. This, doubtless, to the reader's mind, 
as to my own, constitutes the essence of the voluntariness 
of the act. * * No one will pretend that its quality 

varies according as the right arm, for example, or the left 
is used. "An anticipatory image, then, of the sensorial 
consequences of a movement (plus on certain occasions), 
the fiat that these consequences shall become actual, is the 
only psychic state which introspection lets us discern as 
the forerunner of our voluntary acts." 1 This same 
thought has been expressed by Dr. Dewey as follows: 
"Our experience consists in learning to interpret these 
sensations; in seeing what acts they stand for. Hav- 
ing learned this, knowing that a certain sensation 
means a certain movement, we control the movement by 
controlling the sensations. We learn, in other words, not 
only the meaning of a sensation, but the connection of 
the various sensations, and in what order sensations 
must be arranged in order to occasion other sensatio 5 
Anyone can easily convince himself of the truth of the 
above statements by noting facts in his own experience. 
For example, while one is reading, some spot on the sur- 
face of the body may suddenly give rise to sharp, stingi. 
sensations; when, without thought of a muscle or a move- 
ment, the hand will find the spot and relieve the pain. 
What is willed in such cases is not an innervation, not a 
movement, but a change of sensations ; and this causes 
the movements necessary to make the desired changes. 
From the "circumstantial" point of view it is argued 
that in all examples cited as cases of innervation, the feel- 
ing in question proves to be a complex of peripheral sen- 
sations ; and that there are conclusive reasons for believ- 
ing such to be necessarily always the case. Wundt argues 
that, were the feeling of effort of peripheral origin, it 
ought always to be proportional to the work actually 

1. "Principles of Psychology." Vol. II., pp. 4-99-501. 

2. Psychology, p. 375. 



CHARACTER OF THE SEVERAL SENSES. 89 

done, and that this is not the case. A person may feel 
great effort in trying to move a limb partiall}' paralyzed 
when but little or no movement follows. These facts, he 
claims, show a central origin of the feeling. Against these 
arguments, it is claimed that in all such cases where a 
sense of effort is felt, there is actual muscular contraction 
of the respiratory muscles, especially of the glottis, and 
that the feeling of effort always accompanies such con- 
traction ; but that if this be prevented, and no other mus- 
cular contraction occurs, no sense of effort can be felt. It 
is very natural to contract the respiratory muscles in all 
cases of absorbed attention. In listening intently one is 
apt to stop breathing, and this occasions a sense of effort; 
but if natural breathing be maintained while listening, no 
such sense of effort will be noticed. The only histological 
evidence of the existence of a sense of innervation is the 
motor end-plates in the efferent nerves ; but this would 
argue for a peripheral not a central sense. A peripheral 
sense of this nature might arise, but it would always be 
inseparably associated with the efferent muscular sense. 
And as Prof. Ladd says, " we seem warranted in assum- 
ing that there is no such specific difference in the function 
of the two kinds of nerves as is dependent upon the pecu- 
liar structure or molecular processes of each kind. Both 
afferent and efferent nerves are probably capable of the 
same kind of molecular commotion called nervous excita- 
tion, and of conducting this commotion in either direc- 
tion. The marked difference in the results of the exercise 
of this function in the two cases is probably due chiefly to 
the difference in the organs from which the excitation of 
the nerve starts, and into which it is discharged." 1 From 
all the facts stated it would seem most rational to sup- 
pose that the sense of effort is, in so far as its intensity is 
concerned, dependent upon the muscular sense, which is 
peripheral in origin and connected with the stimulation of 
both afferent and efferent nerves. In so far as spatial re- 
lations are associated with the sense of effort, this sense 
is doubtless dependent upon the tactual sense. 



1. "Phys. Psy." pp. 54-5. 



90 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF SENSATION. 

52. The sense of touch seems to be the next sense in 
the order of development. Aside from its relation to the 
muscular sense, there seems to be little doubt regarding its 
character. It is sharply distinguished from the sense of 
temperature; and the only remaining source of doubt seems 
to be its relation to the sense of the articular cartilages. 
Although histolog3 r has done nothing as yet to de- 
termine the presence of nerve end-organs in these carti- 
lages, the sense of feeling connected with them is proba- 
bly a form of the tactual sense connected with the 
synovial membrane reflected upon the marginal surfaces 
of the joints. 

53. The sense of temperature has been represented as 
a double sense, havingboth "heat-spots" and "cold-spots." 
The separate existence of such spots possibh' depends upon 
the fact that some regions of the skin come more frequently 
into contact with objects warmer than themselves, while 
with other regions, the reverse is true. "Sensations of 
temperature have apparently, a certain dependence on the 
temperature of the thermic apparatus itself. This law has 
been elaborated and defended in detail by Hering in the 
following form: 'As often as the thermic apparatus at 
an}" spot in the skin has a temperature which lies above 
its own zero-point we have a sensation of heat; in the con- 
trary case, a sensation of cold.' By the 'zero-point 1 of any 
part of the skin is meant the exact objective temperature 
which at that part will produce no sensation of either heat 
or cold. Such zero-point is, of course, different for different 
parts of the body, according as they are or are not ex- 
posed , and are or are not well supplied with arterial blood . " ! 

£4. The sense next in order of differentiation is taste. 
It is definitely located and has special nerve-branches and 
specific nerve-endings. Since the tongue is the chief organ 
of taste, and also well adapted by its form and situation 
to act as an organ of both touch and temperature, it nat- 
urally follows that sensations of touch and temperature 
are often confused with sensations of taste. So-called pun- 
gent tastes are tactual affections; and cooling tastes, like 

1. Ladd's "Phys. Psy." p. 350. 



CHARACTER OF THE SEVERAL SENSES. '•>! 

that of peppermint, are greatly modified by the sense of 
temperature. From the close proximity and kindred 
nature of the sense of taste to that of smell, odors are 
frequently confused with tastes. So-called flavors are 
principally olfactory affections. 

§5. In the sense of smell a degree of differentiation is 
reached which is characterized by a separate cranial nerve 
and a separate sense-organ. The only confusion in regard 
to the function of the sense of smell is the possible con- 
fusion with the sense of taste. 

£6. The sense of sight has its own special cranial nerve 
and its own separate sense-organ; but as this organ has 
also a very finely discriminating sense of movement, reti- 
nal sensations are greatly modified by the concomitant 
tactual and muscular sensations. 

S7. The auditory sense-organ is the most completely 
differentiated and isolated of all, being enclosed in a bony 
cavity and removed from all the disturbing influences to 
which the other senses are liable. And yet even this sense, 
shut in as it is, is modified in its function by changes 
in its stimulus resulting from the varying conditions of 
the surrounding tissues and fluids. Respiration, pulsa- 
tions of the heart, and the varying pressure of blood-ves- 
sels and air passages, both normal and abnormal, affect 
the undulations that stimulate the auditory end-organs. 
$8. The senses thus entitled to scientific recognition as 
primarj T , special senses, are the muscular sense, and the 
senses of touch, temperature, taste, smell, seeing and hear- 
ing. The specific quality of the sensations of four of these 
senses, and the variations of such quality, are noted and 
named. Sounds are high and low; colors are violet, indigo, 
blue, green, yellow, orange and red; tastes are sweet, sour, 
salt and bitter; temperatures are warm and cold. In this 
respect the other three senses are less fortunate. Odors 
and tactual and muscular sensations are so closely asso- 
ciated with corresponding physical objects that they can 
be named only in connection with those objects. This does 
not lessen their practical value, however, since conscious- 
ness recognizes them and passes to their significates as 
readily as though each had a separate name. 



CHAPTER III. 
Modifying Conditions. 

51. Mental. — Attention is an important factor in de- 
termining the character of sensation. A listener to music 
may follow the soprano, tenor, alto, or bass separately; 
or he may follow the combined result, regardless of the 
different parts. But what he hears in the latter case is 
not a mixture of what he might have heard, following the 
parts separately. One having no knowledge of music 
cannot follow the parts separately; while one skilled in 
music can hardly help doing so more or less, can, in fact, 
hardly hear music as he did before he had learned to ana- 
lyze it. Again, a person listening intently cannot see so 
well, or looking intently, cannot hear so well; his sensa- 
tions are, in either case, different from what they would 
be were his attention not pre-occupied. At every move- 
ment of the attention, the whole presention changes, new 
elements being constantly differentiated and as rapidly 
synthesized. This is not a mere division of the same pre- 
sentation into new parts, but every such differentiation 
renders the whole presentation new. 

Expectation greatly modifies the differentiation and 
the synthesis. When changes are expected, they frequently 
appear without objective causes, or with none sufficient to 
give rise to them as seen. In twilight, people frequently 
see, not real objects before them, but creations of their own 
imagination. 

.4 priori principles, such as substantiality, causality, 
identity and the various spatial and temporal categoric 
dominate all minds alike in ascribing to the presentation 
an independent reality fixed in permanent relations of 



MODIFYING CONDITION'S. 93 

force, space, and time. "Things are known only through 
the sensations which they produce in us; and how can we 
pass from these sensations to the notion of things ex- 
tended in space? Moreover, sensations are in perpetual 
flow; how can we pass from their constant change to the 
changeless relations of space?" 1 In order to maintain the 
conception of things as unchanged in space, in opposi- 
tion to all the testimony of the senses that the objective 
world in every part is in constant change, intellection, 
especially with the a priori categories of identity and sub- 
stantiality, accounts for all changes as effecting appear- 
ance only and not substance. When things disappear en- 
tirely from view and reappear again, consciousness un- 
avoidably concludes that there is something supersensi- 
ble, either magnitudes or substances or forces. These 
metaphysical postulates are then regarded as unchanging, 
and as constituting the basis of all fixed objects related in 
time and space. 

§2. Physical. — "As the total neurosis changes, so does 
the total pS3 T chosis change." The physical conditions in- 
volved in the "neurosis" may be analyzed into component 
elements more or less fixed, and this naturally gives rise 
to the impression that the conscious data involved in the 
"pS3 r chosis" may also be analyzed in a similar manner in- 
to fixed component elements. While there is a certain 
correspondence between the analyses of the neurosis and 
of the psychosis, there is an essential difference between 
the two. A certain sensation ma3 r follow the stimulation 
of a sense-organ. Both the stimulation and the sense-organ 
may be analyzed into separate component elements, and 
a different sensation may result from a partial stimulation 
of the sense-organ. The latter sensation, however, is not 
a component element of the former. Consciousness is a 
synthetic unity of analytic data, but the data can exist 
only as correlated in the unity; and each datum, instead 
of being a component part of the unity, is the unity itself, 
viewed in some correlative aspect. A careful comparative 
study of conscious changes, and of the corresponding 
changes of the neurosis, gives ground for valid inferences 

1. Bowne's "Introduction to Psychological Theory," p. 133. 



94 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF SENSATION. 

concerning the classification of sensations. In this way, 
histology has helped to decide the question as to the ex- 
istence of the muscular sense, and may yet throw more 
light upon the nature of the sense of innervation and the 
sense of the articular cartilages. 

£3. Metaphysical Assumptions. — The physical stimu- 
lus of sensation, so long as it is characterized in terms 
denoting sensible objects, may properl\ r be considered as a 
cause of sensation; but when so characterized, it is not 
antecedent to, or independent of, sensation. This leaves 
the causal agency, not without, but within, consciousness; 
that is, in perceived objects, the perception of which is 
always dependent upon sensation. When the physical 
stimulus is characterized in terms of atoms and molecular 
forces it passes beyond the range of sensibility, and hence 
beyond the scope of empirical science; and becomes meta- 
physical. To say that sensations are mechanically de- 
termined by physical stimuli, can have no possible mean- 
ing for empirical science except that one conscious state 
follows another in causal relations. While empirical 
science must stop here, no rational mind will or can do so. 
The nature of that which lies beyond the changing phe- 
nomena with which empirical science deals will and must 
be postulated, and such postulates arc useful in guiding 
empirical researches. Such postulates, however, should n 
be confused with atoms and undulations, which are sup- 
posed to be actual components of sensible objects, but 
they should be recognized and acknowledged, and able to 
meet thorough criticism. The only postulate that can 
successfully meet such criticism is that of an infinite 
consciousness, regarded as the source of individual, 
or finite, conscious activity. All psychologists must 
admit that all objects of perception are products con- 
structed in the perceptive process. To make any 
such product of perception, or any object inferred 
from an analysis of such product, the cause of 
the conscious activity that constructs or infers it. as 
every form of natural realism does, is to reverse the real 
order of facts. To make an acknowledged creation of 



MODIFYING CONDITIONS. 95 

consciousness the cause of the consciousness that creates 
it, is an absurdity; but to refer all finite consciousness to a 
correlative infinite consciousness as its source, is not only 
a logical, but a necessary conclusion; since finite conscious- 
ness, in all individuals, is in perfect harmony with the 
same a priori principles. This means that the real, which, 
in contrast with the ideal, is regarded as existing indepen- 
dently in quantitative relations of force, space, and time, 
is a strict correlative of the ideal; and hence, that both are 
essential factors of every state of finite consciousness. 
The discussion of this question will appear in the second 
book of this thesis. 



BOOK II. 



The Functions of Sensation and Intellection in 
the Cognition of the Real and the Ideal. 



PART I. 

Cognition of the Real. 



CHAPTER I. 
Distinction Between the Real and the Ideal. 

This distinction rests upon the category of the absolute. 
Whatever is supposed to be absolute and unchangeable in 
itself is naturally regarded as existing independent of all 
finite consciousness, and is hence termed real, in distinc- 
tion from the relative, or ideal, which is referred to finite 
consciousness as a causal agency. This distinction forms 
the basis of natural realism, which gives rise to metaphys- 
ics. Metaplrysical reality is usuall\ r represented as trans- 
cending the range of all possible experience, yet as being 
an object of pure thought. The doctrine of metaphysical 
reality thus represents an object of thought, and conse- 
quently the act of consciousness by which it is apprehend- 
ed, as entirely free from empirical or sensational condi- 
tions; and in so doing, violates the law of correlation. In- 
finite consciousness, of course, contains that which trans- 
cends the limitations of finite consciousness; but no object 
of finite consciousness, even though it may be called an 
object of pure thought, can be free from either of the cor- 
relative aspects of cognition, sensation and intellection. 
A metaphysical reality is thus a mere abstraction; since 
all possible objects of finite consciousness must present 
both aspects, the pure and the empirical. 

The distinction between the real and the ideal, how- 
everts necessar}'; and hence must rest on a universal pro- 
cess of thought, for only thus could it be clear or tenable. 
The ambiguity arising from this distinction, as made by 
different persons, comes from being carried too far. All 
agree in basing it upon the category of the absolute, some 



100 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

include in it the categor}- of substantiality, and still 
others include, in addition to this, the category of causality-. 
Since only a relative distinction can be maintained, it 
would matter little, provided all persons were agreed, 
whether it was based one of the a priori categories or on 
more than one. For convenience of classification, the dis- 
tinction, as made here, will rest on the category of the ab- 
solute; and the categories of substantiality and causality 
will be used to make subordinate distinctions in both the 
real and the ideal. The real, according to this distinc- 
tion, is any object of consciousness viewed as absolute and 
unchangeable in itself; and the ideal is the same viewed as 
relative to the functions of consciousness. 

As indicated in the classification of deductive concepts 
given on p. 54, both the self and the not-self of finite 
consciousness may be differentiated into the real and the 
ideal. The ideal self is further differentiated into the 
primary faculties of consciousness, viz., will, feeling, and 
thought. The real appears, when viewed under the cate- 
gory of activity, as force; when under the category of 
substantiality in the individual aspect, as mind ; when in 
the universal aspect, as matter. The real is cognized in 
mathematical relations of force, space and time, according 
as it is referred respectively to the will, to thought, or to 
feeling. The ideal not-self becomes, when similarly refer- 
red to the will, to feeling, and to thought, the good, the 
beautiful, and the true. Finally the ideal-real, or infi- 
nite consciousness, although it must, in accordance with 
the law of mutual limitation, be regarded as in itself free 
from all finite qualification; must also, when viewed in 
correlation to finite consciousness, assume aspects corres- 
ponding to the primary functions of finite cognition. 

According to the correlative distinction between the 
real and the ideal, the cognition of each is dependent upon 
the function of sensation as well as upon that of intellec- 
tion. To make the truth of this statement evident the 
cognition of each must be analyzed. 



CHAPTER II. 

Cognition of Mind, Matter and Force. 

§1. Cognition of Mind and Matter. — Mind is cog- 
nized whenever any sense-object viewed under the cate- 
gor} T of substantiality assumes the individual aspect; 
when such object assumes the universal aspect, matter is 
cognized. Individuality of substance must not be con- 
fused with unity of substance or with indivisibility of 
substance. Spinoza's substance was a unity, but in it all 
individual^ was lost. An atom is supposed to be an in- 
divisible substance, but no individual characteristic is as- 
cribed to an atom to distinguish it from other atoms of 
the same kind. Unit}' and indivisibilit3 r are both essen- 
tial to individuality, but they do not constitute it. Indi- 
viduality is that which distinguishes one indivisible unit}- 
from all others. Individuality of substance is cognized 
not in space, but in time. Substance, in time only, is 
mind, in space only, is matter. Mind and matter are 
thus correlative aspects of substance. When this correla- 
tion is overlooked, and the two are contrasted under the 
law of contradiction, it is quite natural for matter to 
assume the aspects of substance and causality, and for 
mind to assume the correlative aspects of phenomenon and 
effect. Materialism is thus a natural outgrowth of dual- 
ism. But substance, isolated from its correlate, phenome- 
non, is an abstraction; and matter and mind, when again 
isolated from each other, are but abstractions from ab- 
stractions. To cognize either mind or matter, one must 
regard some object under the category of substantiality, 
and emphasize, under the focus of attention, either the 
individual or the universal aspect of that substance. In 



102 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

this act of cognition, both aspects of the object, sub- 
stance and phenomenon, are involved, but the emphasis 
must fall on the former. To cognize either mind or mat- 
ter thus requires all three of the primary functions of con- 
sciousness. The will is represented by the movements of 
attention; sensation is involved in the cognition of phe- 
nomena; and intellection, in the form of a priori cate- 
gories, dominates the entire process. 

§2. Cognition oi Force. — Force is one of the primary 
phases of both the real self and the real not-self; and in 
either case it may be viewed in relation to either the cate- 
gory of causality or the functions of the will. 

The category of causality, when applied to physical 
changes, assumes either the subjective aspect of effort or 
the objective aspect of energy. Effort and energy are 
thus correlative aspects of force. Either term implies the 
other. Effort is the intensive, energy the extensive meas- 
urement of force; that is, effort is the intensity of the feel- 
ing by which force is estimated, while energy is computed 
in spatial and temporal terms. There can be no effort 
that is not put forth in time and space, nor can energy be 
conceived except as the effort of some self as a center pull- 
ing or pushing some not-self. 

Force is thus cognized as a sensible object viewed under 
the aspect of causality; and it is measured only in units 
consisting of sense-objects which represent both the in- 
tensity of the effort and the relations of the energy to 
space and time. The unit of this measurement is the 
horse-power, which is the elevation of 33,000 pounds one 
foot in one minute. To perceive this unit is to perceive 
the pound weight, the foot of space, and the minute of 
time. The pound weight is the weight of about 2S cubic 
inches of water. In order to perceive this weight one 
must lift the water and experience the effort required. To 
find its comparative weight by balancing it with a certain 
volume of some other substance, gives no weight at all, 
unless the weight of the latter substance be known by ex- 
perience gained in lifting it. This measurement of force is 
an estimate of effort put forth in space and time. 



MIND, MATTER AXI) FORCE. 103 

Another way of measuring force is to find its equivalent 
in heat; but the measurement of this heat involves both 
subjective estimates of the feeling of temperature and ob- 
jective measurement of time and space. In like manner, 
force ma}- be measured by finding its equivalent in light or 
electricity; but the measurement of these, again, involves 
both subjective estimates of intensity of certain feelings 
and objective measurements of time and space. 

Every method of measuring force thus involves both 
subjective estimates of intensity of feeling and objective 
measurements of time and space; and the subjective feeling 
must, in order to give any significance to the measurement 
of force, be that of effort. All other measurements are but 
comparisons based upon the horse-power. The sense of 
effort is essential to voluntas change. The intensity of 
the effort, or the effort as referred to the self, is the basis 
of all estimates of the strength of force as the cause of all 
change. The extensity of the effort, or the effort as differ- 
entiated and synthesized in a, priori relations to the not- 
self, is the basis of all estimates of spatial magnitudes. 
The intensity of the effort rests upon muscular sensation. 
The extensit}^ as will be more evident after space-percep- 
tion has been analyzed, rests upon tactual and retinal sen- 
sation. 

The cognition of force thus involves the functions of 
will, feeling and thought. The will is involved in the 
objective form, volition; feeling, in the muscular and tac- 
ual sensations; and thought, in the a priori categories of 
quantity. 



CHAPTER III. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 



|1. Classification of theories — Theories of space-per- 
ception do not necessarily depend upon the character as- 
signed to space as metaphysical or empiricical. All psy- 
chologists agree that all space-forms, as perceived, are 
products constructed in the act of perception. Dualists 
acknowledge that no extended data can enter the non- 
spatial mind to be elaborated and projected in space-form. 
Materialists acknowledge that the undulations trans- 
mitted to the brain centers cannot carry with them the 
forms or magnitudes of the objects perceived, also that 
such forms and magnitudes cannot be determined by the 
form, extent, or location of the brain-tracts stimulated. 
Dualists, materialists and idealists must all agree that all 
space-forms of consciousness are constructed in the act of 
perception, whatever the nature of that act may be. 

A geometrical theory of space-perception was the only 
one ever definitely formulated before the time of Berkeley. 
This theory held space to be real and to be perceived by 
direct intuition in strict accoid with the laws of the 
reflection and refraction of light. Various writers re- 
jected this theory, but no definite hypothesis in opposition 
to it appeared, until Berkeley wrote his "Essay Toward a 
New Theory of Vision." 

Attempts have been made to classify all theories of 
space-perception into two divisions, the " nativistic " and 
the "empirical;" but such a classification is not only defec- 
tive but misleading. A theory may be both nativistic and 
empirical, as was Berkeley's. A complete classification 
must include three classes : One ascribing all original 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 105 

spatial data to purely sensational sources, or the Sensa- 
tional Theory ; another ascribing no spatial significance 
whatever to sensational functions, but attributing the 
origin of space-form to an intellectual process consisting 
of a reproductive association of successive, non-spatial, 
sensational data, or the Associational Theory ; and a 
third, regarding space- form as a product of an intellectual 
synthesis, a priori and hence automatic, of all such sensa- 
tional data as present the conditions essential to such 
synthesis, or the A Priori Synthetic Theory. 

The sensational theory was first definitely formulated 
by Berkeley. It makes sensation the sole origin of all 
spatial data, from which, by processes of analysis and as- 
sociation, all spatial relations are developed. As ad- 
vanced by Berkeley, this theory made no distinction 
between sensation and intellection, and hence failed to 
give any universal validity to spatial relations. The 
theory, somewhat modified in form, is still supported by 
prominent psychologists, especially by Dr. Ward and 
Prof. James . 

The associational theory has many advocates among 
both the German and the English associational schools, 
the former being principally idealists, and the latter, real- 
ists. Lotze also must be classed among the supporters of 
the associational theory, notwithstanding the fact that 
his theory of " local signs " is pure sensationalism. 

The a priori synthetic theory originated in Kant's dis- 
tinction between the empirical and the a priori functions 
of consciousness ; and, as Kant stated it, the emphasis 
was placed almost entirely upon the latter. The theory 
so modified as to place great emphasis upon sensational 
conditions, is ably supported by Prof. Wundt. 

§2. Statement of the Three Theories. 
(1.) The Sensational Theory. — Berkeley states the 
principal points of this theory as follows: "But those 
lines and angles by means whereof some men pretend to 
explain the perception of distance, are themselves not at 
all perceived, nor are they in truth ever thought of by 
those unskillful in optics. I appeal to anyone's experi- 



106 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

ence, whether, upon sight of an object, he computes its 
distance b} r the bigness of the angle made by the meeting 
of the two optic axes? or whether he ever thinks 
of the greater or lesser divergenc\- of the ra\^s which 
arrive from any point to his pupil? Since, 

therefore, those angles and lines are not themselves per- 
ceived by sight, it follows, from sect. 10, that the mind 
does not by them judge of the distance of objects. 
Secondly, the truth of this assertion will be yet further 
evident to any one that considers those lines and angles 
have no real existence in nature, being onh' an hypothesis 
framed by the mathematicians, and by them introduced 
into optics that they might treat of that science in 
a geometrical way. The third and last reason I shall 
give for rejecting that doctrine, that though we should 
grant the real existence of those optic angles, etc., and 
that it was possible for the mind to perceive them, 
yet these principles would not be found sufficient to ex- 
plain the phenomena of distance, as shall be shown here- 
after. * * * And, first, it is certain by experience, that 
when we look at a near object with both eyes, according 
as it approaches or recedes from us, we alter the disposi- 
tion of our eyes, by lessening or widening the interval 
between the pupils. This disposition or turn of the eyes 
is attended with a sensation, which seems to me to be 
that which in this case brings the idea of greater or lesser 
distance into the mind. Not that there is any natural or 
necessary connection between the sensation we perceive 
by the turn of the eyes and greater or lesser distance. 
But — because the mind has, by constant experience, found 
the different sensations corresponding to the different 
dispositions of the eyes to be attended each with a differ- 
ent degree of distance in the object — there has grown an 
habitual or customary connection between those two 
sorts of ideas ; so that the mind no sooner perceives the 
sensation arising from the different turn it gives the eyes, 
in order to bring the pupils nearer or further asunder, but 
it withal perceives the different idea of distance which 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 107 

was wont to be connected with tha t sensation. " lu Secondly, 
an object placed at a certain distance from the eye, 
to which the breadth of the pupil bears a considerable pro- 
portion, being made to approach, is seen more confused ly. 
And the nearer it is brought the more confused appearance 
it makes. And, this being found constantly to be so, there 
arises in the mind an habitual connexion between the 
several degrees of confusion and distance; the greater 
confusion still implying the lesser distance, and the lesser 
confusion the greater distance of the object. This con- 
fused appearance of the object doth therefore seem to be 
the medium whereby the mind judges distance." 2 "Thirdly, 
an object being placed at the distance above specified, and 
brought near to the eye, we may, nevertheless prevent, at 
least for some time, the appearances growing more con- 
fused, by straining the eye. In which case, that sensation 
supplies the place of confused vision, in aiding the mind to 
judge of the distance of the object ; it being esteemed so 
much the nearer by how much the effort or straining 
of the eye in order to distinct vision is greater." 3 

" In these and the like instances, the truth of thematter, 
I find, stands thus: Having of a long time experienced 
certain ideas perceivable by touch, as distance, tangible 
figure, and solidity, to have been connected with certain 
ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight, 
forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted 
ordinary course of nature, like to follow. Looking at an 
object, I perceive a certain visible figure and colour, with 
some degree of faintness and other circumstances, which, 
from what I have formerly observed, determine me to 
think that if I advance forward as many paces, miles, &c, 
I shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch, so 
that, in truth and strictness of speech, I neither see dis- 
tance itself, nor anything that I take to be at a distance. 
I say, neither distance nor things placed at a distance are 
themselves, or their ideas, truly perceived by sight."* 

1 " Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision." Section 1 2-13. 

2 id., Sections 21-2. 

3 id., Section 27. 

4 id. sec. 45. 



108 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

Dr. Ward supports the sensational theory in the fol- 
lowing statements: "That space is a priori in the epistemo- 
logical sense it is no concern of the psychologist either to 
assert or to deny. Psychologically a priori or original in 
such sense that it has been either actually or potentially 
an element in all presentation from the yqtj beginning it 
certainly is not. * * We do not first experience a succession 
of touches or of retinal excitations by means of move- 
ments, and then, when these impressions are simultan- 
eously presented, regard them as extensive, because the}- 
are associated with or symbolize the original series of 
movements; but, before and apart from movement alto- 
gether, we experience that narrowness or extensity of im- 
pressions in which movements enable us to find positions, 
and also to measure. But it will be objected, perhaps not 
without impatience, that this amounts to the monstrous 
absurdity of making the contents of consciousness extend- 
ed. The edge of this objection will be best turned by ren- 
dering the conception of extensity more precise. Thus, 
suppose a postage stamp pasted on the back of the hand; 
we have in consequence a certain sensation. If another be 
added beside it, the new experience would not be ade- 
quately described by merely saying that we have a greater 
quantity of sensation, for intensity involves quantity, and 
increased intensity is not what is meant ' Attributing 

this property of extensity to the presentation -continuum 
as a whole, we may call the relation of any particular sen- 
sation to this larger whole its local sign, and can see that, 
so long as the extensity of a presentation admits of 
diminution without the presentation becoming nil, 
such presentation has two or more local signs; its parts, 
taken separately, though identical in quality and inten- 
sity, having a different relation to the whole. Such differ- 
ence of relation must be regarded fundamentallv as a 
ground or possibility of distinctness of sign — whether as 
being the ground or possibility of different complexes or 
otherwise — rather than as being from the beginning such 
an overt difference as the term 'local sign,' when used by 
Lotze, is meant to imply. From this point of view we 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 109 

may say that more partial presentations are concerned in 
the sensation caused by two stamps than in that caused 
by one. The fact that these partial presentations, though 
identical in quality and intensity, on the one hand are not 
wholly identical, and on the other are presented onty as a 
quantity and not as a plurality, is explained by the dis- 
tinctness along with the continuity of their local signs." 1 

Prof. James supports the doctrine of "extensity" of 
sensations; but ascribes it, not to the presentation as a 
whole, but "to each and ever\ r sensation" of every sense. 
He states his own position as follows: "Now, my first 
thesis is that this element, discernible in each and every 
sensation, though more developed in some than in others, 
is the original sensation of space, out of which all the 
exact knowledge about space that we afterward come to 
have is woven by processes of discrimination, association 
and selection. 4 Extensity,' as Mr. James Ward calls it, 
on this view, becomes an element in each sensation just as 
intensity is. The latter every one will admit to be a dis- 
tinguishable though not separable ingredient of the sensi- 
ble quality. In like manner extensity, being an entirely 
peculiar kind of feeling indescribable except in terms of 
itself, and inseparable in actual experience from some sen- 
sational quality which it must accompany, can itself 
receive no other name than that of sensational element. 
* It must now be noted that the vastness hitherto 
spoken of is as great in one direction as in another. Its 
dimensions are so vague that in it there is no question as 
yet of surface as opposed to depth ; ' volume ' being the 
best name for the sensation in question. Sensations of 
different orders are roughly comparable, inter se, with 
respect to their volumes. ," 2 "In the sensations of 
hearing, touch, sight and pain we are accustomed to dis- 
tinguish from among the other elements the element of 
voluminousness. We call the reverberations of a thunder 
rftorm more voluminous than the squeaking of a slate 
pencil. * * * In the sensations of smell and taste this 

1. Ency. Brit., Vol. XX, pp. 53-4. 

2. James' "Principles of Psychology," vol. II, pp. 135—6. 



110 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

element of varying vastness seems less prominent but not 
altogether absent." 1 " Now for the next step in our con- 
struction of real space : How are the various sense-spaces 
added together into a consolidated and unitary continu- 
um? For they are, in man at all events, incoherent at 
the start." 2 "How do we ARRANGE these at first cha- 
otically given spaces into the one regular and orderly 
( world of space 1 which we now know?"* 4< Space means 
but the aggregate of all our possible sensations. There is 
no duplicate space known aliunde, or created by an 'epoch- 
making achievement' into which our sensations, originally 
spaceless, are dropped. They bring space and all its places 
to our intellect, and do not derive it thence. " J "The essence 
of the Kantian contention is that there are not spaces, 
but Space — one infinite continuous unit — and that our 
knowledge of this cannot be a piece-meal sensational 
affair, produced by summation and abstraction. To which 
the obvious reply is that, if any known thing bears on its 
front the appearance of a piece-meal construction and ab- 
straction, it is this very notion of the infinite unitary 
space of the world.""' "Let no one be surprised at this 
notion of a space without order. There may be a space 
without order just as there may be an order without 
space. And the primitive perceptions of space are cer- 
tainly of an unordered kind. The order which the spaces 
first perceived potentially include must, before being dis- 
tinctly apprehended by the mind, be woven into those 
spaces by a rather complicated set of intellectual act 
The primordial largenesses which the sensations yield 
must be measured and subdivided by consciousness, and 
added together, before thev can form by their synthesis 
what we know as the real space of the objective world. 
In these operations imagination, association, attention 
and selection play a decisive part; and although they no- 



1 op. eit. p. 134. 

2 id. p. 181. 

3 id. p. 146. 

4 id. p. 85. 
6 id. p. 27o. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. Ill 

where add any new material to the space-data of sense, 
they so shuffle and manipulate these data and hide present 
ones behind imagined ones that it is no wonder if some 
authors have gone so far as to think that the sense-data 
have no spatial worth at all, and that the intellect, since 
it makes the subdivisions, also gives the spatial quality 
to them out of resources of its own." 1 "We seem thus to 
have accounted for all space-relations, and made them 
clear to our understanding. They are nothing but sensa- 
tions of particular lines, particular angles, particular 
forms of transition or of particular out-standing portions 
of space after two figures have been superposed." 2 

{2.) The Associational Theory. — Lotze's doctrine of 
" local signs," as before stated, is an inconsistent combina- 
tion of hypotheses from both the associational and the 
sensational theories. The truth of this statement will ap- 
pear from the following: "Many impressions exist con- 
jointly in the soul, although not spatially side by side 
with one another; but they are merely together in the 
same way as the synchronous tones of a chord; that is to 
say, qualitatively different, but not side by side with, 
above or below, one another. Notwithstanding, the men- 
tal presentation of a spatial order must be produced 
again from these impressions. The question is, therefore, 
in the first place, to be raised: How in general does the 
soul come to apprehend these impressions, not in the form 
in which they actually are, — to-wit, non-spatial, — but as 
they are not, in a spatial juxtaposition? The satisfac- 
tory reason obviously cannot lie in the impressions them- 
selves, but must lie solely in the nature of the soul in 
which they appear and upon which they themselves act 
simply as stimuli. On this account, it is customary to as- 
cribe to the soul this tendency to form an intuition of 
space, as an original inborn capacity. * * * Let it be 
assumed that the soul once for all lies under the necessity 
of mentally presenting a certain manifold as in juxtaposi- 
tion in space; How does it come to localize every individ- 

1 op. cit. p. 145. 

2 id. p. 152. 



112 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

ual impression at a definite place in the space intuited by 
it, in such manner that the entire image thus intuited is 
similar to the external object which acted on the eye? Ob- 
viously, such a clue must lie in the impressions themselves. 
The simple quality of the sensation 'green' or 'red' does 
not, however, contain it; for every such color can in turn 
appear at ever\ r point in space, and on this account, does 
not, of itself, require always to be referred to the one defi- 
nite point. Accordingly we conceive of this in the follow- 
ing wa}-: Every impression of color r — for example, red — 
produces on all places of the retina, which it reaches, the 
same sensation of redness. In addition to this, however, 
it produces on each of these different places, a, b, c, a cer- 
tain accessor}' impression, «, 0, y, which is independent 
of the nature of the color seen, and dependent merely on 
the nature of the place excited. This second local im- 
pression would therefore be associated with every impres- 
sion of color, in such manner that r a signifies the same 
red in case it acts on the point a, rfi signifies the same red 
in case it acts on the point h. These associated accessory 
impressions would, accordingly-, render for the soul the 
clue, by following which it transposes the same red, now 
to one, now to another spot, or simultaneously to differ- 
ent spots in the space intuited by it. In order, however, 
that this may take place in a methodical wa}-, these ac- 
cessory impressions must be completely different from the 
main impressions, the colors, and must not distnrb the 
latter. They must be. however, not merely of the same 
kind among themselves, but wholly definite members of 
a series or a system of series; so that for every impression 
r there may be assigned, by the aid of this adjoined iocal 
sign,' not merely a particular, but a quite definite spot 
among all the rest of the impressions. The foregoing is 
the theory of 'Local Signs.' Their fundamental thought 
consists in this, that all spatial differences and relations 
among the impressions on the retina must be compensat- 
ed for by corresponding non-spatial and merely intensive 
relations among the impressions which exist together 
without space-form in the soul; and that from them in re- 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 113 

verse order there must arise, not a new actual arrange- 
ment of these impressions in extension, but only the men- 
tal presentation of such an arrangement in us." 1 

Volkmann formulates the associational theory from 
the idealistic stand-point, as follows : " Some of the more 
recent space-theories shift the basis of explanation of the 
space-form of the sensations of the muscles, pressure, and 
vision to those peculiarities of the senses which enable 
them to perceive simultaneously a multitude of series. We 
can, in this deduction, accept neither the premises nor the 
conclusion. From the mere simultaneity of sensations we 
cannot obtain the perception of a side by side arrange- 
ment, nor from mere succession that of a one after another 
relation. * * If the sensations of pressure A and B 

are perceived as side by side simply because they are stim- 
ulated at the same time, then must the sounds A and B be 
perceived as side by side when the ear is struck by both 
waves of sound at the same time. * * * To distinguish 
two percepts as such has a double meaning, the negative 
one of their non-identity and the positive one of their du- 
plicity or state of separation, or in short, of contrast and 
opposition. * * * The formation of spatial series takes 
place at a period which leads from that of the negative 
distinction into that of the positive. * * * Space form 
is by no means the prerogative of a certain class of sensa- 
tions, but develops uniformly wherever the conditions for 
development are offered. * * If after a sound series 

a b c the series b a follows, and our attention follows the 
sound qualities of the same, then the sound series a b c as- 
sumes the form of a space-series just as exactly as if the 
letters representing them signified colors, in which case, 
however, we do not claim the space to be that of the outer 
world. * * Without doubt we conceive the scale 

thus formed as a real scale, i. e., as a space series in which 
the individual elements assume fixed positions. Where 
muscular sensations co-operate, as with the singer who 
sings the scale, or with the player upon the piano, then 
the production of space-form is specially favored. That 

1 "Lotze's Outlines of Psychology, "Ladd's Tr., pp 50-5 3. 



114 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

series of sounds but seldom rise to space-form is because 
the space-schemata of the sensations of the muscles, pres- 
sure, and vision are pre-eminently somatic and the scale 
can only be construed by an act of comparison. Further- 
more, that the space-schemata of sounds is almost exclu- 
sively confined to the scale is easily explained, because out- 
side the scale the return of the series in a reverse order de- 
pends entirely upon accidental circumstances, since it is 
seldom caused purposed, for by a reversal of the sound- 
succession the tune would be destroyed, or in other words, 
because musical symmetry is very different from that of 
architecture. The same may be stated about smells, only 
that, as the organ becomes very rapidly blunted, the dis- 
tinct perception of successive and sufficiently strong sensa- 
tions of odor deflects the perception from space-series into 
time-series." 1 

Mr. Herbert vSpencer supports the realistic form of 
the associational theory, as follows: "Extension under 
its several modes is cognizable through a wholly-internal 
co-ordination of impressions; a process in which the ex- 
tended object has no share. Though the data through 
which its extension is known, are supplied by the object; 
yet, as those data are not the extension, and as until they 
are combined in thought the extension is unknown, it fol- 
lows that extension is an attribute with which body does 
not impress us, but which we discover through certain of 
its other attributes." 2 "There is good reason to think, 
therefore, that the consciousness of space is reached 
through a process of evolution." 3 "All that can be rea- 
sonably inferred is, that these correlations and equiva- 
lences, mainly predetermined by the structure of the or- 
ganism, are changed from their potential to their actual 
form by the experiences of the organism; and further that 
while the experiences disclose these latent connections be- 
tween certain nervous actions and between certain corre- 
lative states of consciousness, they further the development 

1 "Lehrbuch der Psychol." 3te Auflage, Bd. II, pp. 63-8. 
a "Principles of Psychology," Vol. II. p. 164. 
8 id., p. 206. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 11 5 

of the structures and determine their details — serving at 
the same time to give definiteness to their actions and to 
the accompanying perceptions." 1 "Space, considered as 
subjective, is derived by accumulated and consolidated 
experiences from Space considered as objective." 2 "A solid 
is decomposable into planes; a plane into lines; lines into 
points; and as adjacent points cannot be conceived as dis- 
tinct from each other, without being conceived as having 
relative positions, it follows that every cognition of mag- 
nitude is a cognition of relations of position. * * Relations 
of position are of two kinds: Those which subsist be- 
tween subject and object; and those which subsist between 
either different objects or different parts of the same object. 
Of these the last are resolvable into the first. * * * All 
relative positions ma3 r be decomposed into relative posi- 
tions of subject and object. * * * These conclusions — 
that Figure is resolvable into relative magnitudes; that 
Magnitude is resolvable into relative positions; and that 
all relative positions ma}' finally be reduced to positions 
of subject and object — will be fully confirmed on consider- 
ing the processes by which the space-attributes of body 
become known to a blind man." 3 

"We saw that our consciousness of Space is an abstract 
of all relations among coexistent positions; that the ger- 
minal element of the consciousness is the relation between 
two coexistent positions; that every relation between two 
coexistent positions is resolvable into a relation of coex- 
istent positions between the subject and the object touched; 
that this relation of coexistent positions between subject 
and object, is equivalent to the relation of coexistent posi- 
tions between two parts of the body when adjusted by 
the muscles to a particular altitude; and that thus the 
question — How do we come by our cognition of Space? is 
reducible to the question — How do we discover the rela- 
tion of coexistent positions between two sentient points 
on our surface?" 4 "The idea of space involves the idea of 

1 op. cit., p. 170. 

2 id. p. 182. 

3 id., pp. 174-5. 

4 id., p. 218. 



116 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

coexistence, and the idea of coexistence involves the idea 
of space. * * * Two somethings cannot occupy abso- 
lutely the same position in space. And hence the coex- 
istence implies space. * * * If now it should turn out 
that in the first stage of mental development a relation of 
coexistence is riot direct^ cognizable, but is cognizable 
only by a duplex act of thought — only by a comparison of 
experiences, the theory of the transcendentalist will be 
finally disposed of. When it comes to be shown that the 
ultimate element into which the consciousness of space is 
decomposable — the relation of coexistence — can itself be 
gained only by experience; the utter untenableness of the 
Kantian doctrine will become manifest." 1 "It is the 
peculiarity alike of ever}- tactual and visual series which 
enters into the genesis of these ideas, that not only does it 
admit of being transformed into a composite state in 
which the successive positions become simultaneous posi- 
tions, but it admits of being reversed. The chain of states 
of consciousness A to Z, produced by the motion of the 
hand over an object, or of the eye along one of its edges. 
ma3 r with equal facility' be gone through from Z to A. Un- 
like those states of consciousness constituting our percep- 
tions of environing sequences, which do not admit of 
unresisted changes in the order of their components, those 
which constitute our perceptions of coexistences may have 
the order of their components inverted without effort — 
occur as readily in one direction as the other. And this is 
the especial experience by which the relation of coexistence 
is disclosed." - 

(3. ) The A Priori Synthetic Theory.— Kant stated the 
principal features of this theory, so far as he developed 
them, as follows : " Space is nothing but the form of the 
phenomena of all external senses ; it is a subjective condi- 
tion of our sensibility, without which no external intuition 
is possible for us. If then we consider that the receptivity 
of the subject, its capacity of being affected by objects, 
must necessarily precede all intuition of objects, we shall 

1 op. at., pp. 201-2. 

2 id., p. 273. 






PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 117 

understand how the form of all phenomena may be given 
before all real perceptions, may be, in fact, a priori in the 
soul, and may, as a pure intuition, by which all objects 
must be determined, contain, prior to all experience, prin- 
ciples regulating their relations. It is therefore from the 
human stand-point only that we can speak of space." 1 
" Space and time are pure forms of our intuition, while sen- 
sation forms its matter. What we can knowaprioribefore 
all real intuition, are the forms of space and time, which 
are therefore called pure intuition, while sensation is that 
which causes our knowledge to be called a posteriori 
knowledge, i. e., empirical intuition. Whatever our sensa- 
tion may be, these forms are necessarily inherent in it, 
while sensations themselves may be of the most different 
character." 2 "Sensation, therefore, being that in the phe- 
nomena the apprehension of which does not form a 
successive synthesis progressing from parts to a complete 
representation, is without any extensive quantity. * * * 
Mere places or parts that might be given before space or 
time, could never be compounded into space or time." 3 "As 
the propositions of geometry are known synthetically a 
priori, and with apodictic certainty; I ask, whence do you 
take such propositions? and what does the understanding 
rely on in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and 
universally valid truths? * * * If, therefore, space, and 
time also, were not pure forms of your intuition, which 
contains the a priori conditions under which alone things 
can become external objects to you, while without that 
subjective condition, they are nothing, 3'ou could not pre- 
dicate anything of external objects a priori and s\mthet- 
ically. It is therefore beyond the reach of doubt, and not 
possible only or probable, that space and time, as the 
necessary conditions of all experience, external and in- 
ternal, are purely subjective conditions of our intuition, 
and that, with reference to them, all things are phenomena 

1 "Critique of Pure Reason," tr. by Max Mueller, p. 23. 

2 id., pp. 37-8. 

3 id., pp., 148-50. 



118 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

only, and not things existing by themselves in such or such 
wise." 1 

Wuxdt's statement of the a priori synthetic theory, as 
will appear from the following quotations, places great 
emphasis on the sensational conditions essential to the 
perception of space-form. "Concerning the perception of 
space we must draw from a priori principles the conclus- 
ion already reached by Leibniz and Kant, that space can- 
not, in objective reality beyond our consciousness, possess 
the form in which we see it. This conclusion follows from 
the stand-point now reached much more evidently than 
from the nativistic theory of space held by Kant. With 
an inborn form of perception which does not need to be de- 
veloped, we might also regard it as a form which did not 
exist objectively and independent of our consciousness. 
However, nobody can imagine that reproductive and as- 
sociative s\mtheses of impressions could exist outside of a 
reasoning consciousness. Here, therefore, remains no 
doubt that space, as well as time, in the form in which we 
perceive it, can exist only in our intuition. * * A single kind 
of isolated sensation never possesses this character, but 
wherever spatial objects are perceived, different sensation- 
complexes act together.* * Experience has also taught that 
the influence of motion becomes fixed so that the resting 
eye in measuring distances is influenced by the laws of mo- 
tion. * * Thenecessity of a reproduction points to a psycho- 
logical process mediating between the co-existence of sen- 
sations and the perception of space, and also establishes 
the fact that every spatially distinguishable point of the 
retina must be represented by a peculiar property of sen- 
sation possessed by it alone i.e., local colorization. * Thus 
we reach that theory- of space-perception which I call the 
theory of complex local signs, to distinguish it from other 
similar hypotheses of a more nativistic or empiristic ten- 
dency. This theory assumes two systems of local signs, 
whose relations to the eye may be represented as follows: 
The first system, the fixed local signs of the retina, forms 
in each eye a continuum of two dimensions. Of the second 

op. cit., pp. 41-3. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 119 

system, which is connected with motion and which in the 
resting eve acts only as a reproducing factor, it is assumed 
that owing to the uniform condition and the intensive de- 
grees of the sensations of space, it is a continuum of only 
one dimension. The process of space-perception we can 
briefly describe as a measuring of one manifoldly extended 
svstem of local siens of the retina bv the uniform local 
signs of motion. As far as its psj^chological nature is con- 
cerned, this process is an associative synthesis; it is the 
union of both sensation-complexes into one product 
whose component elements can no longer be isolated in 
our perception. As these elements disappear entirely in 
the resulting product the}- are no longer separable in con- 
sciousness, which can perceive only the resulting product, 
space-form. There is a certain analogy between this psy- 
chical sjmthesis and a chemical synthesis, which from sim- 
ple elements produces a compound which appears to our 
perception as a homogeneous whole with new properties. 
The general question that might be asked in regard to the 
latter can be answered at once by referring to the proper- 
ties assigned to these two systems of local signs. Of both 
S3 r stems we can suppose that they are unif ormly graduated, 
and thus that the most important property of space, grad- 
uation, is found in them. In addition, we tind two other 
properties which distinguish space from time; the first is 
co-existence, the other, uniformity of directions. For the 
former property, the first S3 T stem of local signs with its 
qualitative arrangement in two dimensions, analogous to 
the system of colors, forms the basis; the other is found in 
the second S3 T stem, from which we can assume, on account 
of the merely intensive graduation possessed b3 r it, that it 
forms for us the next motive to apph^ our ideas of meas- 
urement to space. In the organs of feeling, the relations seem 
to differ in so far that each individual part of the bod3~ 
in motion gives birth to a triple S3 r stem of local 
signs, probably in consequence of the changing formation 
of folds in the skin produced by motion in different direc- 
tions. We have also to recollect that in regard to local 
signs, as well as for space itself, the triplicity of measure- 



120 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

ments depends entirely upon a mathematical form of con- 
struction, which rests upon the elements to be found, or 
here upon the sign of a given locality."! 

§3. Criticism of the Three Theories: 

(1.) The Sensational Theory. — The sensational theory 
fails thoroughly to analyze conscious phenomena, and 
therefore, to show the presence and function of intellection 
inp rimary stages of consciousness. Hence it bases the 
validity of spatial relations, not upon a priori, but upon 
sensational conditions. It assumes spatial sensations in 
its premises, and so explains nothing as to the origin of 
space-form. 

Berkeley earned lasting fame by disproving the geomet- 
rical theory of space-perception, and establishing in its 
place an empirical theory . The three data which he 
named for estimating distance, ocular "sensations corre- 
sponding to" the angle of convergence, "confused appear- 
ance of the object," and the "straining of the eye" in ac- 
commodation, are all factors of visual space-perception. 
Berkeley's essay, however, is really concerned not so 
much with the origin of space-perception, as with visual 
estimates of spatial magnitude. 

Dr. Ward's doctrine of the "extensity" of sensations 
serves at best only to characterize, by a new name, space- 
perception in its early stages; it gives no explanation at 
all of its origin, His theory labors under two difficulties. 
It reduces the earliest form of the presentation-continuum 
to a pure sensation, and hence it must either make this an 
extended sensation, or else deny that spatial relations en- 
ter into the earliest experiences. The first alternative is 
to revert to Locke's sensational realism, the second is 
virtually to abandon the sensational theory for the asso- 
ciational. Dr. Ward expressly repudiates the first, and 
invents the doctrine of "extensity" to avoid the second; 
but in order to do this successfully, two great difficulties 
must be overcome. The extensity ascribed tc sensation 
must be void of all spatial magnitude, and the a priori 

1 "Logik," vol. I, pp. 457-60. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 1 21 

validity of spatial relations must be established upon a 
sensational basis. 

The doctrine of extensit\', as illustrated by Dr. Ward, 
is based upon inferences from supposed cases which are 
absoluteh' impossible in actual experience; it represents 
experiences, which can come only from conscious states 
developed by both mental and plrysical activity, as carried 
back to a state supposed to precede all such activity. The 
"impression caused by a postage stamp pasted upon the 
back of the hand" would be much more significant to a 
consciousness in advanced stages of experience than to one 
in the earliest stages. What that impression is to the de- 
veloped consciousness, is easily determined, and, of course, 
easily interpreted without resort to motion. But just what 
it would be in the first dawn of consciousness, and just 
how it would develop; in short, the whole problem of the 
origin of space-perception, is a question just as far from 
being answered as ever. 

No consciousness whatever can exist "before and 
apart from movement altogether;" but even if it could, 
there would be no " massiveness or extensity of impres- 
sions in which movements enable us to find positions and 
also to measure." Extensity and positions are strict 
correlatives, and so are movement and measure. This 
doctrine of extensity thus separates strict correlatives and 
brings them into consciousness separately. If it should be 
so modified as to represent the presentation-continuum, 
in its earliest stages, as differentiated under a priori cate- 
gories into analytic data which are simultaneously S3 r nthe- 
sized into space-form, thus involving not only sensation, 
but will, in the form of attention, and intellection in the 
form of spatial correlatives, then it becomes tenable ; but 
it also ceases to be sensational and becomes a priori 
synthetic. 

Prof. James explicitly declares that no absolute dis_ 
tinction can be made between sensation and intellection, 
and abscribes " all the categories of the understanding" 
to an " absolutely pure " sensation. As he uses the term, 
a sensation is a concrete object of consciousness ; and 



122 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

"Sensations of different orders are roughly comparable 
inter se, with respect to their volumes.''' This doctrine of 
sensation would render it impossible to analyze processes 
of consciousness into their prima^ correlative factors, 
and would thus represent as a simple datum what is in 
reality complex. This brings Prof. James into conflict with 
Kant concerning the " piecemeal construction" of space, 
and with Prof. Ladd about the "eccentric projection" of 
sensations; but the disagreement comes not so much from 
difference of view as from difference of statement. 

The " Kantian contention " is not "that there are not 
spaces," but that non-extended data cannot be summed 
together to produce extension. It has no bearing on the 
sensational theory; but it discloses the fundamental fallacy 
of the association al theory. Prof James is really in ac- 
cord with this position of Kant's. Kant says, "Mere 
places or parts that might be given before space or time 
could never be compounded into space or time;' and 
James says of his "sensations," '/They bring space and 
all its places to our intellect and do not derive it thence." 
James misunderstands and misrepresents Kant's view, 
confusing it with the associational theory. He asserts 
that in the Kantian view " there is a quality produced out 
of the inward resources of the mind, to envelop sensations, 
which, as given originally, are not spatial, but which, on 
being cast into the spatial form, become united and 
orderly." 1 This again describes, not the a priori synt he- 
tic theory, but the associational theory. The a priori 
synthetic theory, as Kant expressly declares, represents it 
as impossible for the sensations of the spatial series to be 
perceived at all without being synthesized into space-form. 

Prof. Ladd's "epoch-making achievement" does not 
represent "sensations originally spaceless" as "dropped" 
into an empty intellectual space ; but it represents sensa- 
tional data and intellectual processes as simultaneously 
involved in the automatic analysis and synthesis of the 
presentation-continuum into space-form. 

In order to explain the process of space-perception, it is 

1 "Principles of Psychology," vol. II. p. 272. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 123 

necessary to make an absolute distinction between sensa- 
tion and intellection, and to disclose the function of each 
in the perceptive process. This Prof. James makes no at- 
tempt to do ; but he continually confuses concrete objects 
of sense with " absolutely pure " sensations, to which he 
ascribes "vastness," " voluminousness " and "primordial 
largenesses." The fundamental fallacy of Prof. James' 
argument is the representation of consciousness as begin- 
ning in an undifferentiated state. No form of finite con- 
sciousness can exist that does not contain a self and a 
not-self mutually related through functions of sensation, 
intellection and volition. In the perception of space, as 
well as in other forms of perception, these three functions 
are simultaneously involved ; and in an explanation of 
space-perception, their character and mutual relations 
must be disclosed. This, Prof. James makes no attempt 
to do. 

fl2. The Associational Theory. — The associational the- 
ory assumes the existence of successive, non-spatial sensa- 
tions ; and makes space-form a product arising from a 
reproductive synthesis of these non-extended data. In 
doing this, it necessarily commits one of two errors ; it 
must either start with non-spatial data in the premises 
and end with only an assumed space in the conclusion; or 
it must start with spatial data smuggled into its prem- 
ises in such terms as " relations of position," " sensitive 
surface," etc. 

Lotze is one of the most inconsistent writers on space- 
perception. As difficulties arise in the way of one theory 
he abandons it for another, seemingly without being con- 
scious of doing so, and so with the next; and thus he alter- 
nately advocates and abandons both the associational and 
the sensational theories. According to his premises, in which 
he claims that all experience arises from non-spatial, sen- 
sational data, and to his method of deduction, which is by 
means of a reproductive synthesis of successive, non- 
spatial impressions, he must be classed as an association- 
ist; but according to his doctrine of "local signs," the par- 



124 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

ticular feature which has rendered his theor}- noted, he 
must be classed as a sensationalist. 

Lotze's theory- of sensation naturally leads him into 
confusion in the analysis of space-perception. Instead of 
a constantly changing presentation-continuum, he postu- 
lates a chaos of separate, non-spatial sensations in the 
soul, and hence finds it necessary for the soul "to appre- 
hend these impressions not in the form in which they act- 
ually are — to-wit, non-spatial, — but as the}- are not, in a 
spatial juxtaposition." He states that the cause of this 
spatial grouping "cannot lie in the impressions themselves, 
but must lie solely in the nature of the soul." This is pure 
associationalism. Again, when the soul comes to localize 
every individual impression, "a clue must be in the impres- 
sions themselves." This, however, cannot be the simple 
qualit3 r of the sensation," but must be the "associated ac- 
cessoiw impressions," by following which "the soul trans- 
poses the same red, now to one, now to another spot 
This is pure sensationalism; and the two are in direct con- 
tradiction. Again, it would follow from the doctrine of 
"local signs" that each retinal element could see one and 
only one particular point in the objective "space intuited," 
and that the different retinal elements must be so arranged 
"that the entire image thus intuited is similar to the ex- 
ternal object which acted on the eye.*' This is not only a 
fantastic form of sensational realism, making every point 
of an extended object imprint a corresponding spatial 
point upon the non-spatial mind; but it is contrary to facts 
of experience. So long as it is possible to see with a grad- 
ually diminishing retinal area, the vision is of the whole 
object growing less clear. Rays of light from all points of 
the object impinge upon certain retinal elements in or near 
the fovea, yet they are not intuited as coming from the 
same point in the object, as the theory of "local signs" 
represents. Lotze escapes from this difficulty, however, 
bv abandoning the theory and appealing to the associa- 
tions formed between retinal and motor sensations of the 
eve. This is a return to the associational theory, which, 
although it can do much to explain visual estimates of dis- 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 125 

tance, can do nothing to explain the origin of space-per- 
ception. Lotze's doctrine is thus seen to be based upon 
fictions of the imagination, to contain irreconcilable con- 
tradictions, to misrepresent facts of experience, and to be 
based upon a sensationalism which would deprive spatial 
relations of all a priori validity. 

Volkmann's distinction between the " contrast" and 
the ''opposition," or the "non-identity " and the "duplic- 
it3'" of percepts, may hold in a logical, but not in a chron- 
ological order. While the perception of non-identity is 
not the same as the perception of duplicity ; neither per- 
ception can precede the other, hence it is meaningless to 
posit the origin of space-perception between the two, as 
Yolkmann does. 

In making all sensations assume a spatial order when 
they can be arranged in reversible series, he is compelled 
to ascribe to sounds, odors, and tastes, the quality of 
space-form ; although he claims it to be not "the space of 
the external world." A space that is not the space of the 
external world is no space at all ; but it is the only space 
that the associational theory can account for. Sounds, 
odors, and tastes must, in connection with their causal 
agencies, enter into spatial relations ; but this does not 
mean that they form spatial series, or assume space-form. 
Volkmann is a good representative of that form of the as- 
sociational theory which starts without spatial data in 
the premises and ends without space-form in the conclu- 
sion. 

Mr. Spencer's theory is the reverse of Yolkmann 's. It 
starts with spatial data involved in the terms applied to 
the perceiving subject, and the only spatial relations ac- 
counted for are those assumed in the subjective organism. 
It is really not an explanation of the origin of space-per- 
ception, but a theory of the evolution of an extended or- 
ganism conscious of its own extension. Mr. Spencer 
derives "space considered as subjective" from "space con- 
sidered as objective; " and in doing so, he performs a feat 
as remarkable as it is impossible. He divides a solid into 
non-extended points, which he arranges into "relations of 



126 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

position;" and then makes the perception of these rela- 
tions of position the origin of the perception of space. He 
makes the "germinal element" of space-perception "the 
relation between two co-existent positions" which "is re- 
solvable into a relation of co-existent positions between 
subject and object touched." Hence, "the question — How 
do we come by our cognition of space? is reducible to the 
question — How do we discover the relation of co-existing 
positions between two sentient points on our surface?" 
The only logical result of this argument which reduces the 
origin of space-perception to the consciousness of "a rela- 
tion of co-existent positions between subject and object 
touched, * * * between two sentient points on our 
surface," is to identify one of the "two sentient points on 
our surface" with the perceiving subject, and the other 
with the "object touched." This is a form of natural 
realism, more realistic than Locke's ; for it need not go be- 
low the "sentient points on our surface" while Locke's 
had to reach the tablet of the mind. 

Mr. Spencer is right in making the "germinal element" 
of the perception of space the process by which "we dis- 
cover the relation of coexisting positions between 
points on our surface;" but he is wrong in limiting the 
number of the points to two, in making them sentient, and 
in representing the consciousness of our surface as preced- 
ing, in any way, the consciousness of the mutual relations 
of its parts. The consciousness of our surface is the con- 
sciousness of the relations of its parts; it originates in and 
develops with a consciousness of such parts, not merely of 
two, but of all of them, so far and so fast as they are 
differentiated in consciousness. 

Mr. Spencer mistakes again in supposing that "the idea 
of co-existence involves the idea of space." Sounds, odors, 
and tastes may be co-existent, and may be perceived to be 
so; yet Mr. Spencer himself says "No one will allege that 
sound, as an affection of consciousness, has any space-at- 
tributes." 1 In making a relation of co-existence "cogniz 
able only by a duplex act of thought, "he implies that it is 

1 "Principles of Psychology," Vol. II, p. 181. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 127 

possible for an act of thought to be absolutely simple. 
This error seems to lie at the root of all forms of natural 
realism, and it has been sufficiently discussed already in 
the definition of sensation. Co-existence and succession 
are strict correlatives in every act of thought; and hence 
Mr. Spencer, in deriving a consciousness of co-existence 
from a reversible series of successive percepts, commits the 
fallacy of bringing strict correlatives into consciousness 
singly. 

In describing spatial percepts as forming a series in 
which the successive order can be varied more freely than 
it can in a series of non-spatial percepts, Mr. Spencer in- 
verts the real facts in the case. Sounds can be arranged 
in a series, the successive order of which can be not only 
reversed, but varied at will; but everv series of spatial per- 
cepts is limited to a fixed order of succession, the only pos- 
sible variation of which is an exact reversal. This fixed 
serial order is the fundamental characteristic of sensa- 
tional data involved in space-form. 

The only space accounted for by Mr. Spencer is that as- 
sumed in the conditions ascribed to the perceiving sub- 
ject. When, by "a process of evolution," "correlations 
and equivalences mainly pre-determined by the structure 
of the organism are changed from their potential to their 
actual form b} r the experience of the organism," it is plain 
that the "structure of the organism" is already spatial, 
and that the "correlations and equivalences" are as 
"actual" in "their potential" form as in any other; but it 
is not quite so clear just what is the subject of the "ex- 
perience of the organism," unless it be the "sentient points 
on our suface." It is plain, however, that Mr. Spencer's 
analysis of space-perception, when carried to its logical 
outcome, reduces to an exaggerated form of natural 
realism, which represents the perceiving subject as extend- 
ed in space and as perceiving its own space-form. 

(3.) The A Priori Synthetic Theory. — Kant outlined 
the fundamental principles of this theory, which may be 
stated as follows: — The universal validity of spatial rela- 
tions must rest upon an a priori basis ; space cannot orig- 



128 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

inate from an association of successive, non-spatial data; 
both sensation and intellection are essential to the percep- 
tion of space; space-form is a product arising from a syn- 
thesis, a priori, and hence automatic and instantaneous, 
of all sensational data that present the conditions essen- 
tial to such synthesis. In the main, Kant correctly set 
forth these principles, although not so clearry as might be 
wished. Two marked peculiarities of his philosophy con- 
fused not only his statements, but his own views as well. 
His radical dualism, appearing in his antitheses of pure 
and practical reason, sense and understanding, pure and 
empirical sensibility, concepts of understanding and ideas 
of reason, and phenomena and noumena, necessarily dis- 
torted his view o* the character and relations of the func- 
tions of consciousness. Again, the special emphasis 
which he laid on the intellect made him appear to repre- 
sent space as existing in a pure form of thought previous 
to all sensation. In spite of the confusion of his views 
and statements, however, it seems evident that he meant 
to represent this pure form of space as merely a funda- 
mental process of thought, and to make both sensation 
and intellection essential and simultaneous functions of 
space-perception. 

Prof. Wundt accepts Kant's doctrine of space, founds 
it upon a basis both sensational and intellectual, and as- 
cribes to space perception both an origin and a develop- 
ment in experience. He corrects Lotze's doctrine oi " local 
signs " by making it necessary for sensations tobesharply 
differentiated qualitatively in order to be localized in space- 
form. Wundt is right in ascribing to sensations an ac- 
quired tendenc\ T to suggest associated sensations of an- 
other kind, and in making this tendency an important 
factor in developed space-perception ; but the importance 
of this factor lies in its use in estimating spatial magni- 
tudes, not in orginating space-form as he supposes. This 
error is doubtless responsible for the fallacy of the advo- 
cates of the associational theory — they fail to discriminate 
between the origin of space-form and the estimate of its 
dimensions after it has been perceived. The processes are 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 129 

not entirely separate; yet, in explaining space-perception, 
there must be an absolute distinction between the two. 
One is automatic and instantaneous, the other develops in 
experience ; hence, while Wundt is right in positing a syn- 
thesis of sensational data as mediating between the per- 
ception of such data and the perception of space-form, it is 
a productive S3 r nthesis, a priori and instantaneous, as 
Kant stated, and not a reproductive synthesis as held by 
Wundt. 

As Wundt maintains, this synthesis is of a mathematical 
nature, similar to a synthesis of geometric coordinates ; 
but his scheme of making a continuum of one dimension of 
muscular sensation, with which to measure the retinal 
continuum to which he ascribes two dimensions, is not 
only highly imaginary but really absurd. A spatial con- 
tinuum of only one dimension, or of only two, is a mere 
abstraction having no possible meaning, except as referred 
to a continuum having all three dimensions. Besides, the 
idea of measuring one sensational continuum by another 
is misleading. There can be but one presentation-contin- 
uum, which, when it becomes spatial, must assume all 
three dimensions at once. Spatial estimates of the pre- 
sentation-continuum are all based on tactual perception ; 
so-called measurements resulting from visual estimates al- 
ways refer to corresponding tactual experience. 

In passing from a geometric synthesis of sensations to 
their fusion into a new compound, Wundt commits a 
gross error. A sensational continuum may be differenti- 
ated into analytic data, and each datum held in a syn- 
thesis ; but their fusion into a new compound means their 
annihilation, and a sudden transition to an entirety differ- 
ent continuum, a continuum rapidly fading from con- 
sciousness. Prof. Wundt's treatment of space-perception 
is very suggestive, and does more to explain the problem 
than any other cited above; but it involves untenable as- 
sumptions which must be eliminated before it can be 
accepted. 

§4. Relations of the Mental Functions. 

(1.) The Will. — Both forms of this function are promi- 






130 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

inent in the perception of space. Spatial distance is but 
a limitation to the effort of a finite consciousness, and 
effort involves volition ; hence volition is essential to the 
idea of distance. Again, spatial position implies serial 
order, and serial order involves movement of attention ; 
hence attention is essential to the idea of position. From 
this it follows that the experiences in which the sense of 
effort is greatest, give emphasis and fixedness to spatial 
distances, while experiences in which it is least, give great 
freedom to movements of attention, and a corresponding 
facility to the discrimination of positions. 

No one can doubt the above statement concerning the 
attention; but some doubt might be felt concerning the 
dependence of the sense of effort upon volition, on account 
of the distinction which psychologists make between ac- 
tive and passive effort. When the muscles are stimulated 
artificially, the resulting affections are rightly enough 
termed, by way of contrast, passive sensations of effort ; 
but if in this experience there were no associations recall- 
ing volition, as the natural cause of such affections, they 
would have no meaning as sensations of effort. Unlc 
differences of sensational quality discriminated under the 
movements of attention were ascribed to corresponding 
volitions as causes, there could be no spatial distance be- 
tween them, and hence they would be separated, not in 
space, but in time. 

(2.) Feeling. — Since subjective feeling is a correlative of 
objective, both forms must be involved in space-percep- 
tion; but objective feeling, or sensation, is much the more 
conspicuous. Only in the sense of weariness does subjec- 
tive feeling become prominent, in which form it influences 
the estimates of distance. Sensation is essential both to 
the estimate of distance and to the discrimination of po- 
sitions. Only as referred in causal relation to effort, can 
sensation give rise to distance; and only as voluntarily 
differentiated into qualitative contrasts, which sustain 
fixed mutual relations, can it give rise to positions. Only 
muscular and tactual sensations are inseparably connected 
with the sense of effort, and hence, with the perception of 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 



131 



space. In addition to these, only retinal sensations can be 
varied in exact correspondence with voluntary changes in 
the sense of effort; and hence, only the percepts of the 
muscular, the tactual, and the retinal senses can assume 
space-form. All other percepts assume spatial relations 
in connection with their causal agencies ; but instead of 
appearing as things occupying space, they seem to be only 
the effects of the percepts of the muscular, the tactual and 
the retinal senses, which percepts appear as things occu- 
pying space. 

The dependence of spatial order upon voluntary 
changes in the sense of effort, can be illustrated b} r com- 
paring a sensational continuum of eight tactual percepts 
with one of the eight tones of the scale. The successive 
order in the latter can be varied so as to pass through 
each tone in direct or reverse order, through only each al- 
ternate tone, or through them in any order whatsoever. 
The successive order in tactual percepts is fixed, so that 
the only possible variation is an exact reversal. In sound, 
one can choose his starting-point, direction, successive or- 
der, and stopping-place; but in tactual and retinal percep- 
tion, the successive order is fixed. The cause of this fixed 
order lies in the exact correspondence of all voluntary 
changes in tactual and retinal sensation to the accom- 
panying voluntary changes in the sense of effort. 

The muscular sense, since it is essential to all sense of 
effort, must be regarded as fundamentally involved in the 
perception of space. The tactual also, since it is insepara- 
bly connected with voluntary muscular sensation, must 
be regarded as similarly involved. The retinal sense, as 
before stated, cannot be so regarded. It is not essential 
to the sense of effort, and besides, people blind from birth 
have acquired considerable knowledge of space. But since 
all voluntary changes in retinal sensation are involved in 
a fixed serial order of relations, corresponding exactly to 
that of the changes of effort associated with them as their 
causes, and since the sense of effort connected with them is 
comparatively insignificant, it becomes the most efficient 
sense for discriminating spatial positions; and, when guid- 



132 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

ed by tactual associations, an efficient means for estimat- 
ing distances also. 

(3.) Intellection. — The a priori analysis and synthesis 
involved in space-perception consists in an automatic dif- 
ferentiation of the presentation-continuum into the correla- 
tive contrasts, vertical and horizontal, the former of which 
assumes the correlative aspects, up and down, while the 
latter is again differentiated into the correlative contrasts 
lateral and longitudinal, the former assuming the correla- 
tive aspects, right and left, and the latter those of back and 
forth. Being strictly correlative, these three pairs of as- 
pects must simultaneously appear in the presentation-con- 
tinuum, hence the analysis and synthesis are simultan- 
eous. The presentation-continuum thus becomes spatial, 
not through a piece-meal process of reproductive associa- 
tion; but through an a priori process, automatic and in- 
stantaneous, in which the correlatives, position and mag- 
nitude, motion and measure, up and down, right and left, 
back and forth, all originate and develop together. 

Only as referred to voluntary changes in the sense of 
effort, have these correlative terms any meaning; only 
as connected with qualitative changes in sensation, can 
they be perceived; and only as held in an intellectual syn- 
thesis preserving all their mutual relations, can they give 
rise to space-form. These three functions of conscious- 
ness, volition, sensation, and intellection, characterize all 
stages of finite consciousness. Intellection is identical in 
all perceiving subjects, and thus gives to spatial relations 
their a priori validity; sensation varies in each subject, 
and thus occasions the variations of individual perspec- 
tive. To base local significance upon sensational quality 
annuls all universal validity of spatial relations; but to 
base it upon an intellectual synthesis of an invariable order 
of relations which qualitative changes of sensation sus- 
tain to the movements of attention, makes the validity of 
spatial relations universal. The sensational differences are 
necessary, for no intellectual synthesis of relations can exist 
unless supported by sensational differences. Hence to fuse 
sensational differences into a new compound, as Wundt's 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 133 

theory does, destroys both the analytic data and the syn- 
thetic continuum at once. 

That space-form is a product arising from an intellect- 
ual synthesis of the relations which sensational data sus- 
tain to volition, is evident from the following facts. 
Sounds, odors, and tastes, in which the successive order 
of qualitative changes does not vary in conformity to 
changes of effort, do not assume space-form ; but are 
regarded as merely subjective affections caused by tactual 
or visual percepts. In visual perception, where the sense 
of effort is reduced to a minimum, all estimates of dis- 
tance rest upon tactual associations. Visual space-form 
is regarded as real only as it represents tactual conditions; 
and it varies automatically in strict accord with all varia- 
tions, real or supposed, in such conditions. Variations 
can be voluntarily introduced into visual space-form, cor- 
responding to changes merely supposed in tactual condi- 
tions. Thus a concave surface can be made to appear con- 
vex, and conversely. The same set of geometrical lines can 
be made to assume different forms corresponding to objects 
viewed from different directions. The principles of perspec- 
tive rest entirely upon the tendency to interpret visual per- 
ception as merely representative of tactual. This tendency 
becomes so strong that it cannot be entirely overcome. 
Students of free-hand drawing have great difficulty in 
estimating it properly, and in representing objects as they 
would appear if projected on a plane surface. Great errors 
in the estimates of forms and distances in visual percep- 
tion result from misinterpreting the tactual conditions in- 
volved; but when such inferences are corrected, the errors 
in spatial estimates disappear. 

Again, in tactual perception, when the serial order of 
successive percepts is abnormally changed, the perception 
of spatial relations is correspondingly changed. It even 
becomes necessary, in such cases, to correct one's infer- 
ences from present tactual conditions by comparing tact- 
ual perception with visual, and by coordinating the re- 
sults of the two. Prof. James well illustrates this with 
facts which he quotes from well-known cases of anaesthe- 






134 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

sia. His own words are as follows: — "We get such results 
as are given in the following account by Professor A. 
Strumpell of his wonderful anaesthetic boy, whose only 
sources of feeling were the right eye and the left ear; * * 
* * 'He had no feelings of muscular fatigue. If, with 
his eyes shut, we told him to raise his arm and to keep it 
up, he did so without trouble. After one or two minutes, 
however, the arm began to tremble and sink without his 
being aware of it. He asserted still his ability to keep it 
up. Passively holding still his fingers did not affect him. 
He thought constantly that he opened and shut his hand, 
whereas it was really fixed.'" 1 In speaking of another 
case, Prof. James continues, "Or we read of cases like 
this: 'Voluntary movements cannot be estimated the 
moment the patient ceases to take note of them by his 
eyes, if one asks him to move one of his limbs either 
wholly or in part, he does it but cannot tell whether the 
effected movement is large or small, strong or weak, or 
even if it has taken place at all. And when he opens his 
eyes after moving his leg from right to left, for example, 
he declares that he had a very inexact notion of the ex- 
tent of the movement.' " J In explaining such facts, Prof. 
James makes the following significant remarks: " It is, 
in fact, easy to see that, just as where the chain of 
movements is automatic, each later movement of the chain 
has to be discharged by the impression which the next 
earlier one makes in being executed, so also, where the 
chain is voluntary, we need to know at each movement 
just where we are in it, if we are to will intelligently what 
the next link shall be. A man with no feeling of his move- 
ments might lead off never so well, and yet be sure to get 
lost soon and go astray. But patients like those described, 
who get no kinesthetic impressions, can still be guided by 
the sense of sight. Thus Strumpell says of his boy : ' One 
could alwa} T s observe how his eye was directed first to the 
object held before him, then to his own arm; and how it 
never ceased to follow the latter during its entire move- 

1 ''Principles of Psychology," Vol. II. pp. 4S9-90. 

2 id. p. -490. 



PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 135 

ment. All his voluntary movements took place under the 
unremitting lead of the eye, which, as an indispensable 
guide, was never untrue to its functions.' * * * I have 
myself reproduced a similar condition in two hypnotic 
subjects, whose arm and hand were made anaesthetic 
without being paralyzed. They could write their names 
when looking, but not when their eyes were closed." 1 

The construction of space-form, including both the 
magnitude of distances and the location of positions, is 
thus seen to be an intellectual process, in tactual percep- 
tion, as well as in visual ; and space-perception is also 
seen to require, in order to become much developed, a co- 
ordinating comparison of the two. The tactual gives fix- 
edness of distance, the visual, facility in the discrimination 
of positions; both combined, give a highly developed per- 
ception of space. The only element of space-perception 
that is fixed and unchangable is the intellectual S3 r n thesis 
of the mutual relations among the sensational data. The 
intensive force, or voluntary effort, is changeable; the sen- 
sational data are in constant change; every object in space 
is constantly changing its position, in relation not only to 
the consciousness of the individual subject, but also to 
other objects as they are related in universal consciousness. 
The head and feet, right hand and left, back and face, as 
bases of spatial relations, differ in each perceiving subject ; 
and in the experience of all conscious subjects alike, the 
north star, even, is constantly changing position in rela- 
tion to other objects in space. This intellectual synthesis, 
being fixed and absolutely unchangeable, may be called 
real; and the sensational data, being in relative change, 
may, in correlation to it, be called ideal. Not that one is 
independent of consciousness and the other a mere con- 
scious affection; but that the one is absolutely unchange- 
able in all perceiving subjects alike, and the other con- 
stantly changing in relation to each individual subject. 
Thus, only as fixed in conscious processes are spatial rela- 
tions unchangeable. Up and down, right and left, back 
and forth, all represent fixed aspects, not in the objective 

1 op. cit. pp. 490-92. 



136 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

world, but in conscious processes. They cannot originate 
in generalizations from the sense-world, for they are the 
basis of the construction of the sense-world. They cannot 
come from an abstraction of the three dimensions of space, 
for the three dimensions of space rest upon them. Before 
mathematicians can prove the existence of a fourth dimen- 
sion of space, they must disclose a fourth correlative con- 
trast in the a priori differentiation of the presentation- 
continuum, on which to base it. This is not only impossi- 
ble, but the idea seems illogical. The three correlative 
contrasts are a priori in all forms of finite consciousness, 
so far as known, both in human beings and in lower ani- 
mals. It is logical to suppose that in all forms of finite 
consciousness they are essentially a priori, and that, in all 
alike, they give rise to an intellectual synthesis of sensa- 
tional data into space-form. 



CHAPTER IV. 
Perception of Time. 

§1. Number of Theories. — Only two theories have been 
definitely formulated to explain the nature of the percep- 
tion of time. One of these theories regards time as a meta- 
physical realit} r independent of consciousness, and holds 
that it is perceived as a flux because it flows along in con- 
sciousness. This theory has been very appropriately termed 
byDr. Nichols, who has given its latest and fullest statement, 
the "process theory." The other theory is indifferent to the 
character of time in itself, but holds that as it is perceived 
it is a product resulting from an instantaneous intellect- 
ual synthesis of relations among sensational data. This 
theor\- is now supported by many psychologists, but since 
it was originated bj Kant, in connection with his theory 
of space, and since it is in some respects very similar to 
that theory, it seems very appropriate to call it the syn- 
thetic theory. 

£2. Statement of the Two Theories. 

(1.) The Process Theory — Dr. Nichols states the prin- 
cipal points of this theo^ as follows : "But we must not 
fail to note that these changes are not the only compo- 
nents of these ideas, and that these image processions, and 
also their prototype original processions, are not all 
change ; there must be duration without change in order 
for duration with change to be possible." 1 " But accord- 
ing to this, one thing above all else must be carefully noted, 
perception, or perception of time-duration is always a 
process and never a state.; a certain definite time is a cer- 
tain definite process."' 2 "The classic question, therefore, 

1 "Psychology of Time," p. 130. 

2 id., p. 115. 



138 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

whether the idea of succession is or is not a succession of 
ideas, in so far as the question is one as to whether the 
idea is a longitudinally passing process, or a sidewise pre- 
sented state, may as well be fought out with reference to 
the nature of any original sensation and for the briefest 
temporal portion of it, as with reference to any train 
or series of such sensations." 1 "And it is plain also that 
we have in such an idea no such occurrence as that 
described by Herbart, or Mr. Ward, or am- of those who 
conceive that an idea of a series, or of a succession, or of 
time, must be some sort of instantaneously painted pic- 
ture presenting the whole length of time or of the series in 
a simultaneous perspective. * » * We do not 'now' per- 
ceive this something, whatever it is, but so far as I can dis- 
cover we 'now-now-now-now ' perceive it; we do not 
stand still and look along the line to measure this past in 
a perspective view, but run along the line as it were to 
measure it inch by inch, or present by present, by a mov- 
ing process."-' "We are inclined to conclude therefore 
that the duration of the sensation or series, 
the perception of the duration, and the perception of the 
length of the duration are one and identical ; that the dur- 
ation is an ultimate datum, and no more capable or need- 
ful of other explanation or of further analysis than the blue- 
ness of the blue spot." 3 " Sensations and their images or 
reproductions have various attributes; qualitatively they 
are blue, or warm, or painful, etc., intensively they are 
strong or weak, bright or faint, etc. Duration, or con- 
tinuation, is another attribute or characteristic of every 
sensation and of ever\ r image. This attribute is the ulti- 
mate and essential datum of time." 4 " TTe must, with 
greatest care distinguish between perceiving- time and 
apperceiving time relation * * * Without some quali- 
tative or some intensive change there can be no temporal 
relation. 1 '* "Thus if we supposed a creature to be so 

1 op,, cit. p. 117. 

2 id. p. 117-18. 

3 id., p. 119. 

4 id., p. 113. 

5 id., pp. 120-21. 



PERCEPTION OF TIME. 139 

simple as to be without memory, and capable from time 
to time of but a single elementary sensation of constant 
quality, say of pain, (such perhaps are some infusoria) 
we should say that pain was perceived whenever it occur- 
red ; we should not say it was apperceived. We should 
also say that such a creature perceived time." 1 " But how 
do we measure time length, and measure ' how long ago ' 
and 'how long until' ? When speaking of our simple crea- 
ture capable of but a single constant sensation, we said 
that when his pain lasted five seconds, he perceived the 
length of five seconds, and w T hen it lasted one second, he 
perceived the length of one second. We distinctly de- 
clared he did not apperceive either length, and from what 
we have said of change and relations it is clear that I have 
not conceived that this creature perceived relations of any 
kind ; neither relations of difference nor of numbers." 2 

(2.) The Synthetic Theory. — Kant expressed his views 
of time as follows: — "Time is not an empirical concept de- 
duced from any experience, for neither co-existence nor 
succession would enter in»to our perception, if the repre- 
sentation of time were not given a priori. Only when 
this representation a priori is given, can we imagine that 
certain things happen at the same time or at different 
times. * * * On this a priori necessity depends also the 
possibility of apodictic principles of the relations of time, 
or of axioms of time in general. * * To say that 

time is infinite means no more than that every definite 
quantity of time is possible only by limitation of one 
time which forms the foundation of all times. The origi- 
nal representation of time must therefore be given as un- 
limited. * * *' Time is nothing but the form of the in- 
ternal sense, that is, of our intuition of ourselves, and of 
our internal state. Time cannot be a determination pe- 
culiar to external phenomena. * * ■» Time is therefore 
simply a subjective condition of our intuition (which is 
always sensuous, that is so far as we are affected by ob- 

1 op. cit., p. 114. 

2 id. pp. 12S-9. 



140 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

jects), but by itself, apart from the subject, nothing." 1 
Prof. Bowne supports the synthetic theory, as follows: 
"However real time may be, the subjective origin of the 
notion will be the same as in the ideal theory; and how- 
ever ideal time may be as an existence, its actual function 
in our mental life will be unchanged." 2 "There is nothing 
to do but to declare that the time idea rests ultimately 
upon an original and peculiar mental principle, whereby 
it connects its experiences under the special form of se- 
quence. * * * All the conceptions which enter into a 
perception of sequence co-exist in one foim or another in 
the present consciousness. That which constitutes their 
temporal order is not any existing succession, but the pe- 
culiar form of their relation within the field of conscious- 
ness. Hence the act of consciousness by which relations 
of sequence are grasped must itself be without any tem- 
poral distinctions in itself; and in this sense the conscious- 
ness of time is non-temporal." 3 "No inspection of con- 
sciousness will reveal to us the origin of this idea, inas- 
much as the idea is always there long before the reflective 
consciousness begins the inquiry. We can only study 
some of its logical conditions." 4 

Prof. Hoffding supports this theory, and makes some 
valuable statements concerning the measurement of time. 
"Change, transition, alternation and inner-connection 
throughout all change — these were the most important 
characteristics of consciousness. But in these the form of 
time is already given. Psychology must therefore come 
to a pause at this form, as something originally given, a 
psychological ultimate presupposed in all conscious phe- 
nomena, which cannot be itself made an object of explana- 
tion. It is different when the question is of the idea of 
time, of temporal relations. This idea has its psychologi- 
cal history like every other. * * * * The idea of time 
involves therefore two things: (1), the consciousness of 

1 "Critique of Pure Reason," Max Mueller's Tr., pp. 27-30. 

i "Introduction to Psychological Theory." p. 128 

3 id. p. 130. 

4 id. p. 12- 



PERCEPTION OF TIME. 141 

change, of succession; this arises through contrast to a 
constant sensation; (2), repetition of certain states which 
have a strong hold upon consciousness; the recognition of 
these makes a certain measuring and grouping possible in 
the series of changes. 

4 'It would not be possible, from a simple constant sensa- 
tion or a simple constant feeling, to have the idea of time. 
The more we are absorbed in a single thought, the more 
we are 'rapt,' as it were, out of time; for which reason the 
mystics call eternity an 'enduring present.' On the other 
hand, the idea of time could not possibly be derived from 
mere succession of sensations; something would be needed 
that might lead to the surveying and measuring of the 
succession. * So long as the idea of time is 

grounded only on the change of our inner states, the esti- 
mation of time is very uncertain. Two circumstances are 
in this connection of especially great importance; the in- 
terest in the content of the experience and the number of 
traits experienced. The interest in what is experienced 
may have very diverse influence. In concentrating the at- 
tention and so preventing consciousness from noticing the 
succession, it shortens the time both during the actual ex- 
perience and in the remembrance. Seven years passed for 
Jacob like a few days, because he loved Rachel. But inter- 
est may also lengthen the time, since we involuntarily ar- 
gue from the importance and significance of the content 
that a long time must have elapsed. * " :: " Each indi- 

vidual brings his own scale of measurement, depending in 
part on the more or less energetic interest with which he 
spends his life and attends to the passing events, in part 
on the speed with which his ideas are accustomed to move. 
* * * The need of substituting an objective scale of 
measurement for the subjective, the uncertainty of which 
must easily have been noticeable, made itself early felt. 

* We measure by the help of uniform movements in 
nature. But this uniformity has itself to be established, 
so that we move here in a circle. Absolute time might be 
thought as realized in nature, so long as it was believed 
with Aristotle that the heavenly bodies revolve with eter- 



142 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

nal immutability and uniformity; but, this belief once 
abandoned, the idea of absolutely uniform time loses its 
basis in reality. * * * An absolutely uniform time is 
an ideal, requiring that every possible estimation of time 
shall be subjected to a further correction. Every standard 
which has been tried with a view to absolute uniformity, 
has proved to be variable. Only in the s\ T mbolical repre- 
sentation of time as a line is absolute uniformity to be 
found. But here idealizing abstraction has put its hand 
to the work. The conception of absolute time is a math- 
ematical abstraction."] 

Dr. Ward gives the following discussion of the synthesis 
involved in the perception of time: ' 'Granting this impli- 
cation of simultaneity and succession, we may, if we repre- 
sent succession as a line, represent simultaneity as a second 
line at right angles to the first; empty time — or time-length 
without time-breadth, we may say — is a mere abstraction. 
Now it is with the former line that we have to do in treat- 
ing time as it is, and with the latter in treating of our in- 
tuition of time, where, just as in a perspective representa- 
tion of distance, we are confined to lines in a plane at right 
angles to the actual line of depth. * * * * This truism 
— or paradox — that all we know of succession is but an 
interpretation of what is really simultaneous or coexistent, 
we may then concisely express by saying that we are 
aware of time only through time-perspective, and experi- 
ence shows that it is a long step from a succession of 
presentations to such presentation of succession. The 
first condition is that we should have represented together 
presentations that were in the first instance attended to 
successively, and this we have both in the persistence of 
primary memory images and in the simultaneous repro- 
duction of larger or shorter portions ot the memory -train. 
In a series thus secured there may be time-marks, though 
no time, and by these marks the series must be distin- 
guished from other simultaneous series. To ask which is 
first among a number of simultaneous presentations is 
unmeaning; one might be logically prior to another, but in 

1 "Outlines of Psychology." Bag. Tr., pp. 184-90. 



PERCEPTION OF TIME. 143 

time the}' are together and priority is excluded. Neverthe- 
less after each distinct representation a, b y c, d there prob- 
ably follows, as we have supposed, some trace of that 
movement of attention of which we are aware in passing 
from one presentation to another. In our present remin- 
iscences we have, it must be allowed, little direct proof of 
this interposition, though there is strong indirect evidence 
of it in the tendency of the flow to follow the order in 
which the presentations were first attended to. With the 
movements themselves we are familiar enough, though 
the residua of such movements are not ordinarily conspic- 
uous. These residua, then, are our temporal signs, and, 
together with the representations connected b} r them, con- 
stitute the memory-continuum. But temporal signs alone 
will not furnish all the pictorial exactness of the time-per- 
spective. They give us only a fixed series; but the working 
of obliviscence, by insuring a progressive variation in in- 
tensity and distinctness as we pass from one member of 
the series to the other, yields the effect which we call time- 
distance. By themselves such variations would leave us 
liable to confound more vivid representations in the dis- 
tance with fainter ones nearer the present, but from this 
mistake the temporal signs save us; and, as a matter of 
fact, where the memory-train is imperfect such mistakes 
continually occur. * * * But, though the fixation of 
attention does of course really occupy time, it is probably 
not in the first instance perceived as time, L e., as contin- 
uous 'protensity,' to use a term of Hamilton's, but as in- 
tensity. Thus, if this supposition be true, there is an 
element in our concrete time-perceptions which has no 
place in our abstract conception of time. In time con- 
ceived as physical there is no trace of intensity; in time 
psychically experienced duration is primarily an intensive 
magnitude, witness the comparison of times when we are 
'bored' with others when we are amused. * * * We are 
absorbed in the present without being unwillingly con- 
fined to it; not only is there no motive for retrospect or 
expectation, but there is no feeling that the present endures. 
Each impression lasts as long as it is interesting, but does 



144 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

not continue to monopolize the focus of consciousness till 
attention to it is fatiguing, because uninteresting. In such 
facts, then, we seem to have proof that our perception of 
duration rests ultimately upon quasi-motor objects of 
varying intensity, the duration of which we do not directly 
experience as duration at all. They do endure and their 
intensity is a function of their duration; but the intensity 
is all that we directfy perceive." 1 

§3. Criticism of the Two Theories. 

(1). The Process Theory. — This theory is based upon 
an erroneous view of the nature of change. On the one 
hand it holds to the existence of time as an infinite flux 
previous to all change, as a necessar\- precondition of 
change ; on the other, it holds to the existence of a finite 
consciousness in which change does not appear. An infi- 
nite process previous to, or independent of, change, is a 
contradiction in terms. A consciousness in which change 
does not appear is an infinite consciousness. This double 
error in the fundamental principles of the process theory 
necessarily leads it into numerous inconsistencies. It rep- 
resents a "simple creature capable of but a single con- 
stant sensation " as perceiving a "process." as perceiving 
" the length of five seconds ;" hence, since " we do not now 
perceive" time, but " 'now-now-now-now ' perceive it," 
since we " run along the line as it were to measure it inch 
by inch," this "simple creature" would have to "run 
along the line to measure it inch by inch " while experienc- 
ing "but a single constant sensation." Again, since this 
creature can not "perceive relations of any kind," the 
time which it perceives can contain no relations and hence 
must be an "attribute or character of every sensation." 
But this reduces time to a sensational or subjective phe- 
nomenon, instead of an objective reality existing before 
all conscious Changes. In disputing the synthetic view, 
Dr. Nichols very frankly admits that the question, as to 
whether the perception of time is an instantaneous act or 
a successive process, can be settled just as well with refer- 



1 "Psychology," Ency. Brit. Vol. XX, pp. 6-Jr-6. 



PERCEPTION OF TIME. 145 

ence to the shortest perceptible interval as to any period 
however long. This, however, if the process theory is to 
hold good, involves the infinite divisibility of sensible 
time, since, according to this theory, the shortest percept- 
ible time is a process which, in turn, must be composed of 
shorter periods, each of which is again a process, and so 
on ad infinitum. The only escape from this difficulty is 
the abandonment of the process theory ; and Dr. Nichols, 
when he says, "We do not now, but 'now-now-now-now' 
perceive" time, does virtually exchange it for the theory 
of unconscious units of consciousness. One "now" gives 
no conscious "present," but four of these unconscious 
nows summed together give one conscious "now," which 
can be used to measure time "inch by inch, or present by 
present." If this "inch, or present," as its name implies, 
be in the "present" consciousness, and it must be if it is 
used as a measure, then the process theory is abandoned 
for that of unconscious units of consciousness. But if 
this "inch, or present," be not all in the present conscious- 
ness, if it be a succession of shorter periods each of which 
is a conscious process of successive periods still shorter, 
and so on ad infinitum, then sensible time must be infinitely 
divisible. But if sensible time were infinitely divisi- 
ble, no interval, however short, could elapse. For in- 
stance, let one second be the interval. It is evident that 
before the last half of the second can arrive the first half 
must have elapsed. But since it cannot go all at once 
the first half of it must have elapsed before the second 
half can arrive. And since no extent of time, however 
short, can elapse all at once, it would be necessary for an 
infinite process of division to reduce the interval to abso- 
lute zero before it could elapse. But no infinite process of 
division can reduce extension to absolute zeros ; conse- 
quently sensible time cannot elapse in any such process. 
The only possible way in which it can appear in conscious- 
ness is as an instantaneous perspective in which the cor- 
relative aspects, before and after, appear together and 
give time-form. The advocates of the process theory, 
overlooking the correlative nature of these terms, which 



146 COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

are essential to time-form, represent them as entering con- 
sciousness separately, which is impossible. 

(2). The Synthetic Theory. — Kant disclosed the facts 
that time can be perceived only in connection with change, 
and converseh', that change cannot be perceived without 
assuming time-form; also that time-perspective cannot be 
a piece-meal construction, but that it is an instantaneous 
product resulting from an automatic, intellectual s^mthe- 
sis. Kant makes no attempt, however, to explain the 
nature of the intellectual s\mthesis which gives rise to 
time-form . 

Prof. Bowne shows that, whatever may be the nature 
of time in itself, sensible time "rests ultimately upon the 
original and peculiar mental principle, whereby it connects 
its experience under the special form of sequence," and 
that "the act of consciousness by which the relations of 
sequence are grasped must itself be without temporal dis- 
tinction." But instead of attempting to explain the 
nature of this non-temporal act, he declares such ex- 
planation bej'ond the reach of rational attempts. 

Prof. Hoffding agrees that the origin of time-form is "a 
psychological ultimate presupposed in all conscious phe- 
nomena, which cannot itself be made an object of expla- 
nation." He claims, however, that "It is different when 
the question is of the idea of time, of temporal relations," 
and claims that "This idea has its psychological history 
like every other." 

Both of these writers, have done much to render the 
nature of time-perception clear to the student of psychol- 
ogy, and yet both have, according to their own state- 
ments, attempted the impossible, when they rendered 
this service. Prof. Bowne makes it absurd to explain 
even the idea of time. Prof. Hoffding makes "time- 
form" a subject before which psychology must "come to a 
pause," but grants to "the idea of time" the possibility 
of an analysis. The fact is that the only subjects before 
which psychological analysis must "come to a pause" are 
arbitrary creations of imagination ; moreover if any 
problems lie hopelessly beyond the reach of such investiga- 



PERCEPTION OF TIME. 



147 



tion, they lie in ultimate facts of individual consciousness 
rather than in any such facts of universal consciousness 
as the perception of time. And when Prof. Bowne de- 
scribed the " act of consciousness by which the relations 
of sequence are grasped" he analyzed the conditions of the 
origin of the "idea" of time. Prof. Hoffding, also, when 
he discussed the "psychological history" of "the idea of 
time, " was at the same time investigating into the condi- 
tions and origin of" the form of time; " and in doing so he 
has enumerated facts connected with the estimates of dur- 
ation that are very significant, and which will be referred 
to later. 

Dr. Ward, without any limitations of subject, or any 
distinctions between the form and the idea of time, pro- 
ceeds to give one of the best analyses ever given of the 
conditions and processes involved in the perception of 
time. But from the fact that he makes no distinction be- 
tween time-form, as original in all perception, and the de- 
veloped idea of time resulting from reflection and ab- 
straction, there is sometimes a possible ambiguity in his 
statements, as, for example, when he says that 4< in a 
series thus secured there may be time-marks, though no 
time." This might be construed as meaning that time- 
form is a product of experience; but a construction that 
seems more in harmony with the writer's position would 
make it refer, not to an individual consciousness in which 
time-perspective had not yet appeared, but to certain 
facts of consciousness which enter into but do not con- 
stitute the perception of time. This ambiguity of state- 
ment, together with an undue emphasis given to the in- 
tensity of sensation as determining the estimates of dura- 
tion, and a corresponding failure to property emphasize 
the functions of weariness in the same respect, constitute 
the principal defects in Dr. Ward's excellent analysis of 
time-perception. 



S3. Mental Functions. 

(1). The Will. — The function of attention in time-per- 
ception, as in space-perception, is to discriminate position 



14S COGNITION OF THE REAL. 

in the order of relations. Volition proper, including ef- 
fort, does not directh 7 influence time-perspective; but in- 
direct^, through desire, interest, and weariness, it is the 
chief factor in determining temporal distance. The feeling 
of weariness, in connection with interest and desire, 
greatly increases distances in time-perspective. It is not 
the intensit\ r of sensation that increases this distance, as 
Dr. Ward supposed; for when no weariness is felt, both in- 
terest and intensity of sensation tend to make us uncon- 
scious of duration. Prof. Hoffding noted the different ef- 
fects of interest upon apparent duration, but attributed 
the difference to the importance attached to the object of 
interest, and argued that greater importance in the object 
gives greater time-distance. His illustration, however, 
argues against his theory; for to Jacob, Rachel was a 
most important object of interest, and yet, as Prof. Hoff- 
ding admits, "Seven years passed for Jacob like a few 
days." But if Jacob was like other mortals, the years of 
waiting must have seemed longer to him when he was 
weary than at other times. Temporal distances ma}- be 
estimated intellectually by a comparison of objective 
changes; but such estimate is meaningless unless it is re- 
ferred to time-perspective, as determined by interest quali- 
fied by weariness. 

(2). Feeling. — In feeling also, the subjective form is 
prominent in the perception of time. Feelings of pain of 
any kind, but especially of weariness, give greater dis- 
tance in time; while feelings of pleasure tend to make any- 
one unconscious of duration. Sensation is necessary, 
since without it there could be no consciousness; but 
quality of sensation has nothing to do with the flow of 
time, except as it gives rise to feelings of pleasure or of 
pain. As a means of estimating duration, however, re- 
currence of similar sensations is necessary; since temporal 
distance, like spatial, can be measured only by repeating 
a constant unit of measurement. 

(3). Intellection.— The intellectual synthesis is much 
simpler in time-perspective than in spatial. Instead of 
three correlative contrasts in the sensational continuum. 



PERCEPTION OF TIME. 149 

only one appears, that of before and after. This, together 
with the categories of identity and change, and coexistence 
and succession, must enter every possible stage of finite 
consciousness, and must automatically give rise to the 
construction of time-form, in which, as an instantaneous 
present, both past and future must appear simultaneously 
and inseparabh'. Many more empirical elements enter in- 
to developed stages of consciousness than into primitive 
stages; but in even- possible stage, consciousness is differ- 
entiated by a priori categories, one of which is that of be- 
fore and after; hence there can be no stage of perception 
that is not characterized in its time-perspective by both 
memory and expectation. 

Both distance and position, in the perspective of both 
memory and expectation, are largely dependent upon in- 
tellectual processes. When the thoughts are absorbed in 
the object, the present hardly seems to endure; but when 
they turn frequently to self, time seems to lengthen. When 
the ordinar3 T course of thought is disturbed, subjective dis- 
placement of temporal order occurs. W r ho has not, some- 
times, after having failed to understand words when spok- 
en, yet, upon subsequently and accidently discovering the 
thought of the speaker, heard distinctly the words spoken 
and located them in the time-perspective, not in the order 
understood, but as they were spoken? Why should not 
the vague impression upon the ear be carried forward to 
the time when it received meaning instead of the meaning 
being carried back to the vague sounds ? Apparent^ be- 
cause the category of causality determined the position in 
the time-perspective, and hence it corresponded to the po- 
sition of the causal agency. In memory the category of 
causality governs, to a great extent, position in the time- 
perspective. 

As stated and illustrated by Prof. Hoffding, all sub- 
jective estimates of duration must be corrected by objec- 
tive comparison; and for such correction, no invariable 
objective standard exists. Every possible perception of 
time involves both, aspects, the subjective, the relative, the 
ideal, and the objective, the absolute, the real; and in every 



150 COGXITIOX OF THE REAL. 

estimate of duration, whether subjective or objective, ref- 
erencemust be made in some way, directly or indirectly, to 
changes in spatial relations. No change can occur in either 
time or space that does not involve a corresponding change 
in the other. Time and space are thus strict correlatives, the 
former referring all changes to the self as subjective, and 
the latter referring them to the not-self as objective. As 
consciousness becomes absorbed in the not-self, time-per- 
spective gives way to space-perspective ; and changes are 
regarded not so much in their successive relations in time 
as in their causal relations in space. When consciousness 
objectifies the self, time-perspective becomes prominent. 
The self, in contrast with the not-self, appears as relative, 
ideal, finite, and the not-self assumes the opposite aspects, 
absolute, real, infinite; } r et, since these aspects are strictly 
correlative, both classes of contrasts are, as has been 
shown, essential to the perception of both space and time. 
Space, in contrast with time, appears stationary, while 
time appears as an endless flux; yet, when either space or 
time is objectified in contrast with the perceiving subject, 
it becomes an infinite continuum, in which the perceiving 
subject changes, and through which it passes ; and con- 
versely, when the perceiving subject is objectified it be- 
comes a fixed identity before which the changes of both 
space and time continually pass in an endless process. 
Should the perceiving subject "run along the line/' as 
represented in the process theory, time would be a fixed 
continuum ; onry when the subject is fixed can time be a 
process. And in the perception of the flux of time, just as 
in the perception of motion in space, the from which and 
the to which, the before and the after, must appear simul- 
taneously. It is as faulty to represent the subject as 
being conscious or unconscious in time, as in space. 
He may be unconscious of certain temporal as well as of 
certain spatial relations ; but he is not conscious or uncon- 
sciousness in either, except in so far as his feelings may 
be said to change in time. 

The statement made on p.100 that force, space, and time 
are correlative phases of the real, as it is referred respec- 



PERCEPTION OF TIME. 151 

tivelv to the will, to thought and to feeling, can now be 
made more clear. Will and force are corresponding phases 
of the ideal self and the real self, when viewed under the 
category of causality. Just as the motive phase of con- 
sciousness, or the will, is a correlate of the sentient phase 
which presents both aspects, thought and feeling; so the 
causal phase of the real self, or force, is a correlate of the 
substantial phase, which presents both forms, space and 
time. In the same way that thought and feeling are cor- 
relatives, the one being objective and fixed, and the other 
subjective and changeable; space and time prove correla- 
tives, the one being objective and fixed, and the other sub- 
jective and changeable. Thus the parallelism is complete, 
showing that the three fundamental phases of the real, 
force, space, and time, rest upon the three fundamental 
phases of consciousness, will, thought, and feeling; and 
since the latter are essential functions of all finite con- 
sciousness, the former are correlative phases of all objects 
of finite consciousness. Not that all such objects must as- 
sume the aspects of energy, or of space-form, or of time- 
form; but that they must, in entering into finite conscious- 
ness, become related in some waj T to force, to space, and 
to time. 



PART II. 

Cognition of the Ideal 



CHAPTER I. 
The Good, the Beautiful and the True. 

§1. The Good. 

(1 ) . Definition. — The good has already been referred to 
as the phase of the ideal not-self dependent upon motivity. 
This does not mean that it is not also a phase of the self; 
nor could it so mean, since the self and the not-self have been 
recognized as correlatives. But inasmuch as the good, 
the beautiful and the true, when objectified, become a not- 
self oppOvSed to the perceiving self, it is proper to define 
them as the ideal phases of the not-self in correlation to 
the fundamental phases of the conscious self, will, feeling, 
and thought respectively. 

Every object of consciousness involves change, change 
emphasizes the causal phase of the ideal, or volition, voli- 
tion implies motive, motives are good or evil; hence the 
perception of any object of consciousness may. if the at- 
tention be so directed, give rise to the cognition of the 
good. All people discriminate between good and evil mo- 
tives, howevermuch they may differ as to the nature of 
the distinction. This universal fact must rest upon a psy- 
chological basis that is universal; and, at the same time, 
the individual differences in the distinction, as made by 
different persons, show that such psychological basis must 
include individual as well as universal characteristics. A 
reference to the tabulation of deductive concepts on p. 54 
will show that such is the case, and that the distinction 
of the good, the beautiful and the true, from their oppo- 



THE GOOD, THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE TRUE. 153 

sites, the evil, the ugly and the false, does, in each case, 
rest upon such basis; also that the individual character- 
istics are most predominant in the case of the beautiful, 
and least in that of the true. From this it follows that 
the only universal distinction that can be made in regard 
to either the good, the beautiful or the true is a general 
one, which must be further defined b\ r each individual as he 
applies it to specific objects. 

The only definition of the good that has universal 
validit\r is, that motives are good in so far as the\ r subor- 
dinate the interests of the individual self to universal 
interests, and evil in so far as they subordinate universal 
interests to the interests of the individual self. When it is 
necessary to decide what particular acts meet the require- 
ments of the good, individual differences must appear; but 
since strictly individual differences can not be defined, a 
further definition would not be universally valid. But 
although the good cannot be further defined, it can be 
differentiated into tw r o correlative forms, the subjective or 
conscience, and the objective or duty. 

(2) . Conscience. — Conscience is the subjective feeling of 
obligation that arises in the cognition of the good as con- 
nected with one's own volition, and that impels one to act 
according^. This feeling cannot be educated in the strict 
sense of the term, but education can greatly develop it. 
Education deals with processes of thought ; but thoughts 
awaken corresponding feelings, hence a proper education 
w r ill strengthen conscience. Conscience thus exists in very 
different degrees of force. With some it is authoritative, 
with others it is only persuasive, and with still others it is 
merely impulsive. This last form of conscience is funda- 
mental and universal. All the finer types are evolutions 
from it. 

(3) . Duty is the definite conception of such volition as 
will result in good. In its general form, it is concisely ex- 
pressed in Kant's categorical imperative, "Act in con 
formity with that maxim, and that maxim only, which 
you can at the same time will to be a universal law. 1,1 



1 Watson's "Selections frotn Kant," p. 241. 



154 COGNITION OF THE IDEAL. 

In particular cases, dut\- must be denned from the stand- 
point of individual conditions, and such conditions con- 
tinually vary. A great evil frequently resulting from 
stereotyped definitions and rules of duty is the reduction 
of conduct to mere formalism. A similar evil comes from 
an injudicious bestowal of rewards and punishments, 
which cheat the one on whom they are bestowed out of 
the natural fruit of goodness of character. Goodness con- 
sists in a sacrifice of individual interests to universal in- 
terests, not in a sacrifice of one individual interest to 
another. The reward of fidelitv to dutv is strength of 
character, which gives both subjective satisfaction and 
objective advantages. Any artificial reward is a species 
of wages, which transfers conduct from the sphere of duty 
to that of hired service. But, on the other hand, duty 
does not consist in a mere sacrifice of one's wishes to the 
wishes of another, unless such sacrifice promotes universal 
interests; and no universal rule for determining what will 
promote general welfare can be given. 

(4). Mental Functions. — The most prominent of the 
mental functions in the cognition of the good is will in its 
objective form, volition. Feeling is emphasized in its sub- 
jective form in conscience; and intellection lays special em- 
phasis upon the categories of self and not-self, individual- 
ity and universality, cause and effect, and activity and 
passivity. These categories are all involved in ever}- act 
of duty, for every such act requires the individual self to 
do or to suffer in order to promote the universal interests 
of both the self and the not-self. 

^ 2. The Beautiful. 

(1) . Definition. — Beauty is that quality of all objects of 
consciousness the cognition of which is conducive to uni- 
versal pleasure. At first thought, this definition may seem 
too broad, since there are connected with universal pleas- 
ure certain feelings that seem to pertain solely to the lower 
animal nature. The contemplation of animal or physical 
comfort is usually regarded as the opposite ot the con- 
templation of representations of the beautiful; but when this 



THE GOOD, THE DEAUTIFUL AND THE TRUE. 155 

comfort is conducive to universal pleasure, its representa- 
tion and contemplation involve the cognition of the 
beautiful. Many rare works of art, both of painting and 
of poetr\ r , picture to the aesthetic imagination the enjoy- 
ment of just such comfort; and the only requirement of 
such productions is^jthat they represent this comfort as 
being conducive to universal pleasure. It is a great 
stroke of genius to represent m suggestive imagery pleas- 
ures of this kind, which have become sacred to the memory 
through cherished associations. Another apparent criti- 
cism upon the definition of beauty given above is that in 
many works of art pronounced beautiful, there is much 
that is conducive to universal pain. In all such works of 
art, if there were not other elements that were still more 
conducive to universal pleasure, they would cease to be 
works of art and become relics of barbarism. The only dis- 
tinction between works of art and such relics of barbarism 
is the test found in the definition of the beautiful given 
above. So long as they are universalkv pleasing, they are 
works of art ; when a different culture renders them repul- 
sive, they become relics of barbarism. Every finite work 
of art thus contains the ugly as well as the beautiful. 

The elements of goodness and truth form essential ele- 
ments of the beautiful. When a work of art represents 
bravery and self-sacrifice, although it must be conducive 
to pain in every beholder, still it yields a pure t3'pe of 
pleasure that is universal. Evidences of design, also, yield 
an exquisite pleasure to all admirers of nature, to devotees 
of science as well as of art. In the beautiful as well as in 
the good, there are two forms, the subjective, or aesthetic 
taste, and the objective, or art. 

(2). Aesthetic Taste. — This bears the same relation to 
art that conscience does to duty. It rests upon the 
sensibility, it is the ideal factor, the element that impels to 
expression. Aesthetic taste is a birth-right ; no amount of 
experience or culture could originate it. Education may 
develop it, just as it does conscience, but the capacit\- 
must be inborn ; and the most exquisite forms of it, repre- 
sented by the finest art, are but evolutions from the 



156 COGNITION OF THE IDEAL. 

primordial germ that finds expression in the tattooing or 
the war-paint of the savage. 

(3). Art. — Art is the objective realization of the beauti- 
ful. It is the embodiment of the beautiful in concrete ob- 
jects which conform to universal laws of aesthetic taste. 
It is a philosophical classification that distinguishes be- 
tween fine arts and useful arts; but the distinction rests, as 
will be seen later, upon the relative freedom with which all 
qualitative changes in the sensations of the different senses 
can be voluntarily controlled, rather than upon lack of util- 
ity, on the one hand, or the absence of beaut}-, on the other. 
The subject-matter of many gems of fine art is the repre- 
sentation of certain forms of the useful arts; and, on the 
contrary, many products of the useful arts involve a com- 
bination of fine arts. To the true artist, there is beauty 
in every product of honest toil. If there were no beauty 
in the real facts when 

"The mug of cider simmered low, 
The apples sputtered in a row,*' 

then there would be no beauty in " Snow Bound." The 
chief beauty, both in the real facts and in the artistic rep- 
resentation of them, lies in the cherished associations of 
memory; and the commemoration of these associations 
is the great object of fine art. To accomplish this the 
artist struggles for that freedom of expression which is 
found only in connection with the associations of sight and 
hearing. In both of these senses there are general rules 
for the synthesis of individual elements into universal uni- 
ties, giving symmetry of form and harmony of sounds 
and colors. The fine arts representing the associations of 
sight are architecture, sculpture, and painting; those 
representing the associations of hearing are music, poetry 
and orator\ r . But in all these arts, where freedom of 
expression and general rules for order are found, there re- 
main many individual variations subject to no law 
except that they must be universally pleasing. Invariable 
symmetry and constant harmony become tiresome. Some 
of the finest effects of music, as for example, the minor 
key, come from blending sounds whose wave lengths inter- 



THE GOOD, THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE TRUE. 157 

fere. The ideal element is always prominent in art. It is 
that which brings reality in all its freshness directly to 
consciousness. As in the good so in the beautiful, the ideal 
and the real elements are not only essential, but cor- 
relative. 

(4). Mental Functions. — In a comparison of the men- 
tal functions involved in the cognition of the beautiful, 
the will appears least prominent. It enters only indi- 
rectly. The attention is always invoked in the cognitive 
process, and in addition to this, volition becomes an indi- 
rect factor in the subject-matter of all representations of 
moral action. 

Feeling, both subjective and objective, appears most 
prominent, the former in aesthetic taste, and the latter in 
the subject-matter of all works of art. Subjective feelings 
might be classified as sensational, moral and intellectual, 
according as they arise principally from sensation, or from 
the contemplation of motives or of designs. Objective 
feelings might be classified as emotional, including audi- 
tory and visual sensations, and as sensual, including all 
other sensations. 

Intellection appears in all rules for symmetry, rhythm, 
and harmony. 

§3. The True. 

(1). Definition. — The true is cognized when any object 
of consciousness discloses a system of relations which 
synthesizes individual data in one universal whole. In 
so far as finite cognition represents all individual data as 
harmonized in one all-inclusive sj^stem of relations, it is 
true; but in so far as it fails to do so and represents them 
as in discord, it is false. 

In the real, individual data are synthesized and related 
to the conscious self in terms of force, space and time; but 
in the ideal, the self and the not-self are synthesized in an 
order of relations which harmonize individual character- 
istics in universal concord, and which correlates all finite 
selves in an infinite self. 

(2). Judgment. — The subjective form of the true, or 



158 COGNITION OF THE IDEAL. 

judgment, is the consciousness of individual data as sub- 
sumed by means of an all-inclusive system of relations in 
one harmonious whole. In the real the judgment deals 
with questions of fact; in the ideal, with questions of 
right, or fitness. The judgment is the facult\ T which, in 
the fullest sense of the term, can be educated; 3'et it can 
not be created by education. It must exist before there 
can be anythmg to educate. Its psychological basis, 
which is the consciousness of unity in plurality, is univer- 
sal. 

(3). Plan. — The objective form of the true, or plan, in 
the real, rests on universal processes of thought expressed 
in relations of force, space, and time. In the ideal, plan 
involves universal processes of thought, but its distinctive 
feature is its variability relative to each individual self in 
its correlation with the universal self, or relative to each 
finite self in its correlation with the infinite self. 

(4). Mental Functions. — In addition to attention, 
which is essential to all cognition, volition appears both 
in the purpose of the plan and in the self-subordination of 
the individual to the universal. 

Subjective feeling appears in the sense of harmony, ob- 
jective feeling in the sensations involved in the sense of 
harmony. 

Intellection lays special stress upon the categories of 
self and not-self, individuality and universality, cause and 
effect, activit3 r and passivity, and the absolute and the re- 
lative. These categories, of course, are not at first con- 
sciously present, that is, are not objectified under the at- 
tention in the cognition of the true; but they unconsciously 
dominate the cognitive processes from the beginning, and 
when this process is developed and made an object of at- 
tention, their nature and function become manifest. Es- 
pecially is this the case with the category of the absolute 
and the relative, which underlies the distinction between 
the real and the ideal. As in the cognition of the real, so 
in that of the ideal, both the absolute and the relative are 
essential factors; but while in the cognition of the real the 
former is emphasized, in the cognition of the ideal, on the 



THE GOOD, THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE TRUE. 159 

other hand, the latter is emphasized. Thus the laws ac- 
cording to which all relations of force, space and time are 
synthesized are universal, unchangeable, absolute; but the 
laws according to which all relations of goodness, beauty 
and truth are S3'nthesized must vary in relation to each 
individual. This places the two spheres in contrast, as the 
absolute and the relative, or, the real and the ideal. But 
since the contrast, not only between the absolute and the 
relative, but between the antithetic terms of each cate- 
gory, is strictly correlative; so must the contrast between 
the real and the ideal be correlative. In uniting these cor- 
relative aspects of consciousness, cognition is compelled to 
contemplate that which transcends all finite limitations, 
and which, since it must appear to finite cognition both 
as real, and as ideal, may be appropriately termed the 
ideal-real. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE IDEAL-REAL. 

§1. Definition. — The ideal-real " that' shall satisfy the 
facts and truths to which both Realism and Idealism 
appeal " is the infinite consciousness which, as a correlate 
of finite, changeable consciousness, is not subject to 
change. In so far as the self changes in accordance with 
invariable laws, it is a universal self; in so far as it 
changes in accordance with no law but its own, it is an in- 
dividual self; in so far as it changes at all, it is a finite self; 
but in so far as it does not change at all, it is an infinite 
self. Since change and identity' are a priori correlates 
characterizing finite consciousness, every conscious self is 
both finite and infinite; also, the finite self is both indi- 
vidual and universal. The contrast between the finite 
self and the infinite self is thus a contrast, not between a 
self and a not-self, but between a limited self and an un- 
limited self. The finite self exists in the infinite self. There 
is no individual self incommunicable to the infinite self, 
since the finite self is known only to and through the 
infinite self. In the infinite self, conscience, aesthetic taste 
and the sense of right have absolute authority ; change 
and its limitations of force, space and time are here trans- 
cended; and goodness, beauty and truth are eternal. 

$2. Mental Functions.— In passing from finitude to 
infinitude, the limitations of finite thought must neces- 
sarily be reflected in all possible representations of the in- 
finite ; hence all a priori categories applied to the infinite 
must be subject to the law of mutual limitation. The cat- 
egory of substantiality represents the infinite self as 
unchangeable; and that of casuality, as an agent acting 
in time and space. The difficulty here is that the a priori cat- 
egories come into conflict when finitude attempts to compre- 
hend infinitude. The only rational procedure is to recognize 
the source of the conflict as Ivins: in the limitations of finite 



THE IDEAL-REAL. 161 

cognition, and to realize that the only way in which a 
unity can appear to such cognition is through pairs of 
correlative aspects. In the same way that the conflicting as- 
pects of the finite self are harmonized in a synthesis of 
correlative opposites, so must the conflicting aspects of 
the infinite self be correlated ; and just as the synthesis is 
subject to the law of mutual limitation governing the ap- 
plication of the a priori categories to the finite self, so also 
must it be in their application to the infinite self. The ap- 
parent conflict lies, not in the nature of the infinite, but in 
the limitations of finite cognition, which reflects its own 
limitations on all its objects. 

From the stand-point of the will, the cosmological argu- 
ment has represented the infinite as the first cause; and 
from the same stand-point, Christian theology holds to 
the incarnation of the Word. 

From the stand-point of feeling, the faith argument has 
represented the infinite as revealed through a direct intui- 
tion of feeling; and from the same stand-point, Christian 
theology holds to the individual manifestation of the 
Holy Spirit as a personal Comforter. 

From the stand-point of intellection, the teleological 
argument has represented the infinite as the designer of 
the universe; and from the same stand-point, Christian 
theology holds to the omniscience of the Father Almighty. 

Each of these representations, like the psychological 
function on which it rests, if taken separately, reduces 
to a mere abstraction; but if taken in correlation, the 
three representations lead to a concrete intuition of the in- 
finite. This trinity, then, instead of being three separate 
beings, is the finite representation of the three correlative 
phases of the one Being which, in comprehending the indi- 
viduality of every finite self, is ideal; in being ab- 
solute and unchangeable, is real ; and in being thus 
both ideal and real, is infinite, the infinite Self. And 
since every finite self is a correlate of this infinite self, it is 
necessarily finite, not as an individual, isolated in space 
and time, but as an eternal element in the concrete being 
of the " Ideal-Real.' ' 



162 SUBJECT-INDEX. 

Attention:— Continuous, 79; Def., 80-82; Functions, 130, 

147, 157, 158. 

Categories; — Aristotle's, 15; Classification, 52; Correla- 
tive Nature, 18, 43; Deduction, 44; Def., 18, 43; Func- 
tions, 92, 99, 103, 132; List, 47. 

Concepts:— 52. 

Feeling:— Def., 80, 82; Functions, 130, 148, 154, 157, 
158, 161. 

Force:— 100, 102. 

Genealogical Tree: — 53; A Priori, 54; Empirical, 55. 

Intellect:— 11, 12, 82. 

Intellection:— Analysis, 12. 14, 43; Def., 14, 80, 82; 
Functions;— 132, 148, 154, 157, 158, 161. 

Laws of Thought:— Contradiction, 15, 21, 56; Correla- 
tion, 16, 21, 56; Mutual Limitation, 16, 21, 56. 

Local Signs;— 28, 112, 124; 128, 132. 

Matter:— 99; 100, 101. 

Metaphysics; — Assumptions, 94; Basis, 99. 

Mind:— 99; 100, 101. 

Principles of Knowledge:— Correlativity, 18, 21, 57, 
Relativity, 19, 21, 56. 

Psycho-Physical Law: — 85. 

Sensation: — As a Correlative Aspect, — 3S, 74; As Form- 
less Matter, 33, 68; As Incipient Perception, 29, 64: 
As Sense-Perception, 22, 59; As Ultimate Units of 
Consciousness, 34, 68; Def.; 11, 80,82; Functions; 130, 

148, 157; Kinds, 87. 
Sense:— 11, 12, 82. 

Space:— Ideal, 135; Theories, 104; A Priori Synthetic, 
105, 116, 127; Associational, 105, 111, 123; Sensa- 
tional, 104, 105, 120. 
Sufficient Reason, Prin. of:— 17. 
The Beautiful:— 154. 
The Good:— 152. 

The Ideal:— Basis, 99; Def., 100; Divisions, 100. 
The Ideal-Real:— 160. 

The Real:— Basis, 99; Def., 100; Divisions, 100. 
The True:— 157. 
Thought:— Def., 80, S2; Forms, 80, 82, 



. « 

1 : U 



SUBJECT-IXDEX. 163 

Time:— Ideal, 149; Theories, 137; Process, 137, 144; Syn- 
thetic, 139, 146. 
k Volition:— Def., 80, 82; Functions, 130, 157. 

Will:— Def., 80; 82; Forms, 80, 82; Functions, 129, 147, 
161. 



DEC 1? 1900 



164 authorities cited. 

Aristotle, 11, 15, 44. 

Bain, 80. 

Berkeley, 7, 12, 23, 60, 63, 104, 105, 120. 

Bowne, 93, 140, 146. 

Descartes, 12, 16. 

Dewey, 13, 40, 77, 88. 

Fichte, 12, 29: 

Fick, 13, 36. 

Geulincx, 12, 16. 

Green; 7, 13, 38, 74. 

Hamilton, 7, 12, 26, 60, 70. 

Hegel, 12, 20, 21, 46, 58. 

Herbart, 12, 20, 21. 

Hobbes, 12, 22. 

Hoffding, 140, 146, 149. 

Hume, 12, 17, 22, 24, 43, 60, 66. 

James, 13, 30, 66, 85, 87, 105, 109, 121. 133. 

Kant, 18, 33, 43, 47, 53, 68, 105, 116, 122, 137, 146, 153. 

Ladd, 13, 41, 77, S4-5, 87, 89, 90, 122. 

Leibniz, 12, 17. 

Lewes, 13, 37, 72. 

Locke, 7, 12, 17, 22, 23, 43, 59. 

Lotze, 12, 2S, 62, 105, 111, 123. 

Malebranche, 12, 16. 

Mill, 7, 12, 27, 62, 63. 

Murray, 12, 29, 63. 

Nichols, 137. 

Parmenides, 11. 

Plato, 11, 14. 

Reid. 12, 25, 60. 

Reinhold, 13, 34, 6S, 

Schelling, 12, 19, 5S. 

Socrates, 14. 

Spencer, 7, 13, 35, 5S, 63, 71, 114, 125. 

Spinoza, 12, 16. 

Sully, 12, 29, 64. 

Volkmann, 113, 125. 

Ward, 7, 13, 30, 61, 65, 105, 10S, 120, 142, 147. 

Wundt, S7, 118, 12S. 




IITY 



DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 



SENSATION AND INTELLECTION 



Their Character and their Function 



IN THE 



Cognition of the Real and the Ideal 



A. THESIS 



Presented for the Degree of Ph. D. at 
The University of Minnesota 



By Henry Webb Brewster, A. B. 



18©J2 



MINNEAPOLIS 

THE UNIVERSITY OP MINNESOTA 

1893 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



It 

021 094 816 8 




l * 



^ 



